383 P.3d 977
Or. Ct. App.2016Background
- Defendant was subject to a Family Abuse Protection Act (FAPA) restraining order prohibiting contact and staying within 200 feet of her estranged husband, T.
- T told defendant he was at the courthouse and in the process of dismissing the FAPA order; defendant believed him and traveled with T and their son to the coast for Father’s Day weekend.
- While riding ATVs together, police discovered the restraining order still in effect; defendant was arrested on June 14. A judgment dismissing the FAPA order was entered June 19.
- Defendant was charged with contempt under ORS 33.015(2)(b) for willful disobedience of a court order; at trial the court explicitly credited defendant’s testimony that she believed the order had been dismissed, but nonetheless found her in contempt for failing to verify dismissal.
- On appeal, defendant argued the trial court’s finding of a good-faith belief precluded a willfulness finding; the state argued the issue was unpreserved and that failure to verify can support willfulness.
- The Court of Appeals reversed, holding legislative history establishes “willfully” under ORS 33.015(2) means intentional conduct with knowledge that the conduct was forbidden, so a good-faith belief that the order was dismissed negates willfulness.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court’s finding that defendant believed the order was dismissed is inconsistent with finding she acted "willfully" under ORS 33.015(2)(b) | The state: even if defendant believed dismissal, her failure to verify meant onus was on her and supports willfulness | Defendant: her contemporaneous, good-faith belief that the order was dismissed negates the knowledge element of "willfully" so contempt cannot be adjudicated | Reversed: legislative history defines "willfully" as intentional action with knowledge that conduct was forbidden; a good-faith belief that the order was dismissed negates that element and precludes contempt |
| Whether defendant forfeited the argument by failing to object after the court’s speaking verdict | State: defense failed to preserve the claim by not objecting after the court’s oral ruling | Defendant: argument was preserved by counsel’s closing argument that the credited facts would foreclose willfulness | Court: preserved—defense raised the legal argument in closing; further objection would not have served preservation policy |
| Proper statutory meaning of "willfully" in ORS 33.015(2) | State: court could apply Couey/other precedents to find willfulness based on voluntary noncompliance | Defendant: "willfully" must be understood per SB 376 legislative history to require intent plus knowledge that conduct was forbidden, so good-faith belief negates it | Held: legislative history controls—"willfully" means intentional and with knowledge that conduct was forbidden; Couey does not govern construction of ORS 33.015(2) here |
| Whether remand could cure any factual gaps | State: not urged to identify alternate basis | Defendant: credited factual finding leaves no alternative basis to sustain contempt | Court: no unresolved material factual issues that could support contempt on remand; reversal required |
Key Cases Cited
- State ex rel Mikkelsen v. Hill, 315 Or. 452 (discussing historical development of contempt and willfulness requirements)
- Couey v. Couey, 312 Or. 302 (Supreme Court formulation of contempt elements under prior statute)
- Rust v. Pratt, 157 Or. 505 (early articulation of "wilful disregard" standard)
- State ex rel Grover v. Grover, 158 Or. 635 (quoting Felton and discussing willfulness and bad intent)
- State v. Crombie, 267 Or. App. 705 (application of willfulness as conscious choice not to comply with a court order)
- State v. Barboe, 253 Or. App. 367 (remand required when factual issues on material elements remain)
- State v. Gaines, 346 Or. 160 (guidance on reliance and weight of legislative history)