State v. Nathan, 522 S.W.3d 881

Background

Ledale Nathan committed a home‑invasion robbery and murder at age 16 and was convicted on 26 counts (including first‑degree murder, multiple robberies, kidnappings, and armed criminal action).
At the original sentencing Nathan waived jury sentencing and received life without parole (LWOP) for murder plus multiple additional life and term‑of‑years sentences for nonhomicide offenses, many ordered consecutively.
On appeal this Court (Nathan I) remanded for resentencing under Miller v. Alabama because the sentencer had not considered Miller’s required youth‑related mitigation; the case was returned for jury sentencing on certain counts.
At resentencing the jury did not unanimously impose LWOP for murder, so the court entered a conviction for second‑degree murder and the jury recommended various sentences (including life for second‑degree murder and multiple long consecutive terms for other crimes).
Nathan argued (1) the State committed a Brady violation by withholding a police report about prior sexual abuse and (2) his aggregate consecutive sentences (including homicide and multiple nonhomicide terms) are the functional equivalent of LWOP and thus violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under Graham and Miller.
The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed: it found no Brady violation (Nathan knew of the report), and held Graham and Miller do not categorically prohibit constitutionally imposed consecutive sentences that in aggregate exceed life expectancy where the sentencing scheme and precedent do not clearly extend those cases to aggregate terms.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Nathan)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Brady disclosure	State suppressed a police report about Nathan’s sexual‑abuse history, vitiating his original waiver of jury sentencing	Nathan had disclosed the abuse to a caseworker and thus knew the information; no suppression by the State	Denied — Nathan had prior knowledge; no Brady violation
Applicability of Graham to aggregate sentences	Consecutive long terms (homicide + nonhomicide) are the functional equivalent of LWOP and violate Graham/Graham’s principle that juveniles must have meaningful opportunity for release	Graham is limited to juveniles sentenced to LWOP solely for nonhomicide offenses; it did not address cumulative effect of constitutionally imposed consecutive sentences	Denied — Graham’s categorical bar does not extend to this sentencing posture under current U.S. Supreme Court precedent
Applicability of Miller to aggregate sentences	Miller’s youth‑related individualized sentencing protections require that aggregate de‑facto LWOP sentences be treated like formal LWOP and invalid if no finding of irreparability	Miller applies only to mandatory LWOP schemes; once first‑degree LWOP was removed and Nathan was resentenced on second‑degree murder and other counts within statutory ranges, Miller does not bar consecutive lawful terms	Denied — Miller not violated because sentencer considered Miller factors; Miller does not clearly govern cumulative consecutive sentences here
Sentencer authority to run sentences consecutively	Consecutive sentencing defeated jury’s refusal to impose LWOP and thus nullified jury’s Miller/Graham determination	State and court maintained authority to impose consecutive sentences within statutory ranges after individualized consideration; multiple crimes can justify multiple punishments	Denied — sentencing court properly considered mitigators/aggravators and exercised statutory discretion to impose consecutive terms

Key Cases Cited

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (due process duty to disclose favorable, material evidence)
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (juveniles cannot be sentenced to LWOP for nonhomicide offenses)
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (mandatory LWOP for juveniles unconstitutional; sentencer must consider youth‑related factors)
Nathan v. State (Nathan I), 404 S.W.3d 253 (Mo. banc 2013) (Missouri guidance on Miller remand procedures)
Hart v. State, 404 S.W.3d 232 (Mo. banc 2013) (explaining sentencer’s Miller obligations)
Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding Graham did not clearly bar consecutive fixed‑term sentences totaling long terms under federal habeas analysis)
Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2013) (aggregate long term treated as de facto LWOP under Graham/Miller principles)
McKinley v. Butler, 809 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2016) (aggregate long consecutive terms can implicate Miller)
State v. Zuber, 152 A.3d 197 (N.J. 2017) (Graham/Miller principles applied to de facto LWOP aggregate sentences)
State v. Ramos, 387 P.3d 650 (Wash. 2017) (Miller protections apply to de facto LWOP aggregate sentences)