State v. Nathan, 2013 Mo. LEXIS 44

Background

Nathan, age 16 at the time, was found guilty of first-degree murder and 26 related counts (burglary, assault, robbery, kidnapping, and armed criminal action) in a home invasion resulting in Gina Stallis’s death and others injured.
Trial court sentenced Nathan to life without parole for murder, plus multiple consecutive terms for non-homicide offenses and armed criminal action; some counts were dismissed as outside juvenile court jurisdiction.
Certification proceedings under §211.071 focused on Nathan as a juvenile and whether the juvenile court relinquished exclusive jurisdiction to circuit court; eight charges involved victims Whitrock and Stallis.
The court later dismissed Whitrock-related counts for lack of jurisdiction but affirmed the Stallis-related counts; Nathan was remanded for re-sentencing consistent with Miller v. Alabama.
Nathan appealed challenging the certification framework and Miller-based resentencing; the court held Missouri’s certification statute constitutional and remanded for re-sentencing under Miller.
On remand, Nathan must be re-sentenced for first-degree murder with individualized consideration under Miller; if the state cannot justify life without parole, the court may reclassify to second-degree murder.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Validity of certification protocol and scope of relinquishment	Nathan argues certification tied to petition facts and Whitrock should have been dismissed.	State contends certification concerns the juvenile, not the petition specifics; relinquishment allows prosecution on appropriate charges.	Certification governs the juvenile, not the specific acts; Whitrock counts properly dismissed, Whitrock not properly certified; Stallis counts proper.
Constitutionality of Missouri’s certification scheme	Section 211.071 violates due process and double jeopardy by allowing relinquishment on unproven petition allegations.	Process requires no jury finding of actual conduct; Kent-based due process suffices; Apprendi concerns addressed on remand.	Certification procedure is constitutional; Apprendi concerns rejected; due process and double jeopardy concerns not mandating jury findings in certification.
Sufficiency of evidence on deliberation	Evidence insufficient to prove Nathan deliberated to cause Stallis’s death.	Evidence showed Nathan acted after deliberation, either as shooter or as aider/encourager; transferred intent applies.	Evidence was sufficient to prove deliberation under the verdict director whether Nathan fired or aided Coleman.
Plain error in premeditation instruction	Instruction 5 is vague about the ‘matter’ deliberated; could mislead the jury.	Instruction’s referent is clear; deliberation defined within the same sentence; no plain error.	Instruction not plain error; no basis to reverse on this ground.
Remand for Miller v. Alabama resentencing	Life without parole for a juvenile is permissible only with individualized Miller-based consideration.	Trial court sentenced per statute; Miller requires remand for individualized consideration.	Nathan must be re-sentenced for first-degree murder on remand under Miller’s individualized consideration framework; if not justified, sentence may shift to second-degree murder.

Key Cases Cited

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Eighth Amendment prohibits mandatory life without parole for juveniles without individualized consideration)
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (due process and fair treatment in juvenile transfer proceedings)
Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (double jeopardy concerns in certification transfer)
State v. Andrews, 329 S.W.3d 369 (Mo. Banc 2010) (certification procedures and Apprendi considerations post-Kent)
State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232 (Mo. 2013) (Miller framework applied to remand timing and sentencing under Miller)
Coney v. State, 491 S.W.2d 501 (Mo.1973) (constitutional review of certification decisions; non-detailed findings permissible)
State v. Gray, 887 S.W.2d 369 (Mo. Banc 1994) (circumstances for inferred deliberation in accomplice-deliberation cases)
State v. Turner, 623 S.W.2d 4 (Mo. Banc 1981) (deliberation and use of deadly weapon by accomplice)
State v. Lindsey, 507 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. Banc 1974) (deliberation where accomplice continues after threats)
State v. Couch, 256 S.W.3d 64 (Mo. Banc 2008) (limitations on collateral impeachment evidence)