State v. Murray, 2017 Ohio 949

Background

Murray was indicted on four counts of aggravated trafficking in oxycodone (three counts for selling/offering to sell; one count for preparing for shipment) and juvenile-specifications on three counts; he pled not guilty.
Three controlled buys were conducted using confidential informant C.B.; buys yielded 98, 83, and 100 pills of oxycodone respectively; surveillance, recordings, and agent testimony tied Murray to the transactions (including arranging or directly calling for sales).
Police executed a search of Murray’s home and recovered a pill bottle with 114 oxycodone pills and three firearms; one count was reduced at trial to aggravated possession.
Defense presented witnesses about Murray’s disturbed state after his mother’s death and attempted to elicit mental-state evidence; the trial court limited presentation of an insanity/intoxication defense.
Jury convicted Murray on Counts 1–3 (aggravated trafficking) and on aggravated possession as a lesser-included for Count 4; trial court imposed an aggregate eight-year sentence and $32,500 fine.
On appeal Murray raised four assignments: evidentiary error (hearsay/recordings), insufficiency of evidence, manifest-weight challenge, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1. Admissibility of recorded telephone calls (Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(e))	Recordings were admissible as co-conspirator statements because independent proof (agent testimony, surveillance, role of middleman) raised an inference of conspiracy.	Recordings were hearsay; state failed to present independent proof of a conspiracy involving Murray, Guy, and C.B.	Court: admissible — agent testimony and other evidence provided independent proof sufficient to infer a conspiracy, so recordings could be admitted.
2. Sufficiency of evidence for Count 1 (aggravated trafficking)	State showed Murray’s role in the first buy via recording and testimony (he arranged sale and had son deliver pills).	Because Murray was not physically present at the first buy and no forensic linkage existed, evidence was insufficient.	Court: sufficient — recordings and testimony established Murray’s participation and supported the trafficking conviction.
3. Sufficiency & manifest-weight of juvenile specification for Count 3	State argued C.B.’s testimony about "teenage kids" provided sufficient contextual evidence that juveniles were present.	Defendant argued “teenage” could include 18–19 year olds and testimony was too vague to prove presence of juveniles.	Court: upheld — context and testimony supported a reasonable inference juveniles were present; verdicts were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
4. Ineffective assistance of counsel	State: counsel’s tactical choices did not prejudice outcome; strong presumption of reasonable representation.	Murray: counsel pursued an improper insanity/intoxication theory after court warnings and elicited character evidence that opened the door to harmful cross-examination.	Court: denied — even if counsel’s performance was imperfect, Murray failed to show Strickland prejudice; result would not likely have differed.

Key Cases Cited

Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217 (Ohio 1983) (abuse-of-discretion standard for appellate review of trial court rulings)
State v. Skatzes, 104 Ohio St.3d 195 (Ohio 2004) (co-conspirator statement admissibility under Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(e) requires independent proof of conspiracy)
State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545 (Ohio 1995) (prima facie showing of conspiracy required before admitting co-conspirator statements)
State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380 (Ohio 1997) (sufficiency versus manifest-weight standards)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 (Ohio 1967) (credibility and weight of testimony are for the trier of fact)
United States v. Henley, 360 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2004) (drug-distribution ‘chain’ conspiracies support inference of agreement)