State v. Muhammad Sarfraz, 851 N.W.2d 235

Defendant Muhammad Sarfraz was convicted of second‑degree sexual assault after an incident on May 15, 2010 in which the complainant, I.N., was injured and sexual intercourse occurred; forensic evidence (semen, knife with blood/DNA) and injuries supported the State's case.
Sarfraz's theory was that the sexual contact was consensual and that he and I.N. previously had a romantic/sexual relationship limited to mutual masturbation (no prior intercourse); he sought to admit testimony to that effect.
The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing and found the proffered prior sexual conduct occurred but excluded detailed testimony under Wisconsin's rape‑shield statute, concluding the prior acts were not material and were unduly prejudicial.
The court of appeals reversed, holding the excluded evidence was material to consent and its probative value outweighed prejudice, and ordered a new trial.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court granted review and held the trial court erred only on the materiality prong but properly excluded the evidence under the third DeSantis balancing prong because the prior conduct (mutual masturbation) was dissimilar and of limited probative value compared to the violent, forcible intercourse alleged.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Sarfraz)	Held
Whether proffered evidence of prior sexual conduct between defendant and complainant was admissible under Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b)1 (rape‑shield exception for past conduct with defendant)	Exclude: prior mutual masturbation is remote/dissimilar and unduly prejudicial under DeSantis balancing	Admit: prior sexual conduct is material to consent, credibility, and explains entry/interaction; falls within § 972.11 exception	The trial court correctly excluded the evidence: court erred in finding it immaterial but the probative value did not outweigh prejudice under the third DeSantis prong; exclusion affirmed on that basis
Whether exclusion violated defendant's constitutional rights to present a defense and confront witnesses	No constitutional violation because excluded evidence was low probative value and highly prejudicial under the rape‑shield framework	Exclusion deprived Sarfraz of his rights to present a defense and confront witnesses by preventing evidence relevant to consent and credibility	No constitutional violation: rights do not guarantee admission of evidence that is irrelevant or whose prejudice substantially outweighs probative value; rape‑shield statutory balancing controls

State v. DeSantis, 155 Wis. 2d 774 (1990) (three‑part test for admitting complainant's past sexual conduct: relation to defendant, materiality, and probative value vs. prejudicial nature)
State v. Jackson, 216 Wis. 2d 646 (1998) (application of rape‑shield exceptions and § 971.31(11) inverted balancing presumption against admissibility)
State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633 (1990) (limits on admissibility of complainant's sexual history and constitutional context)
State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768 (1998) (definition of "material" as evidence probative of consequential facts)
State v. Ringer, 326 Wis. 2d 351 (2010) (standard for sufficiency of proffer that prior conduct occurred)
State v. Carter, 324 Wis. 2d 640 (2010) (legislative purpose of the rape‑shield statute; protection of complainants)
Holmes v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 259 (1977) (evidence need not directly prove an element to be consequential; may bear on other factors)
State v. Dunlap, 250 Wis. 2d 466 (2002) (context on rape‑shield rationale and prior sexual history relevance)