924 N.W.2d 434
N.D.2019Background
- On Sept. 8, 2017 an officer stopped at a red light observed Travis Morsette in the adjacent lane tapping his illuminated cell phone screen about ten times over ~2 seconds.
- The officer could not see the screen content and testified Morsette was manipulating the touchscreen; he initiated a traffic stop for violating N.D.C.C. § 39-08-23 (use of wireless communications device while driving).
- During the stop the officer investigated, Morsette was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia.
- Morsette moved to suppress evidence, arguing the officer lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion to effect the stop; the district court denied the motion.
- Morsette reserved the right to appeal the suppression ruling after pleading guilty; the Supreme Court reviewed the denial of the suppression motion.
- The Supreme Court reversed, concluding the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle and remanded to allow Morsette to withdraw his plea.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officer had reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop Morsette for violating the cell‑phone statute | Officer observed rapid tapping and screen illumination which made it reasonable to suspect a statutorily prohibited electronic message was being composed/read/sent | Tapping and screen illumination are consistent with many lawful phone uses; no particularized facts tied the conduct to a prohibited use | No—stop lacked reasonable suspicion; reversal and remand to allow withdrawal of plea |
| Whether an objectively reasonable mistake of fact or law could salvage the stop | State: under Heien an objectively reasonable mistake can supply reasonable suspicion | Officer had no articulable legal mistake and could not explain why the observed conduct was unlawful, so claim of reasonable mistake fails | No—no reasonable mistake of fact or law justified the stop |
| Whether decisions from other jurisdictions (e.g., Paniagua‑Garcia) preclude stops based on observed phone use | State: ND statute proscribes broader categories of electronic messages than Indiana’s statute, so observations may be more probative here | Defendant: Paniagua‑Garcia shows that visible phone use generally does not allow officers to distinguish lawful from unlawful uses | Court relied on the reasoning in Paniagua‑Garcia and found the State’s distinctions insufficient to justify the stop |
| Whether permitting stops on these facts would allow unreasonable, standardless discretion | State argued enforcement is permissible when facts reasonably indicate violation | Defendant warned that permitting such stops would authorize stopping a substantial portion of law‑abiding drivers | Court agreed with defendant that suspicion was too broad and would permit standardless stops; therefore disallowed the stop |
Key Cases Cited
- Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (an officer’s objectively reasonable mistake of fact or law can sometimes supply reasonable suspicion)
- Arizona v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) (reasonable‑suspicion inquiries require totality of the circumstances and allow inferences from commonsense judgments)
- U.S. v. Paniagua‑Garcia, 813 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2016) (observing visible cellphone use from a distance is insufficient to distinguish lawful from unlawful uses)
- State v. Hirschkorn, 2016 ND 117, 881 N.W.2d 244 (N.D.) (recognizing Heien and that reasonable mistakes may justify stops if objectively reasonable)
- State v. Wolfer, 2010 ND 63, 780 N.W.2d 650 (N.D.) (standard for reviewing district court suppression rulings and reasonable‑suspicion principle)