State v. Morrison
2018 Ohio 53
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2018Background
- Jerad Morrison pleaded guilty to one count of murder after the state dismissed a mandatory firearm specification as part of a plea agreement; the trial court accepted the plea and immediately conducted the Crim.R. 11 colloquy and sentencing.
- Morrison was sentenced to an indefinite term of 15 years to life imprisonment and was credited with 261 days time served.
- Morrison later learned from the Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections that, by statute, convicted murderers are ineligible for earned-credit days that would reduce the minimum portion of an indefinite sentence.
- Morrison filed a post-sentence pro se motion to vacate his sentence and withdraw his guilty plea, asserting (1) his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because he believed he could earn days off the minimum sentence, and (2) trial counsel was ineffective for not advising him about ineligibility for earned credit and the obligation to serve the full 15-year minimum.
- The trial court denied the motion; Morrison appealed pro se. The Seventh District affirmed, finding (a) the Crim.R. 11 colloquy and written plea adequately advised him of constitutional rights and maximum penalties, and (b) Morrison failed to show deficient performance or prejudice under Strickland.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Morrison’s guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because he was mistaken about eligibility for earned-credit days | State: Crim.R.11 colloquy and written plea complied with requirements; any reference to earned credit in the later entry did not affect the plea | Morrison: He believed he could earn days off the minimum and that belief rendered the plea invalid | Held: Overruled — court found strict compliance with constitutional advisals; written plea and colloquy informed him of maximum penalties and mandatory prison; post-sentence entry’s mention of earned credit did not vitiate plea |
| Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to advise Morrison about ineligibility for earned-credit and serving the full 15-year minimum | State: Counsel secured dismissal of firearm spec and explained charges and penalties; record shows Morrison conferred with counsel and declined further explanation | Morrison: Counsel failed to correct his belief about earned credit and the need to serve the full minimum, causing prejudice | Held: Overruled — Morrison failed to produce operative facts showing counsel’s performance fell below objective standard or that he was prejudiced under Strickland |
Key Cases Cited
- Smith v. State, 49 Ohio St.3d 261 (Ohio 1990) (standards for demonstrating manifest injustice to permit post‑sentence plea withdrawal)
- Caraballo v. State, 17 Ohio St.3d 66 (Ohio 1985) (appellate standard: review plea-withdrawal denial for abuse of discretion)
- Herring v. State, 94 Ohio St.3d 246 (Ohio 2002) (definition of abuse of discretion)
- Stewart v. State, 51 Ohio St.2d 86 (Ohio 1977) (Crim.R.11 federal vs. nonfederal advisals; knowledge of minimum not constitutionally required)
- Jackson v. State, 64 Ohio St.2d 107 (Ohio 1980) (postconviction: petitioner must present operative facts showing lack of competent counsel and prejudice)
- Sanders v. State, 94 Ohio St.3d 150 (Ohio 2002) (Strickland framework applied in Ohio; deference to counsel’s strategic decisions)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)