State v. Morales, 160 A.3d 383

Background

Defendant Angel Morales attended a nightclub altercation in Hartford culminating in a parking‑lot fight where a handgun was involved; Morales shot Miguel Delgado, who later died. Morales fled and discarded the gun.\
Charged by long‑form information with murder (and related manslaughter counts) and criminal possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. He admitted he shot the victim but claimed accidental discharge and self‑defense.\
Jury acquitted Morales of murder, convicted him of the lesser included intentional manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm and of criminal possession; one manslaughter verdict was vacated on double jeopardy grounds.\
Morales moved pretrial to bifurcate (separate proof of the prior‑felony element) or to sever the criminal possession count from the homicide counts; the court denied both requests.\
At trial the state introduced a stipulation that Morales had previously been convicted of a felony (no details). The court instructed the jury on limits to use that stipulation, on combat‑by‑agreement as an exception to self‑defense, and refused Morales’s requested necessity instruction on the possession charge.\
Morales appealed, arguing (1) denial of bifurcation/severance was prejudicial; (2) the combat‑by‑agreement instruction was unwarranted; and (3) the court should have instructed on the common‑law necessity defense to criminal possession. The court affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Morales)	Held
Whether trial court abused discretion by denying bifurcation of criminal‑possession elements	Bifurcation unnecessary because possession + prior‑felony element must be tried together under § 53a‑217; separate pleading of prior conviction would be meaningless.	Bifurcation necessary to avoid prejudice from proof of prior felony (which might force defendant to testify or be unfairly prejudiced on homicide counts).	Denial affirmed — elements cannot be usefully bifurcated; information must allege both elements together (State v. Banta).
Whether trial court abused discretion by refusing severance of criminal possession from homicide counts	Joinder appropriate; prior‑felony was shown by brief stipulation with limiting instructions, minimizing prejudice.	Joinder was prejudicial because proof of prior felony could unfairly influence jury on homicide counts; severance or separate trials needed.	Denial affirmed — applying Banta factors (manner of proof, limiting instruction, prosecutor use, inflammability, strength of evidence) court found no substantial injustice from joinder.
Whether combat‑by‑agreement instruction was improper (no evidence of mutual combat)	Instruction appropriate because facts allowed reasonable inference of tacit agreement to engage in combat (presence, waiting, not leaving, participating).	No evidence defendant agreed to mutual combat; instruction should not have been submitted.	Affirmed — sufficient evidence to infer tacit agreement; instruction properly adapted to the facts and law (§ 53a‑19(c)(3)).
Whether court erred by refusing necessity instruction on criminal possession	Necessity not available because defendant had lawful alternatives when gun fell (leave, call police, warn others); defendant failed to make threshold offer of proof on necessity elements.	Necessity applied because defendant acted to prevent imminent harm by obtaining control of a gun during a violent altercation.	Affirmed — necessity is narrow common‑law defense; defendant failed to show no legal alternative, so court properly refused the instruction.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Banta, 15 Conn. App. 161 (1988) (elements of convicted‑felon firearm offense cannot be usefully bifurcated)
State v. Jones, 234 Conn. 324 (1995) (severance standard: trial court discretion; severance only if joint trial substantially prejudices defendant)
State v. O’Bryan, 318 Conn. 621 (2015) (combat‑by‑agreement may be tacit; instruction warranted when evidence supports inference of mutual combat)
State v. Crenshaw, 313 Conn. 69 (2014) (trial court not required to give limiting instruction sua sponte)
State v. Willoughby, 153 Conn. App. 611 (2014) (no contemporaneous limiting instruction required)
State v. Johnson, 53 Conn. App. 476 (1999) (review of sufficiency to support an instruction; view evidence favorably to upholding instruction)
State v. Marsala, 59 Conn. App. 135 (2000) (elements for common‑law necessity defense: no legal alternative, imminent harm, causal relation)
State v. Wright, 106 Conn. App. 295 (2008) (discussing standards for necessity instructions)
State v. Thompson, 81 Conn. App. 264 (2004) (prior conviction stipulation is an element of criminal possession)
State v. Hampton, 293 Conn. 435 (2009) (jury instructions reviewed in context of entire charge for possible misleading)
State v. Jamison, 320 Conn. 589 (2016) (presumption that jury follows limiting instructions)
State v. Singleton, 292 Conn. 734 (2009) (defendant’s right to present defenses; standards for reviewing omitted instructions)
State v. Drummy, 18 Conn. App. 303 (1989) (necessity has no statutory basis in Connecticut; narrow common‑law availability)
Perez v. Cumba, 138 Conn. App. 351 (2012) (trial court duty to adapt instructions to issues presented)