State v. Moore, 318 P.3d 1133

Background

Defendant drove on Highway 101, collided head‑on, injured himself and killed an occupant of the other vehicle; trooper Farrar suspected DUII.
At the hospital, after Miranda warnings, Farrar read the statutory implied‑consent form (ORS 813.130) and asked for blood and urine; defendant orally consented and samples showed controlled substances.
Defendant moved to suppress the chemical‑test results, arguing no exigent circumstances and that consent was involuntary because it followed the implied‑consent warnings. Trial court suppressed the results, relying on Court of Appeals’ Machuca I holding that the warnings are coercive.
The Court of Appeals affirmed; the state petitioned to the Oregon Supreme Court. The state did not contest the trial court’s finding that exigent circumstances were not shown.
The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed whether reading the statutory warnings rendered consent involuntary under Article I, §9 of the Oregon Constitution and whether the Court of Appeals’ precedent bindingly required suppression.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Moore's Argument	Held
Whether consent was coerced by reading ORS 813.130 warnings	Accurate statement of lawful consequences is not coercive; consent was voluntary	The warnings (including that refusal “may be offered against you”) coerced consent	Consent was voluntary; reading the warnings did not unconstitutionally coerce consent
Whether Court of Appeals’ Machuca I rule that implied‑consent warnings are inherently coercive controls	Machuca I was wrongly decided; Newton plurality not binding; prior authority supports that lawful warnings ordinarily aren’t coercive	Relied on Machuca I to argue consent involuntary	Newton plurality not controlling; Machuca I’s coercion analysis rejected
Whether warning that refusal “may be offered against you” rendered consent involuntary because use in criminal trial may be unconstitutional	The officer’s wording was conditional and accurate; refusals can be used in noncriminal proceedings; court may assume ORS 813.310 could raise constitutional issues but not decide them here	Argued ORS 813.310 (use of refusal in criminal cases) makes the warning coercive	Court assumed arguendo some uses might be unconstitutional but held the specific wording (“may be offered”) was not coercive and accurately described lawful consequences
Whether exigent‑circumstances or implied consent justified warrantless seizure	State did not press exigency here; alternatively argued statutory "deemed consent" when driving	Trial court found no exigency and suppressed on voluntariness ground	Court did not decide implied‑consent statutory question or Fourth Amendment exigency (state didn’t press); reversal based on voluntariness ruling — suppression was error

Key Cases Cited

State v. Machuca, 231 Or App 232 (Or. Ct. App.) (Court of Appeals decision treating implied‑consent warnings as coercive)
State v. Machuca, 347 Or 644 (Or. 2010) (Oregon Supreme Court reversing on exigency grounds; declined to decide voluntariness issue)
State v. Newton, 291 Or 788 (Or. 1981) (plurality statement that consent after threat of substantial penalty is not free)
State v. Hirsch, 267 Or 613 (Or. 1974) (officer’s accurate statement of lawful adverse consequences ordinarily not constitutionally coercive)
State v. Wolfe, 295 Or 567 (Or. 1982) (totality‑of‑circumstances test for voluntariness)
State v. Parker, 317 Or 225 (Or. 1993) (voluntariness is legal question on appeal; trial‑court fact findings binding if supported)
State v. Douglas, 260 Or 60 (Or. 1971) (discussion of whether threat to obtain warrant coerces consent)
State v. Williamson, 307 Or 621 (Or. 1989) (discussion on officer statements about seeking warrants and voluntariness)
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (U.S. 2013) (Fourth Amendment exigency must be assessed case‑by‑case; no per se rule for blood draws)