State v. Moody, 1307020184

In July 2013 a Wilmington police officer observed Robert Moody bicycling with a noticeable bulge at his right rear waistline in a high‑crime area late at night; Moody made a “security check,” fled down an alley, and a .357 Magnum with live rounds was later found on a nearby roof.
Moody was tried and convicted by a jury of Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon (CCDW), Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (PFBPP), and Possession of Ammunition by a Person Prohibited (PABPP).
Trial counsel stipulated Moody was a “person prohibited” rather than putting the prior felony before the jury; counsel also did not move to suppress the firearm.
Moody sought postconviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel for (1) stipulating to prohibited‑person status and (2) failing to move to suppress the gun as the fruit of an illegal stop.
The State defended counsel’s choices as reasonable trial strategy and argued any suppression motion would have failed because the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Moody.
The Superior Court denied the motion, finding counsel’s decisions were strategic, not objectively unreasonable, and that Moody suffered no Strickland prejudice; it also held the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Moody.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Moody)	Held
Whether trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating Moody was a person prohibited (versus severing or introducing prior conviction evidence)	Stipulation was sound strategy to avoid exposing prior felony to the jury and minimized prejudice from joinder	Stipulation allowed the jury to infer propensity and made conviction on PFBPP and CCDW more likely; counsel should have moved to sever	Counsel's stipulation was a reasonable strategic choice; severance likely would not have been granted; no Strickland prejudice found — claim denied
Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress the gun as the product of an unlawful stop	Officer had reasonable and articulable suspicion (bulge, security check, wrong way on one‑way street, high‑crime area, flight); suppression motion would have failed, so no prejudice	Officer lacked sufficient reasonable suspicion; the stop was unlawful and evidence should have been suppressed	Court found stop supported under totality of circumstances; suppression motion would have been denied; counsel not ineffective and no prejudice — claim denied

Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668 (ineffective assistance standard: deficient performance and prejudice)
Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736 (Del. 1990) (presumption of reasonable professional assistance)
Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856 (Del. 1999) (presence in high‑crime area alone may be insufficient for reasonable suspicion)
Dale v. State, 155 A.3d 833 (Del. 2017) (joinder/severance analysis for Person Prohibited charges)