State v. Monafo
33,639
| N.M. Ct. App. | Jul 5, 2016Background
- On July 1, 2011 Deputy Seely stopped John Monafo for a traffic violation while he was towing a van; Seely released him and began to leave the scene.
- A bystander, Francisco Castro, told other officers at the scene that he owned the van and had not consented to its removal; Seely returned after receiving that information and re‑stopped Monafo shortly after release.
- Seely asked for a bill of lading/manifest for the van; Monafo produced a receipt book and opened it to the receipt for the van, which Seely inspected and ran a license check on.
- Seely then walked to the rear of the truck with other officers and, while still holding the receipt book, leafed through other receipts and discovered inconsistencies that led to Monafo’s arrest for unlawful taking of a motor vehicle.
- Monafo moved to suppress evidence from the second stop as fruit of the first illegal stop and to suppress the contents of the receipt book except the single van receipt; the district court denied suppression and Monafo entered a conditional plea preserving appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Monafo) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence from the second stop is inadmissible fruit of an earlier unconstitutional stop (attenuation) | The second stop was attenuated from the first because Seely released Monafo, Monafo began to leave, and Castro’s fortuitous arrival was an intervening circumstance. | The second stop flowed directly from the first illegal stop; no meaningful intervening event occurred, so subsequent evidence must be suppressed. | Court: Attenuation exists under both Fourth Amendment and state law — release and attempted departure (plus Castro’s arrival) created an intervening circumstance; no flagrant police misconduct. Evidence from the second stop generally admissible. |
| Whether Seely exceeded the scope of Monafo’s consent by searching the entire receipt book | Monafo gave the receipt book to Seely without qualifying his consent, so Seely could examine it. | Consent was limited to the single receipt for the van that Monafo opened and handed to Seely; flipping through other receipts exceeded that consent. | Court: Consent was limited to the specific receipt for the van; examining other entries impermissibly exceeded scope. Suppress contents of receipt book except the van receipt. |
| Whether the van qualified as a “vehicle” or a “nonrepairable vehicle” under the Motor Vehicle Code (affecting the unlawful‑taking charge) | The State maintained the van could reasonably be found to be a vehicle under Code definitions. | Monafo argued the van was a nonrepairable vehicle and thus not within the statute's definition of vehicle/motor vehicle. | Court: Factual question for the jury; denial of pretrial dismissal affirmed because record could support either classification. |
Key Cases Cited
- Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (defines "fruit of the poisonous tree" and attenuation analysis)
- Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) (sets three‑factor attenuation test: temporal proximity, intervening circumstances, flagrancy of official misconduct)
- Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (police mistake of law may be reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes)
- United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973 (10th Cir. 1996) (acts such as telling a person he is free to leave can be an intervening circumstance)
- United States v. Simpson, 439 F.3d 490 (8th Cir. 2006) (discusses when misconduct is sufficiently flagrant for attenuation analysis)