State v. Miller
185 Wash. 2d 111
| Wash. | 2016Background
- Spencer Miller was convicted in 2002 of two counts of attempted first-degree murder and sentenced to consecutive 200‑month terms (400 months total) under RCW 9.94A.589(1)(b).
- Miller did not challenge his sentence on direct appeal; the conviction and sentence became final and the Court of Appeals affirmed in 2004.
- In 2011 (after Mulholland), Miller filed untimely CrR 7.8 personal restraint petitions arguing Mulholland represented a "significant change in the law" excusing the one‑year time bar in RCW 10.73.090(1) and requiring resentencing.
- The superior court granted relief and ordered resentencing; the Court of Appeals affirmed that order.
- The Washington Supreme Court granted review to decide whether Mulholland constitutes a significant change in the law for purposes of RCW 10.73.100(6).
- The majority held Mulholland does not qualify as a "significant change in the law" that overcomes the one‑year PRP time bar and vacated the resentencing order; a dissent argued Mulholland was a significant, retroactive clarification and that lenity favors Miller.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Mulholland is a "significant change in the law" under RCW 10.73.100(6) allowing an untimely collateral attack | Mulholland clarified that RCW 9.94A.589(1)(b) gives trial courts discretion to impose concurrent exceptional sentences for serious violent offenses; this change excuses the one‑year bar | Mulholland merely interpreted unsettled law and did not overturn prior controlling precedent; dispelling dicta is not a "significant change" | Mulholland is not a significant change in law for RCW 10.73.100(6) purposes; Miller's untimely petition is barred and resentencing order vacated |
| Whether an intervening decision must overturn prior precedent to be "significant" | Overruling precedent is not required; clarifying dicta that was relied on in practice can be significant | "Significant change" contemplates overturning prior appellate decisions that were determinative; cases that apply settled law to new facts or dispel dicta do not qualify | The court requires more than dispelling dicta or novel interpretation; the exemption applies when an intervening decision overturns prior determinative precedent |
| Whether counsel or practitioners’ long‑held understanding can make an interpretation "significant" | Longstanding practical reliance on the contrary view means the new interpretation materially changed the law | Change in lawyers’ or judges’ understanding does not equate to a legal change; the statute requires a change in the law itself | Practitioners’ misunderstanding does not satisfy the statutory requirement for a significant change |
| Whether Mulholland’s clarification should be applied retroactively to justify relief | Mulholland clarified judge discretion that existed but was unrecognized; retroactive application is appropriate to correct unlawful continued incarceration | Because Mulholland did not overturn prior precedent, it is not the kind of intervening case that triggers retroactive relief under RCW 10.73.100(6) | No retroactive relief: Mulholland does not qualify to overcome the one‑year bar, so relief is denied |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Pers. Restraint of Mulholland, 161 Wn.2d 322 (interpreting RCW 9.94A.589(1)(b) to allow concurrent exceptional sentences for serious violent offenses)
- In re Pers. Restraint of Tsai, 183 Wn.2d 91 (exemption applies when intervening decision overturns prior determinative precedent)
- In re Pers. Restraint of Turay, 150 Wn.2d 71 (applying settled law to new facts is not a "significant change")
- In re Pers. Restraint of Domingo, 155 Wn.2d 356 (dicta cannot establish a rule that later qualifies as a significant change)
- In re Pers. Restraint of Lavery, 154 Wn.2d 249 (test whether issue could have been raised before publication of intervening decision)
- In re Pers. Restraint of Greening, 141 Wn.2d 687 (discussion of when PRPs will or will not be granted concerning sentence issues)
- In re Pers. Restraint of Runyan, 121 Wn.2d 432 (preserving unlimited review where continued incarceration validity is at issue)