879 S.E.2d 762
S.C.2022Background
- Petitioner Michael Frasier arrived by commercial bus, entered a car driven by Cheryl Jones, and was observed "scanning" the bus-station area by plainclothes officers conducting a narcotics interdiction.
- Officers initiated a traffic stop (via patrol officer Hall) for an inoperable third brake light; officers had told Hall Frasier seemed "suspicious" but did not convey specific details.
- During the stop Hall noted Jones’s zipper was down, Frasier appeared nervous and sweating, and Hall told dispatch he would issue a warning and attempt to obtain consent to search.
- Jones consented to a search of the vehicle; Hall asked Frasier to exit, told him to remove his hands from his pockets, and asked if he minded a search; Frasier said, "I do, but..." and placed his hands on the hood at officers’ direction.
- Officers located cocaine on Frasier and in his jacket; Frasier moved to suppress arguing the stop was unlawfully prolonged and any search was not voluntary; the trial court and court of appeals denied relief; the South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officer had reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop beyond issuing a warning | The totality (bus-route known for trafficking, Frasier "scanning" the lot, Jones’ driving/delay, zipper down, evasive answers, sweating/nervousness) created reasonable suspicion to extend the stop | Once the warning was issued the stop's purpose ended; the remaining facts were an unparticularized hunch and insufficient to justify prolongation | No reasonable suspicion as a matter of law; prolongation unlawful; conviction reversed |
| Whether Frasier voluntarily consented to a search | Frasier’s words ("I do, but...") and his conduct (placing hands on car, exposing pockets) constituted consent | Frasier’s conduct was at officers’ direction and not voluntary; submission was coerced or ordered | Consent not voluntary; State failed to meet burden of proving consensual search; reversal warranted |
| Proper appellate standard of review for Fourth Amendment suppression rulings | Maintain the traditional deferential "any evidence" standard (as previously followed) | Adopt Ornelas-style two-step review: defer to trial court factual findings but review legal conclusion (reasonable suspicion/probable cause) de novo | Court adopts two-step approach: factual findings reviewed for evidentiary support; ultimate legal question reviewed de novo |
Key Cases Cited
- Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (advises two-part review: defer to factual findings; legal conclusions reviewed de novo)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (consent-to-search voluntariness assessed under totality of the circumstances)
- Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (establishes that reasonable-suspicion standard is less than probable cause but requires objective justification)
- Robinson v. State, 407 S.C. 169 (defines when a person is "seized" under the Fourth Amendment)
- State v. Brockman, 339 S.C. 57 (discussed prior South Carolina rejection of Ornelas; Court revisits that approach)
- State v. Moore, 415 S.C. 245 (illustrative South Carolina decision on facts supporting reasonable suspicion; court cautions against overreliance on nervousness)
- State v. Morris, 411 S.C. 571 (example where observable indicia of contraband supported reasonable suspicion)