State v. McReynolds, 951 N.W.2d 809

In the early morning of Sept. 14, 2018 officers found an unoccupied vehicle with a name tag inside; Sgt. Hoffman saw a woman (McReynolds) walking away and had Officer Watson contact her.
Watson ran the name, found an outstanding failure-to-appear warrant in the database, and identified McReynolds from a photo; Watson re-approached McReynolds with Officer Seiner.
McReynolds recorded the encounter, fled when officers ordered her to stop, turned as Watson caught up, and struck Watson in the back of the head with her cell phone, causing a laceration.
McReynolds was charged with multiple counts including simple assault on a law-enforcement officer (one theory: recklessly causing bodily injury) and the State filed a habitual-offender charge alleging a prior felony conviction.
The trial court granted a defense motion in limine excluding evidence of the outstanding warrant, but over objection instructed the jury that the legality of the officers’ contact was not in dispute; a jury convicted McReynolds of simple assault (recklessness theory) and obstruction.
In the bench habitual-offender proceeding the court admitted a certified Codington County judgment of conviction (without live testimony from a records custodian) and found McReynolds to be a habitual offender; McReynolds appealed three issues.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of the evidence (judgment of acquittal)	State: Evidence (officers’ testimony about fleeing, turning, and hammer-like swing) supports a finding of recklessness and bodily injury.	McReynolds: Her turn was a panicked, negligent reflex—not conscious disregard; insufficient to show recklessness.	Affirmed: Viewing evidence in prosecution’s favor, jurors could infer conscious disregard of a substantial risk; recklessness proven.
Jury instruction that the legality of police contact was not in dispute	State: Instruction avoided juror speculation about why officers re-approached defendant and was appropriate given the excluded warrant evidence.	McReynolds: Instruction injected facts not in evidence, effectively stipulating legality and prejudicing her defense.	Affirmed: Court acted within discretion; instruction wasn’t misleading or prejudicial and did not address the assault’s elements.
Admission of certified prior conviction at habitual-offender proceeding (Confrontation Clause)	State: SDCL 22-7-11 permits admission of certified court records to prove prior conviction; clerk’s certification is non-testimonial public record.	McReynolds: Judgment is testimonial; admitting it without a witness to allow cross-examination violated the Sixth Amendment.	Affirmed: A routine certified judgment offered only to prove the fact of a prior conviction is non-testimonial and does not implicate the Confrontation Clause.

State v. Larson, 582 N.W.2d 15 (S.D. 1998) (distinguishes recklessness from negligence; focus on defendant's awareness of risk)
State v. Olsen, 462 N.W.2d 474 (S.D. 1990) (awareness of risk can be proven indirectly through conduct)
State v. Janklow, 693 N.W.2d 685 (S.D. 2005) (state-of-mind test for recklessness vs. negligence)
State v. Morse, 753 N.W.2d 915 (S.D. 2008) (standard of review for sufficiency of evidence)
State v. Stone, 925 N.W.2d 488 (S.D. 2019) (application of sufficiency standard)
State v. Grooms, 359 N.W.2d 901 (S.D. 1984) (pre-Crawford view that judgments can be admitted without live certification)
State v. Reinhardt, 875 N.W.2d 25 (S.D. 2016) (fingerprint cards and administrative records are non-testimonial)
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (U.S. 2004) (Confrontation Clause limits testimonial out-of-court statements)
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (U.S. 2009) (laboratory reports prepared for prosecution are testimonial)
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (U.S. 2011) (forensic reports are testimonial; analysts must be available for cross-examination)
United States v. Causevic, 636 F.3d 998 (8th Cir. 2011) (distinguishes testimonial vs. non-testimonial uses of prior judgments; admissible to prove existence of prior conviction)