State v. McGovern
311 Neb. 705
| Neb. | 2022Background
- On Sept. 25, 2018, a resident observed a man peering into an apartment bathroom; the resident chased the man and found a cell phone along the suspect’s path of flight. Police seized the phone and obtained a Buffalo County warrant to search it for evidence of unlawful intrusion.
- Forensic examiner Warrington extracted the phone and (while searching for photos/videos of the Sept. 25 event) viewed media and web-history terms suggesting voyeurism and discovered videos depicting a sexual assault of K.S. that appeared to date from 2017 in Hall County/Grand Island.
- The State later obtained a second warrant (March 2020) to search the phone for evidence of first-degree sexual assault; that warrant relied in part on what had been observed during the earlier extraction.
- McGovern moved to suppress: he argued the first warrant lacked probable cause and particularity (beyond subscriber info), and that evidence from the first search tainted the second warrant; the district court initially granted suppression (for the first warrant) but later denied McGovern’s second suppression motion.
- McGovern was tried (bench), convicted on multiple counts including first-degree sexual assault and recording a person in a state of undress, and sentenced (including probation for the Class II felony); the State appealed the leniency of the sentence and McGovern cross-appealed the evidentiary rulings.
Issues
| Issue | McGovern (claim) | State (response) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Sept. 2018 warrant was supported by probable cause to search the phone for photos/videos | Warrant only supported searching for subscriber ID; no particularized probable cause to search for photos/videos of the intrusion | Affidavit tied the phone to the suspect (found on flight path) and the nature of unlawful intrusion gives a fair probability the phone contained photos/videos | Judge had substantial basis to find probable cause to search for images/videos; warrant valid on probable-cause review |
| Whether the Sept. 2018 warrant satisfied the Fourth Amendment particularity requirement | Warrant was overbroad (listed essentially all phone data) and lacked temporal limitation | Warrant and incorporated affidavit limited the search to a specific offense and timeframe; brief examination of all phone data is reasonable to locate responsive material | The warrant was sufficiently particular when read with the incorporated affidavit; lack of explicit temporal words on the face was cured by the affidavit |
| Whether evidence observed during the first extraction (videos of sexual assault) was lawfully viewed / in plain view and therefore could support the March 2020 warrant | Viewing videos exceeded the scope of the first warrant and produced evidence used to obtain the second warrant (tainting it) | Officers were lawfully authorized to review images/videos to determine responsiveness; once videos showing nonconsensual assault were encountered, they were in plain view and supported the second warrant | Viewing videos to determine whether they were responsive was reasonable; videos were within scope/plain view, so second warrant was not tainted |
| Whether the good-faith or independent-source doctrines save the March 2020 warrant | Second warrant relied on fruits of an unlawful search and should be excluded; no applicable exception | Even if any defects existed, officers reasonably relied on the warrant; also the viewed evidence was properly within scope, so independent-source need not be invoked | Good-faith and independent-source issues need not defeat admissibility because the initial viewing was reasonable and within the warrant’s scope; suppression was properly denied on the second motion |
| Whether the sentence for first-degree sexual assault (probation + 90 days jail) was excessively lenient | N/A (McGovern cross-appealed evidence only) | Sentence was within statutory limits and reflected balancing of punishment and rehabilitation; aggregate sentences may be considered | Sentences were within statutory limits and not an abuse of discretion when viewed collectively; affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) (cell phones are minicomputers with vast, qualitatively different data; warrants for phones require careful Fourth Amendment consideration)
- State v. Short, 310 Neb. 81 (2021) (Nebraska precedent on scope and particularity for cell-phone warrants)
- Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988) (independent-source doctrine elements and rationale)
- Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993) (plain-view/seizure principles)
- Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (limits on exploratory searches and plain-view cautions)
- Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232 (2016) (discussion of exclusionary rule and fruit-of-the-tree principles)
- State v. Gibson, 302 Neb. 833 (2019) (standard for appellate review of sentences)
