State v. Mayo, 113 A.3d 250

Background

At ~1:00 a.m., outside a Portsmouth bar, an altercation occurred between groups; defendant Josiah Mayo’s cousin was engaged in a confrontation with the victim’s party.
Josiah arrived, saw his cousin being converged on and hearing racial slurs, and kicked the victim once in the face; the victim suffered serious head injuries (concussion, skull fracture, intracranial hemorrhage).
Josiah was charged with first-degree assault with a deadly weapon (shod foot alleged as deadly weapon) and reckless second-degree assault; he asserted defense-of-others at trial.
The jury convicted Josiah of both counts; he appealed raising three principal claims: (1) erroneous jury instructions on defense of others (no reasonable-belief language regarding the third person’s initial aggressor status), (2) insufficiency of evidence that a shod foot was a deadly weapon, and (3) improper admission of prior felony convictions for impeachment.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court reviewed statutory interpretation de novo and assessed jury instruction error for prejudice; it reversed and remanded for a new trial based on the instruction error, upheld deadly-weapon sufficiency, and affirmed admission of priors.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Mayo)	Held
Whether jury should be instructed that defendant may act in defense of a third person based on his honest, reasonable belief that the third person was not the initial aggressor/provoker	Statute and common-law alter-ego rule do not permit a reasonable-belief instruction about the third person; the actor "steps into the shoes" of the third person	Jury should be instructed that defendant is justified if he honestly and reasonably believed the third person was not the initial aggressor or provoker	Court: Instruction was erroneous; RSA 627:4’s reasonableness framework governs defense of others and does not require the actor to be factually correct about the third person’s status; reversal and new trial due to non-harmless error
Whether a shod foot can be a "deadly weapon" under RSA 625:11 when used to kick once in the face	Implicitly: manner of use can render an otherwise innocuous object a deadly weapon; evidence of severe injury supports designation	Shoe/sneaker is innocuous and a single kick cannot be a deadly weapon	Court: Sufficient evidence supported deadly-weapon finding based on manner and force of the roundhouse kick and severe injuries; denial of motion to dismiss upheld
Whether admission of defendant’s three prior felony convictions for impeachment was unduly prejudicial	Priors were admissible under N.H. R. Ev. 609 because they were recent, felonies, and defendant’s credibility was central; court limited inquiry to existence and date	Priors’ probative value was low (non-dishonesty crimes) and unfairly prejudicial	Court: Admission was proper; probative value (central credibility issue) outweighed prejudice and trial court reasonably limited detail of convictions

Key Cases Cited

State v. Etienne, 163 N.H. 57 (N.H. 2011) (standard for reviewing jury instructions and statutory interpretation)
State v. Germain, 165 N.H. 350 (N.H. 2013) (sufficiency-of-evidence review and circumstantial evidence principles)
State v. Hull, 149 N.H. 706 (N.H. 2003) (when ordinary objects may be deadly weapons depends on manner and circumstances)
State v. Connor, 156 N.H. 544 (N.H. 2007) (harmless-error standard — State must prove error did not affect verdict beyond a reasonable doubt)
State v. Vassar, 154 N.H. 370 (N.H. 2006) (entitlement to jury instruction where some evidence supports defense theory)
State v. Hebert, 158 N.H. 306 (N.H. 2009) (Rule 609 balancing factors; priors admissible even if not dishonesty crimes)
State v. Cook, 515 S.E.2d 127 (W. Va. 1999) (discussion of the common-law alter-ego rule and Model Penal Code’s reasonable-belief approach)
Appeal of Local Gov’t Ctr., 165 N.H. 790 (N.H. 2014) (doctrine against adding language to statutes beyond their plain text)