State v. Matthew S. Hinton, 239 A.3d 246

In 2015 Matthew Hinton, then under DOC supervision, absconded from furlough, committed burglaries, and was found with a firearm, producing three prosecutions (state escape charge in Rutland; burglary charges in Addison; federal felon-in-possession charge).
In 2018 Addison court sentenced Hinton on burglary convictions to 4–10 years; federal court sentenced him to 7 years (concurrent with the state burglary sentence).
On March 7, 2019, Hinton pled guilty in Rutland to escape from furlough and was sentenced to 4–5 years, ordered to run consecutively to the Addison and federal sentences; he appealed that sentence.
While the appeal was pending, the Legislature (Act 77) effective July 1, 2019, decriminalized certain furlough-escape conduct and substituted administrative remedies (arrest warrant and forfeiture of earned credit) for criminal punishment.
Hinton argued the new law should apply retroactively to vacate his escape conviction/sentence; alternatively he argued the consecutive sentence was an abuse of discretion because it delayed rehabilitation and was punitive given decriminalization.
The Supreme Court affirmed: (1) the State’s saving statute (1 V.S.A. § 214) controls and a sentence is “imposed” when the trial court pronounces judgment, so the amendment did not apply to Hinton; and (2) the consecutive sentence was within the court’s broad sentencing discretion.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the 2019 amendment decriminalizing furlough-escape applies retroactively to Hinton's sentence	§214 prevents retroactive application; a sentence is imposed at trial-court sentencing, so amendment does not govern	A sentence is not "imposed" for §214(c) purposes until direct appeal is resolved, so the amendment should apply	The court held §214(c) inapplicable: "imposed" means when the trial court sentences/enters judgment; the amendment did not apply to Hinton
Whether imposing Hinton's 4–5 year escape sentence consecutively was an abuse of discretion	Sentence was within statutory bounds and justified for punishment, deterrence, and public safety	Consecutive sentence unduly delayed rehabilitation and is wholly punitive (especially after decriminalization)	The court held no abuse of discretion: judge considered statutory factors, history, rehabilitation need, and properly exercised discretion; sentence affirmed (but defendant may seek §7042 review)

State v. Petrucelli, 156 Vt. 382 (discussing saving statutes and retroactivity of legislative change)
State v. Barron, 189 Vt. 193 (explaining §214(c) and that a sentence "imposed" means pronounced by trial court)
State v. Aubuchon, 195 Vt. 571 (statutes generally operate prospectively; applying pre-amendment law where sentence preceded amendment)
State v. Therrien, 140 Vt. 625 (treating the sentence as imposed at original sentencing for post-sentencing motions)
State v. Merchant, 173 Vt. 249 (entry of judgment after sentencing constitutes final judgment)
United States v. Richardson, 948 F.3d 733 (6th Cir.) (sentence is imposed when pronounced by district court; rejects Clark’s view)
United States v. Pierson, 925 F.3d 913 (7th Cir.) (sentence is imposed at district court sentencing irrespective of appeals)
United States v. Cruz-Rivera, 954 F.3d 410 (1st Cir.) (same; imposition occurs at district court level)
United States v. Clark, 110 F.3d 15 (6th Cir.) (contrasting authority holding sentencing statute applied to cases pending on appeal; criticized and not followed here)