State v. Matsumoto., 452 P.3d 310

Background

Keith T. Matsumoto was arrested after allegations he inappropriately touched a minor at a high‑school wrestling tournament and was charged with third‑degree sexual assault.
While in custody he took a polygraph; the examiner later testified the result was "inconclusive," but Detective Kuaana told Matsumoto he "did not pass" and then used that representation during an accusatory post‑test interrogation.
Matsumoto made inculpatory statements after being told he failed the polygraph; he later moved to suppress those statements and to admit evidence about the polygraph circumstances. The trial court admitted the confession but barred explicit mention of the words "polygraph" or "test."
The jury convicted; the ICA affirmed. Matsumoto sought certiorari to the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court held the detective’s misrepresentation about the polygraph was a deliberate, extrinsic falsehood that is coercive per se; it also held the court’s restrictions on testimony about the polygraph circumstances violated the defendant’s right to present a defense and that the jury instruction on "intimate parts" misstated the law. The conviction was vacated and the case remanded.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Matsumoto's Argument	Held
Voluntariness of confession after polygraph representation	Kuaana’s statement was not a falsehood; at worst the test was not passed and any deception was intrinsic and permissible; confession voluntary.	Detective deliberately told him he "did not pass" though result was inconclusive; lying about polygraph is extrinsic deception likely to induce false confessions → confession coerced per se.	Court: Detective’s representation was an objective, deliberate falsehood about polygraph results and extrinsic to the offense; falsified polygraph results are coercive per se and the confession was inadmissible. Error was not harmless.
Exclusion of evidence about polygraph and circumstances of eliciting confession (right to present a defense/confront witnesses)	Polygraph evidence is per se inadmissible and any mention would be unduly prejudicial; limiting rule should apply.	Matsumoto needed to tell the jury why he confessed (effects of being told he failed); Crane/Kelekolio protect right to present the circumstances relevant to confession’s credibility.	Court: The trial court’s prohibition (barring "polygraph/test" and related detail) prevented Matsumoto from presenting the full circumstances bearing on credibility of his confession; exclusion violated his constitutional rights. Evidence about surrounding circumstances must be admitted for weight/credibility (with limiting instruction if needed).
Jury instruction defining "intimate parts" ("buttocks")	The instruction, read as a whole, required the jury to consider context and was adequate.	Instruction misstated law by defining the buttocks categorically as an "intimate part" and failed to explain that context must focus on whether touching had sexual connotations; requested instruction tracked State v. Silver.	Court: Instruction misstated the law and was ambiguous/incomplete—it improperly conveyed the buttocks as an intimate part as a matter of law and failed to instruct sufficiently on context. Remand for correct instruction.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Kelekolio, 849 P.2d 58 (Haw. 1993) (police deception law distinguishing falsehoods intrinsic vs. extrinsic; extrinsic falsehoods coercive per se)
State v. Silver, 249 P.3d 1141 (Haw. 2011) (buttocks may be an "intimate part" only when conduct is associated with sexual relations; context matters)
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (U.S. 1986) (defendant must be allowed to present circumstances surrounding a confession to challenge its reliability)
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (U.S. 1998) (description of what a polygraph purports to measure)
State v. Cabagbag, 277 P.3d 1027 (Haw. 2012) (reliability concerns may justify judicial protections and special jury instructions)