State v. Marquis, 181 A.3d 684

Maine State Police investigators traced child-pornographic files to an IP address at Marquis's family residence and went to the home in plain clothes in unmarked vehicles.
The lead investigator knocked on an enclosed-porch door; Marquis opened it, identified himself as the homeowner's son, and spoke with the officer for ~25 seconds while the officer entered the porch and the door closed.
On the porch, the officer told the family police had observed child-pornographic files on the residence's network; Marquis acknowledged receiving files via peer-to-peer networks and said he deleted them and that no one else used the computer.
Marquis consented orally to the officer's use of a search tool on the computer, and later signed a written consent-to-search form allowing seizure of the computer and SD card.
After the on-porch forensic check showed many hits, officers left but returned and arrested Marquis because young children were present in the home.
Marquis moved to suppress, arguing entry and search lacked voluntary consent and interrogation occurred in custody; the motion court denied suppression, a jury convicted him on three counts, and he appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Marquis consented to officers' entry onto the enclosed porch	Marquis contends he merely acquiesced and did not give voluntary consent to entry	State argues Marquis actively cooperated and objectively manifested consent by opening door, speaking, and not objecting to officers' entry	Court held evidence supports that Marquis consented to entry; judgment affirmed
Whether consent to search and seizure of computer was voluntary	Marquis argues any consent was involuntary because officers delayed stating purpose, used deception, and entry was not authorized	State argues Marquis repeatedly and affirmatively consented orally and in writing after being told he did not have to consent	Court concluded consent to search/seizure was voluntary and supported by the record
Whether post-entry questioning was custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings	Marquis argues he was in custody for Miranda purposes when questioned at home	State argues questioning was non-custodial; Marquis was free to end interaction	Court found Marquis was not in custody for Miranda purposes
Whether suppression motion should have been dismissed as untimely	State argued late filing without good cause warranted dismissal	Marquis did not prevail on timeliness defense	Court did not reach or rely on timeliness issue because it affirmed on the merits

State v. Nadeau, 1 A.3d 445 (Me. 2010) (consent exception to warrant requirement and consent standards)
State v. Cress, 576 A.2d 1366 (Me. 1990) (mere acquiescence insufficient; active assistance may establish consent)
State v. McLain, 367 A.2d 213 (Me. 1976) (consent determined from totality of circumstances)
State v. Rabon, 930 A.2d 268 (Me. 2007) (constitutional protection against unreasonable searches of the home)
State v. Prinkleton, 178 A.3d 474 (Me. 2018) (standard of review for suppression rulings)
State v. Cooper, 153 A.3d 759 (Me. 2017) (consider evidence in light most favorable to motion court)
State v. Lagasse, 149 A.3d 1153 (Me. 2016) (uphold denial if any reasonable view supports it)
State v. Bailey, 989 A.2d 716 (Me. 2010) (Burden on State to prove consent by preponderance)
State v. Seamen's Club, 691 A.2d 1248 (Me. 1997) (absence of objection supports consent finding)