[¶ 1] Jаck D. Bailey II appeals from a judgment of conviction of ten counts of gross sexual assault (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 253(1)(B) (2009); one count of sexual exploitation of a minor (Class B), 17 M.R.S.A. § 2922(1)(A) (Supp. 2008); and two counts of unlawful sexual contact (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 255-A(l)(E) (2009), 17-A M.R.S.A. § 255(1)(C) (Supp. 2002), entered in the Superior Court (Pe-nobscot County, Anderson, J.) following a bench trial. 1 Bailey argues that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from his home because: (1) he did not affirmatively consent to the search of his computer; (2) to the extent he did consent to any search, his consent was the result of deception and is therefore void; and (3) the officer exceeded the scope of any consent given in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
[¶ 2] Because we conclude that the search of Bailey’s computer violated the Fourth Amendment, we vacate the judgment of conviction and remand for further proceedings to determine whether the evidence obtained as a result of that search must be suppressed as fruits of the illegal search.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶ 3] Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the court’s judgment,
see State v. Connor,
[¶4] On January 18, 2008, the Maine State Police Computer Crimes Unit contacted Detective Brent Beaulieu at the Bangor Police Department regarding the dissemination of child pornography via a peer-to-peer networking program 2 from an internet protocol (IP) address in Maine. This IP address had connected to a peer-to-peer network on both July 12, 2007, and December 12, 2007, and shared at least one video file authorities knew contained child pornography because of its unique hash value. 3 On both dates, the connections were identified by the same globally unique identifier (GUID), meaning thаt the *719 same target computer used the same internet access point on both dates. The State Police ascertained through a subpoena of Time Warner RoadRunner that the IP address in question was assigned to a residential internet service subscriber in a Bangor neighborhood.
[¶ 5] Beaulieu obtained a search warrant for the residence and executed it on January 30, 2008. The officers did not discover either the target computer or any child pornography during the execution of the warrant; instead, they determined that the IP address sharing the files was associated with an unsecured wireless router located at that residence. In other words, someone within range of the router was using it to access a peer-to-peer network and disseminate the files in question. After the search, Beaulieu turned off the wireless router at the residence.
[¶ 6] On February 1, 2008, Beaulieu began canvassing neighborhood homes in range of the router in order to discover the target computer. In the course of his investigation, the detective knocked on Bailey’s door. Beaulieu was in plain clothes аnd arrived in an unmarked car, but identified himself as a member of the police department. Beaulieu recorded the exchange with Bailey with a digital recording device in his pocket, without Bailey’s knowledge.
[¶ 7] After Bailey allowed him into the apartment, Beaulieu stated that he was “checking the neighborhood, [because] there’s been a problem in the neighborhood with people gaining access to someone else’s computer and [he] just want[ed] to make sure that [Bailey didn’t] have the same issue.” Beaulieu asked if he could “loоk at [Bailey’s computer] real quick just to make sure [Bailey didn’t] have the same issue.” Bailey led him to the computer and manipulated the keyboard to “wake up” the computer. Beaulieu then sat in front of the computer while Bailey stood behind him, observing what he was doing. Bailey asked several questions about what Beaulieu was looking for on his computer. Each time, Beaulieu responded that he was searching for a file that would indicate Bailey had an “issue,” and explained that the “issue” was whether anyone had accessed Bailey’s computer.
[¶ 8] The detective saw a LimeWire icon on the desktop of the computer, but was unable to match the GUID number on Bailey’s computer to the GUID number of the target computer. Because he knew that a reinstallation would account for a different GUID number, Beaulieu asked Bailey if he had ever reinstalled the Lime-Wire software; Bailey said he had done so one or two months earlier. Bailey also told Beaulieu that he had been accessing the Internet through a wireless connection, and that the connection had stoрped working two days earlier.
[¶ 9] Without further discussion, Beau-lieu then searched the computer for video files containing child pornography by running a general search for a type of file called audiovisual interleave (AVI). 4 Beaulieu accomplished this by typing the file extension “.avi” into the computer’s search function. The search revealed four AVI files that appeared to contain child pornography; Beaulieu recognized them by the thumbnail screenshots and file names. Beaulieu did not open the files, or search the cоmputer any further. 5
*720 [¶ 10] Beaulieu started to question Bailey about the AVI files. In response to those questions, Bailey acknowledged that he had a “problem” involving child pornography and then, at Beaulieu’s request, orally consented to a search of his apartment; Bailey later signed a consent-to-search form. During the search, Beaulieu found seven eight-millimeter tapes, which Bailey allowed the detective to take. Bailey was not arrested at the end of the encounter.
[¶ 11] After reviewing the tapes, Beau-lieu discovered that one of them contained a homemade video depicting two young girls talking to the camera operator named Jack; one of the girls repeatedly exposed herself to the camera. Beaulieu was later able to identify the two girls and determine that the video had been created in the attic of Bailey’s former residence. One of the girls told Beaulieu that she had spent the night at Bailey’s residence every other weekend for over a year, and that Bailey had sexual intercourse with her at each of those times. The other girl reported that Bailey had also touched her in a sexual manner. Both girls were under the age of fourteen at the time of these events.
[¶ 12] Bailey was arrested and a grand jury returned an indictment that charged him with ten counts of gross sexual assault (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 253(1)(B); one count of sexual exploitation of a minor (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 282(1)(A) (2009); and two counts of unlawful sexual contact (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 255-A(l)(E).
[¶ 13] Bailey moved to suppress all the evidence obtained as a result of the February 1, 2008, search of his computer and apartment on the same grounds as presented in this appeal. Aftеr a hearing, the court denied Bailey’s motion. The court found that Bailey consented to the search of his computer through nonverbal conduct when he led Beaulieu to his computer and manipulated the keyboard to illuminate the screen. In determining whether Bailey’s consent to search his computer was the result of deceit or trickery and therefore void, the court focused on the officer’s initial representation and on the meaning of the word “issue.” The court found that Beaulieu was intentionally ambiguous in his use of the word “issue,” 6 and aрplied a subjective and objective analysis to determine the effect of the ambiguity:
[I]t is more likely than not that [Bailey] reasonably interpreted the detective’s comments to mean he was checking to see if [Bailey] was accessing another person’s wireless router. Subjectively, [Bailey] knew that he had been accessing his neighbor’s wireless without permission, which makes it likely that he construed the detective’s comments as referring to such activity. Objectively, anyone such as [Bailey], who did not have a wireless router and who was confrontеd by the “issue” of someone accessing another’s computer, could only reasonably conclude that he was the one doing the accessing.
The court concluded that Bailey’s consent to search his computer was valid because Bailey “knew it was probable he was being investigated for accessing his neighbor’s wireless router without permission” when he consented, and therefore Beaulieu did *721 not affirmatively misrepresent his purpose prior to procuring Bailey’s consent.
[¶ 14] The suppression court did not make a specific finding as to the scope of Bailey’s consent, but relied on its deception analysis to conclude that the detective’s search of the computer did not exceed the scope of the consent that Bailey gave. Because the court found that the scope of his consent was not exceeded, it did not reach Bailey’s fruits of the poisonous tree argument or his argument concerning the consensual search conducted after the alleged Fourth Amendment violation.
[¶ 15] During a jury-waived trial, the parties entered stipulations to the content but not the truth of the testimony of the two minors. 7 In addition, a copy of the eight-millimeter film was admitted over Bailey’s objection. After considering this evidence, as well as testimony from Beau-lieu, the court found Bailey guilty on all thirteen counts. The court sentenced Bailey to twenty years in prison, suspended all but ten years, and imposed six years of probation. Bailey timely appealed pursuant to 15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2009) and M.R.App. P. 2.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
[¶ 16] “[W]e review the factual findings of the motion court to determine whether those findings are supported by the record,” and will only set aside those findings if they are clearly erroneous.
State v. Reynoso-Hernandez,
B. Standing
[¶ 17] The State has argued that, because some of the AVI files located by Beaulieu were found in a shared LimeWire folder, Bailey cannot argue that he had any Fourth Amendment rights in those files. The State contеnds that Bailey forfeited his right to privacy by making these files available to anyone on the LimeWire network. There is case law to support the position that law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by using peer-to-peer software to remotely access shared files contained on a defendant’s computer because the defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the remote accessing of files he has made available to other users on the peer-to-peer network.
See United States v. Ganoe,
[¶ 18] This argument might have been effeсtive if Bailey were challenging the detective’s use of peer-to-peer software to remotely access Bailey’s shared files, but that is not the situation here. Detective Beaulieu did not use the technology available to remotely determine that it was Bailey who had used a peer-to-peer network to download child pornography. Instead, Beaulieu shut down Bailey’s access to the Internet by turning off his neighbor’s wireless router, then manually accessed and searched Bailey’s computer. Because Bailey has a reаsonable expectation of privacy in his computer and its contents when it is not being accessed through the peer-to-peer network,
see Game,
C. Voluntariness of Consent to Search: Verbal Response
[¶ 19] Bailey first contends that he did not consent at all to the search of his computer because he made no verbal reply to Beaulieu’s request. We review a finding of voluntary consent for clear error.
State v. Kremen,
[¶20] The record amply supports thе suppression court’s determination that Bailey consented to the initial search of his computer through his actions. Although he did not utter or write any words of consent at that point in the encounter, Bailey resided at the house, stated that the computer belonged to him, and clearly manifested his consent to the search of his computer by leading the detective to and assisting the detective in waking up the computer. The court did not clearly err in finding that Bailey’s actions constituted an expression of consent.
D. Voluntariness of Consent to Search: Deception
[¶ 21] Bailey next contends that аny consent he may have given is void because it was induced by Beaulieu’s deceit and misrepresentation. He contends that the detective misrepresented the purpose of his investigation; although Beau-lieu claimed he was investigating a problem in the neighborhood of people gaining *723 access to others’ computers, he was actually investigating the dissemination of child pornography. Bailey argues that had he known the true purpose of the search, he would not have consented.
[¶ 22] “The burden of proof for justifying the lawfulness оf a search upon consent lies on the State which, to satisfy the same, must prove that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.”
State v. Barlow,
[¶ 23] We have recognized the “practical necessity for the use of deception in criminal investigatiоns,”
State v. Carey,
[¶ 24] As with other factors bearing on voluntariness, whether a misrepresentation of the purpose of a search by thе police invalidates consent is a question of fact based on the totality of the
*724
circumstances.
See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
E. Scope of Consent
[¶ 25] Bailey finally contends that the court applied the improper standard for determining the scope of his consent and erred in finding that Beaulieu’s search did not exceed the scope of Bailey’s consent. We agree.
[¶ 26] Consent is a firmly established excеption to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment,
see Florida v. Jimeno,
[¶ 27] Although the standard to be applied by the trial court when considering the scope of a suspect’s consent is one of objective reasonableness, we have not yet determined the appropriate standard of review to be applied to a trial court’s determination of this issue.
10
See Sargent,
*725
[¶ 28] The suppression court concluded that “[a]t the time [Bailey] consented, [he] knew that it was highly probable that the detective wanted to look at his computer to see if he had accessed his neighbor’s wireless router” by considering the dialogue between Bailey and Beaulieu, Bailey’s subjective knowledge “that he had been accessing his neighbor’s wireless router without permission,” аnd the fact that Bailey did not have his own wireless router. The consideration of subjective factors in determining the scope of Bailey’s consent was error under the objective reasonableness standard.
See Jimeno,
F. Fruits of the Poisonous Tree
[¶ 29] Although we hold that the search of Bailey’s computer violated the Fourth Amendment and, on that basis, vacate Bailey’s conviction, we remand the case to the Superior Court for further proceedings. Bailey’s motion to suppress and its supporting memorandum asserted that, if the initial search of Bailey’s computer was unlawful, Bailey’s subsequent oral and written consent to search both the computer and his home should be disregarded and all the subsequently discovered evidence should be suppressed. At the heаring on Bailey’s suppression motion, however, the parties and the court agreed to limit the issue considered to a determination of whether Detective Beaulieu’s initial search of Bailey’s computer was lawful. The parties agreed at that time that, should the trial court rule in Bailey’s favor, the issue concerning the evidence obtained from subsequently obtained witnesses would be taken up in a subsequent hearing. With the issue of Bailey’s initial consent now resolved, on remand, the court must consider the remainder of Bailey’s motion to suppress.
III. CONCLUSION
[¶ 30] We vacate the judgment of conviction and remand the case to the Superi- *726 or Court for a hearing on the balance of Bailey’s motion.
The entry is:
Judgment of conviction vacated. Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
.Although the convictions reflect the statutes in force at the time of the offenses, two counts of the indictment charged Bailey with violating statutes that were enacted subsequent to the alleged offenses. Count 11 of the indictment charged Bailey with sexual exploitation of a minor (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 282(1)(A) (2009), for a July 27, 2004, incident; section 282, however, was not in force until July 30, 2004. See P.L. 2003, ch. 711, § B-12 (effective July 30, 2004). Similarly, count 12 of the indictment charged Bailey with unlawful sexual contact (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 255-A(1)(E) (2009), for an incident that occurred in the summer of 2002; section 255-A, however, was not in force until January 31, 2003. See P.L. 2001, ch. 383, § 23 (effective Jan. 31, 2003).
. A peer-to-peer network is designed to facilitate the sharing of electronic files between participating members over the Internet. To join a network, an individual downloads and installs the networking software onto her computer, and designates files she wishes to share with other members on the network. The files remain on the individual computer, but users logged into the network can access and copy one another’s files.
See United States v. Lewis,
. A hash value is a unique identifier for electronic files that is generated through a mathematical algorithm. Only identical electronic files have the same hash value.
. The detective testified at the motion hearing that he was not concerned about searching for one of the specific files he knew had been shared through the target computer, because those files could have been deleted by the time of his search.
. It was later detеrmined that these files were located in the shared LimeWire folder on *720 Bailey's computer.
. Beaulieu testified at the hearing that the issue in the neighborhood that he was investigating was not a problem with someone accessing the Internet through a neighbor’s wireless router. The detective explained that the issue he was investigating was "someone in that neighborhood providing ... child pornography for downloading," and that his basic interest was to find videos containing child pornography.
. Bailey contended that the identities and testimony of the minor girls were fruits of the poisonous treе because they were only discovered as a result of the illegal search of Bailey’s residence. The State contended that the identities and testimony were not fruits of the poisonous tree, and that the victims would be available to testify even if the suppression judgment was overturned. Bailey maintained an objection on the stipulated testimony and the admission of the eight-millimeter tape as fruits of the poisonous tree in order to appeal the suppression issue. Given the unusual circumstances of the trial proceedings, the cоurt engaged in a colloquy with Bailey to ensure that he understood the proceedings and the rights he was foregoing.
. We have addressed in several cases the effect of police deception in contexts different than that presented here. For example, in
State v. Barlow
we held that consent that resulted from submitting to an officer's false claim of lawful authority to search regardless of a warrant is constitutionally impermissible.
.
See Graves v. Beto,
. The United States Supreme Court has also not yet addressed this issue, and the federal circuits are split.
Compare United States v. Stewart,