416 P.3d 803
Ariz.2018Background
- In 2012 DHS created DACA, deferring removal and authorizing work but not providing lawful permanent status or a path to citizenship.
- DACA recipients obtain Employment Authorization Documents (EADs); Maricopa County Community College District (MCCCD) accepted EADs as proof of residency for in-state tuition.
- Federal IIRIRA restrictions (8 U.S.C. § 1623(a)) bar states from granting residence-based postsecondary benefits to aliens who are "not lawfully present," unless the state makes the same benefit available to U.S. citizens regardless of residency.
- Arizona law (A.R.S. § 15-1803(B)) and voter enactments prohibit in-state classification for persons without lawful immigration status.
- The Arizona Attorney General sued to enjoin MCCCD from awarding in-state tuition to DACA recipients; the trial court ruled for MCCCD and the students, the court of appeals reversed, and the Arizona Supreme Court granted review on eligibility for in-state tuition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether DACA recipients are "lawfully present" under IIRIRA § 1623(a) for in-state tuition | Brnovich: DACA recipients are not lawfully present and thus ineligible under § 1623(a) unless Arizona satisfies the statutory exception | MCCCD: DACA recipients are "lawfully present" because DHS authorized their stay (EADs); § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii) definition of "unlawfully present" makes them lawful while deferred | Held: DACA recipients are not "lawfully present" for § 1623(a); § 1621(a) controls benefits-eligibility and DACA recipients are not among § 1621(a) categories |
| Whether the INA definition of "unlawfully present" (§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii)) applies to benefits eligibility | Brnovich: That INA definition is limited to its paragraph and does not control benefits statutes | MCCCD: The INA definition shows DACA recipients’ presence is authorized, so they are lawfully present for benefits | Held: The INA definition is limited and does not govern benefits eligibility; identical terms can vary by context and Congress defined benefits-eligibility in § 1621 |
| Whether Arizona may grant in-state tuition to DACA recipients under § 1623(a)’s exception | Brnovich: Arizona has not made in-state tuition available to all U.S. citizens regardless of residence, so exception not satisfied | MCCCD: Arizona’s policy effectively allows DACA recipients to qualify consistent with state discretion | Held: Arizona did not satisfy the § 1623(a) exception; state law actually bars in-state classification for those without lawful status |
| Whether the court should defer to DHS/agency practice recognizing DACA EADs for residency | Brnovich: Agency recognition for other purposes does not override Congress’s definitions in benefits statutes | MCCCD: Agency practice and EADs demonstrate practical lawful presence for state purposes | Held: The court declined to treat agency practice as controlling; statutory text and structure govern benefits eligibility |
Key Cases Cited
- Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (federal supremacy and broad federal immigration power)
- Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (identical statutory terms should be read consistently)
- Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855 (Cal. court applying IIRIRA to in-state tuition)
- State v. Jurden, 239 Ariz. 526 (de novo review of statutory interpretation)