State v. Maresh, 2014 Ohio 3410

Maresh, a Parma Municipal Court probation officer (also a North Royalton corrections officer), engaged in a sexual relationship with B.M., one of his probationers, leading to two counts of sexual battery under R.C. 2907.03(A)(1) and (A)(6).
Maresh moved in December 2012 to suppress statements made to North Royalton Detective Loeding at the VA Hospital, arguing they were coerced and involuntary due to mental-health treatment.
Loeding, with D. Rybicki, interviewed Maresh at the VA Hospital around July 25, 2012; Maresh signed a Miranda waiver after being informed of rights, and the interview lasted about three hours, with most of the time spent writing a statement.
The State presented text messages and nude images Maresh sent to B.M., and B.M. testified to a June 21 and June 25, 2012 encounter at her apartment, including Maresh asserting authority over B.M. and pressuring her to comply with his demands.
The trial court denied suppression; at bench trial, Maresh was convicted on both counts, merged for sentencing, and sentenced to three years in prison as a Tier II sex offender; Maresh appeals on five assignments of error, which the court of appeals addresses and affirms.
The Eighth District ultimately affirms the convictions, holding that 2907.03(A)(6) is a strict-liability offense, and that the evidence supports sufficiency and weight conclusions; the suppression ruling was proper.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Maresh's statements were voluntary and admissible	Maresh argues coercion due to hospital treatment and mental-health issues	Maresh contends custody and coercive interrogation rendered statements involuntary	Statements voluntary; suppression denied
Whether 2907.03(A)(6) is a strict-liability offense	State argues the statute imposes strict liability	Maresh contends mental-state requirement should apply	A strict-liability offense; mens rea not required for conviction
Whether the trial court used correct standard of review	State relies on standard for suppression rulings	Maresh argues improper standard applied	Correct standard applied; no reversible error
Whether evidence sufficed to prove sexual battery under 2907.03(A)(6)	State satisfied elements; B.M. was in custody	Maresh asserts lack of custody/detention	Evidence sufficient beyond reasonable doubt
Whether the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence	State argues credibility and corroboration support conviction	Maresh challenges conflicting testimony	Verdict not against the manifest weight; affirmed

State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152 (Ohio 2003) (standard for suppression review; mixed questions of law and fact)
State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357 (Ohio 1992) (credibility and appellate review framework for suppression)
State v. Brewer, 48 Ohio St.3d 50 (Ohio 1990) (Miranda voluntariness analysis—totality of circumstances)
State v. Edwards, 49 Ohio St.2d 31 (Ohio 1976) (Miranda rights and waiver analysis)
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (coercion threshold; mental condition as a factor)
State v. Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 54 (Ohio 2004) (mental condition as factor in voluntariness)
State v. Fortson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92337, 2010-Ohio-2337 (Ohio 2010) (sexual battery under 2907.03(A)(6) is strict liability)
State v. Diar, 120 Ohio St.3d 460 (Ohio 2008) (standard for sufficiency of the evidence)
State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380 (Ohio 1997) (standard for sufficiency—reasonable doubt)
State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (Ohio 1991) (Jackson v. Virginia framework)
State v. Chipps, 1983 Ohio App. LEXIS 13030 (Ohio App. 3d) (interpretation of 2907.03(A)(6) as custodial context)
State v. Arega, 2012-Ohio-5774 (Ohio 2012) (custody-related sexual conduct)