488 P.3d 610
N.M.2021Background
- In 2015 APD Officer Daniel Webster stopped Davon Lymon and Savannah Garcia after suspecting Lymon rode a stolen motorcycle; Webster approached with his weapon drawn, later holstered it, and while attempting handcuffs Lymon shot Webster six times and fled.
- Lymon was tried on first-degree murder and multiple related counts; jury returned inconsistent preliminary verdict forms for Count 1 (first-degree murder), later deliberated and returned a final guilty verdict; the court polled the jury and jurors confirmed the verdicts.
- After trial, convictions for shooting from a vehicle and one tampering count were vacated; remaining convictions were affirmed by the district court and appealed.
- On appeal Lymon challenged (1) the trial court’s communications with the jury as coercive, (2) denial of a self-defense instruction based on alleged excessive force by the officer, (3) several evidentiary rulings (impeachment with an 18-year-old fraud conviction; admission of a prior stop; exclusion of cross-examining a witness about an alleged prior false kidnapping claim), and (4) the trial court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing and new trial based on alleged juror misconduct.
- The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed: the court held the trial court properly clarified an ambiguous preliminary verdict without coercion, correctly denied the self-defense instruction, did not abuse discretion on evidentiary rulings, and acted properly regarding juror-misconduct allegations.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Lymon) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court coerced jury by querying ambiguous preliminary verdicts instead of immediately polling | Court may clarify ambiguous preliminary verdicts and its neutral notes were proper to resolve inconsistency | Notes and repeated send-backs coerced jurors and impermissibly pressured them to change votes | No coercion; court had duty to clarify inconsistent preliminary verdicts and its neutral questions did not improperly influence jurors |
| Whether defendant was entitled to a self-defense instruction (police excessive force) | Officer’s drawn weapon and foot-on-foot control did not amount to excessive force; no reasonable minds could find excessive force | Officer’s conduct (drawing weapon, foot on foot) justified instruction for self-defense against excessive police force | Denial correct: evidence insufficient for reasonable juror to find officer used excessive force (holstered weapon, context justified draw) |
| Admissibility of impeachment and other prior-act evidence (18‑yr-old fraud conviction; prior stop footage; exclusion of cross-exam on alleged false kidnapping) | 18‑yr fraud conviction admissible for impeachment because probative of truthfulness; prior-stop evidence relevant to intent/self-defense; exclusion of remote, low-probative prior false-kidnapping claim proper | Admission was unduly prejudicial given forgery charge and remoteness; prior-act evidence was impermissible propensity evidence; cross‑examination about kidnapping was proper impeachment | No abuse of discretion: court excluded a duplicative forgery conviction but properly admitted fraud conviction with limiting instruction, properly admitted limited prior-stop evidence, and permissibly barred cross-exam into remote, low‑probative alleged kidnapping under Rules 11‑403/11‑608(B) |
| Whether trial court should have held additional evidentiary hearing/new trial for alleged juror misconduct (livestream/extraneous information) | Trial court properly held an initial hearing, found extraneous material reached only an alternate juror and was duplicative, and denied further hearing/new trial | Alleged livestream access and jurors’ phone use created reasonable probability extraneous information affected deliberations and warranted further inquiry | No abuse of discretion: defendant failed to show extraneous material actually reached deliberating jurors or reasonably probably affected verdict; trial court’s hearing and denial of new trial affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Aguilar, 451 P.3d 550 (N.M. 2019) (preliminary verdicts are not final; court may clarify ambiguous jury responses)
- State v. Phillips, 396 P.3d 153 (N.M. 2017) (trial court duties to resolve ambiguity in jury responses)
- State v. Apodaca, 940 P.2d 478 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (court not compelled to accept preliminary verdict; Rule on polling and clarity)
- State v. McCarter, 604 P.2d 1242 (N.M. 1980) (trial communications must not coerce jurors; judge may communicate neutrally)
- United States v. Shippley, 690 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2012) (example of non-coercive remedial jury instruction when addressing inconsistent verdicts)
- State v. Ellis, 186 P.3d 245 (N.M. 2008) (self-defense against police requires some evidence officer used excessive force; reasonableness standard)
- State v. Holloway, 740 P.2d 711 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987) (duty to resolve jury uncertainty before final verdict)
- Kilgore v. Fuji Heavy Indus. Ltd., 240 P.3d 648 (N.M. 2010) (standard for proving juror misconduct and when evidentiary hearing is required)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (U.S. 1989) (objective reasonableness test for police use of force)
