State v. Lykins, 314 P.3d 704

Defendant convicted, including tampering with a witness; upward departure of 48 months imposed under vulnerable victim factor.
Dispute whether the victim for purposes of the rule is the witness (O’Connor) or the state; defendant argues the state is the primary victim.
Trial court found both the state and O’Connor were victims and that the vulnerable victim factor was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Defendant argued O’Connor was not a victim under the rule and, even if a victim, not a vulnerable one; state argued the opposite.
Court considered Teixeira to define ‘victim’ for sentencing guidelines, concluding O’Connor is a victim under the guidelines; affirmed departure based on vulnerability.
Opinion affirmed; court held the record supported substantial and compelling reasons for departure.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether vulnerable victim applies to witness in tampering case	State: witness is victim; vulnerable victim applies	Teixeira type of victim is not the state's victim; O’Connor not a victim	O’Connor is a victim; vulnerable victim applies
Whether the departure was based on substantial and compelling reasons	State provided compelling reasons linked to victim’s vulnerability	No compelling reasons to depart	Yes, reasons were substantial and compelling
What is the controlling definition of 'victim' for sentencing purposes	Broader than substantive offense; includes states’ logic	Limited to victim of crime under the statute	Teixeira definition applied; a directly injured party is a victim for guidelines

State v. Teixeira, 259 Or App 184 (2013) (defines ‘victim’ for sentencing guidelines, narrows to directly injured party)
State v. Enemesio, 233 Or App 156 (2010) (summary of facts and approach for sentencing issues)
State v. Wolff, 174 Or App 367 (2001) (upward departure standards and substantial and compelling reasons)