197 Conn.App. 675
Conn. App. Ct.2020Background
- Lori T. (defendant) had visitation; her ex-husband (CF) had sole legal and physical custody of four children. Over Memorial Day 2015 three children refused to return to CF’s home.
- When CF arrived per the visitation schedule, Lori told him she would not send the children out because they did not want to go; she later told Officer Nash she would not make them go.
- Officer Nash warned Lori she could be in trouble and, after the children still did not return to school, sought an arrest warrant; DCF and Glastonbury police became involved and temporary custody was transferred to family members.
- Lori was charged with (originally) four counts of custodial interference in the second degree under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-98(a)(3); the state dropped one count and a jury convicted her on three counts.
- On appeal Lori argued (1) the statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied because "refuses to return" is undefined and could not fairly notify her that inaction (not forcing children) was criminal, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to prove she "otherwise refused to return" the children. The court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Lori) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 53a-98(a)(3) is unconstitutionally vague as applied | Statute’s plain language and dictionary meanings show "refuses to return" covers affirmative refusals and equivalent inaction; Lori made affirmative statements she would not send children out | Phrase undefined; Lori lacked notice that not forcing children to go could be criminal; statute invites arbitrary enforcement | Court: Not vague as applied. Dictionary/common meaning supplies a core meaning covering both affirmative refusal and inaction when one ignores or declines to take steps to return a child; Lori’s conduct fell within that core meaning. |
| Whether evidence was sufficient to prove Lori "otherwise refused to return" the children | Testimony showed Lori told CF and Nash she would not make the children go and she supported their decision; jury could infer she had ability to act but refused | Lori contended she did not prevent access, made children available to police/others, and children independently refused to go | Court: Evidence sufficient. Lori’s statements and conduct permitted a reasonable jury to find she had the ability to compel return but refused to take steps to do so. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 (Conn. 1989) (framework for review of unpreserved constitutional claims)
- State v. DeCiccio, 315 Conn. 79 (Conn. 2014) (void‑for‑vagueness standards and as‑applied analysis)
- Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (U.S. 1983) (vagueness doctrine emphasizes guidelines to govern law enforcement)
- Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (U.S. 1972) (vague laws impermissibly delegate standards and risk arbitrary enforcement)
- State v. Corbeil, 41 Conn. App. 7 (Conn. App. 1996) ("refuse" may be shown by conduct or failure to cooperate)
- Rana v. Terdjanian, 136 Conn. App. 99 (Conn. App. 2012) (failure to return property after demand can constitute an unqualified refusal)
- State v. Drupals, 306 Conn. 149 (Conn. 2012) (statutory construction principles for criminal statutes; rule of lenity)
- State v. Daniel G., 147 Conn. App. 523 (Conn. App. 2014) (statute may have a clear core that defeats vagueness claim)