State v. Looby, 2018 Ohio 842

William Looby was charged with multiple felonies (including attempted murder, aggravated arson, felonious assault) and, pursuant to a plea agreement, pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated arson, one count of arson, and one count of felonious assault.
At plea colloquy the trial court personally recited the constitutional rights a defendant has at trial (jury trial, confrontation, compulsory process, presumption of innocence, burden of proof, right to remain silent, right to testify) and confirmed Looby’s understanding.
The court did not expressly tell Looby that by pleading guilty he was waiving those constitutional trial rights, nor did it ask whether he understood that pleading guilty would waive them.
The trial court sentenced Looby to concurrent terms aggregating eight years imprisonment. Looby appealed his conviction and sentence.
The appellate court, sua sponte, raised whether the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) and, after briefing, concluded the court failed to strictly comply with that rule, vacated Looby’s guilty pleas, reversed the judgment, and remanded.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) when accepting guilty plea	The State: the colloquy explained the trial rights sufficiently (explained rights a defendant retains if going to trial), so the plea was valid	Looby: the court failed to inform him that pleading guilty waives those constitutional rights, as required by Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c)	The court held the trial court failed to strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c); plea invalid and vacated
Whether the failure to strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) requires reversal	The State: implied that the colloquy was adequate; dissent argued any error was not shown to be prejudicial and should be plain-error scrutinized	Looby: argued (via supplemental briefing) that strict compliance was required and not satisfied	The majority applied Veney and held strict noncompliance invalidates the plea; reversal required
Effect on remaining assignments of error (nonconstitutional)	The State: not directly addressed after the Crim.R. 11 ruling	Looby: those issues were preserved but would be moot if plea vacated	The court held remaining five assignments moot because pleas vacated

State v. Veney, 897 N.E.2d 621 (Ohio 2008) (trial court must strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) when accepting a felony plea)
State v. Ballard, 423 N.E.2d 115 (Ohio 1981) (trial courts strongly encouraged to use Crim.R. 11(C) language and ask defendant if they understand they are waiving rights)
State v. Engle, 660 N.E.2d 450 (Ohio 1996) (plea must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily)
United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 (2004) (plain-error prejudice standard for unpreserved Rule 11 error)
State v. Rogers, 38 N.E.3d 860 (Ohio 2015) (appellate review plain-error standard when Rule 11 error not raised below)