State v. Long
2021 Ohio 2202
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2021Background
- Margaret "Pebbles" Long (mother of defendant Michael Long) made multiple social-media posts during her son's retrial that the trial court found alarming.
- Trial judge issued a July 12, 2018 order barring trial participants and certain nonparties (including family) from posting: (1) discovery material, (2) attorney-client communications, and (3) any threats against jurors, witnesses, attorneys, and court personnel; violation punishable by contempt.
- Margaret Long was previously adjudicated and sentenced for contempt for violating the order; later the state pursued additional indirect-contempt proceedings and a different judge held a show-cause hearing based on stipulated exhibits of social-media posts.
- The trial court found three posts to be "threats" in violation of the no-threat prong and imposed a 50-day jail sentence (40 days stayed).
- On appeal Long argued (1) the order was unlawful and exceeded judicial authority, (2) it violated the First Amendment as an impermissible prior restraint, and (3) the contempt finding lacked sufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
- The appellate court held the trial court had authority to issue and enforce a no-threat order against nonparties with notice, and that the order’s no-threat prong was not facially invalid under Bey; but concluded the evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Long made true threats, so it reversed the contempt conviction and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Long's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Court authority to issue no-threat order and punish nonparty indirect contempt | Courts have inherent contempt power; order lawful and may bind nonparties with actual notice | Order is "legislating from the bench"; only legislature defines crimes; nonparty cannot be punished for indirect contempt | Court: Inherent contempt power permits such orders and inclusion of nonparty with notice; overrules Long’s related challenge |
| 2. First Amendment — whether no-threat prong is an unconstitutional prior restraint | Order targets true threats (unprotected speech) and is therefore permissible | Order is an impermissible prior restraint under Bey; it reaches speech and requires strict scrutiny | Court: No-threat prong targets true threats (a category of unprotected speech) and is not facially invalid under Bey |
| 3. Sufficiency/manifest-weight — did postings constitute "true threats" beyond a reasonable doubt | Postings, in context, expressed intent to intimidate or incite violence and supported contempt finding | Posts were vague, metaphorical, contingent, or political/legal rhetoric—not proven true threats beyond reasonable doubt | Court: Evidence insufficient to prove true threats beyond a reasonable doubt; reverses contempt judgment |
| 4. Procedural protections (indictment, jury trial, independent prosecutor) | Contempt proceedings fall within judicial power and need not follow standard criminal indictment/jury procedures for petty contempts | Long needed grand jury indictment and jury trial for criminal charges; independent prosecutor required | Court: Such criminal-procedure protections are not required for the contempt penalties imposed here; trial court properly proceeded without those processes |
Key Cases Cited
- Denovchek v. Bd. of Trumbull Cty. Commrs., 36 Ohio St.3d 14 (Ohio 1988) (recognizes contempt power as inherent and necessary for courts to function)
- Bey v. Rasaweh, 161 Ohio St.3d 79 (Ohio 2020) (examines prior restraints in civil-stalking protection orders and limits on enjoining future speech)
- Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (U.S. 2003) (defines "true threats" as statements expressing intent to commit unlawful violence)
- Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (U.S. 1969) (distinguishes political hyperbole from true threats)
- R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (U.S. 1992) (discusses viewpoint/content discrimination in restrictions on speech)
- Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (U.S. 1976) (establishes absolute prosecutorial immunity)
- ConTex, Inc. v. Consol. Technologies, Inc., 40 Ohio App.3d 94 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (criminal contempt requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Midland Steel Prods. Co. v. Internatl. Union, United Auto..., 61 Ohio St.3d 121 (Ohio 1991) (nonparties with actual notice may be bound by injunctive orders and contempt)