State v. Lobue, 453 P.3d 929

Defendant (Zachary Lobue) was charged with a Class C felony (possession of a stolen vehicle) and released on a written release agreement setting a specific 35‑day call date/time/location and various obligations.
The release form stated, in the first person, that defendant would “appear in court” on May 1, 2017, and warned that failure to appear could lead to arrest, revocation of release, and criminal penalties.
Defendant’s attorney attended the May 1 hearing but defendant did not; a warrant issued and defendant was charged with first‑degree failure to appear under ORS 162.205.
At trial defendant moved for judgment of acquittal arguing the release agreement did not unambiguously require his personal appearance; the trial court denied the motion, finding a jury could infer personal appearance was required.
The Court of Appeals reversed: because Oregon law allows appearance through counsel except at certain statutorily defined felony critical stages, ORS 162.205 can penalize failure to appear only when the release agreement unambiguously conditions release on the defendant’s personal appearance; the agreement here was not unambiguous and defendant appeared through counsel.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the release agreement unambiguously required defendant’s personal (as opposed to counsel’s) appearance so as to support a conviction under ORS 162.205	The release terms (first‑person promises and the warning about criminal penalties) reasonably imply that defendant himself must appear; the agreement required personal appearance	The agreement does not use the phrase “personally appear” and Oregon law permits appearance through counsel; the form is ambiguous and does not support a felony failure‑to‑appear conviction	Reversed: ORS 162.205 applies only when the release agreement unambiguously conditions release on personal appearance; this agreement was ambiguous and defendant appeared through counsel

State v. Casey, 346 Or 54 (2009) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence for judgment of acquittal)
State v. Graves, 299 Or 189 (1985) (criminal statutes must give fair notice of prohibited conduct)
State v. Cornell/Pinnell, 304 Or 27 (1987) (constitutional concern about standardless application of criminal law)
State v. Plowman, 314 Or 157 (1992) (equal application requirement for criminal laws)
Eagle Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, 321 Or 398 (1995) (contract interpretation—court starts with the contract text)
Batzer Constr., Inc. v. Boyer, 204 Or App 309 (2006) (court may consider formation circumstances when assessing contractual ambiguity)
Valenti v. Hopkins, 324 Or 324 (1996) (construction of unambiguous contract is question of law)
Eads v. Borman, 351 Or 729 (2012) (agency principles: principal bound by acts of authorized agent)