336 P.3d 713
Alaska Ct. App.2014Background
- Tara Leighton was indicted by a grand jury on five counts of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor for sexual penetration of a 13-year-old whom she coached.
- Leighton moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing the grand jury should have been instructed it has absolute discretion to refuse to return an indictment even when the State’s evidence suffices.
- The presiding judge instructed jurors that if at least ten jurors believed the State’s evidence, the indictment "should" be endorsed "a true bill."
- Superior Court Judge Olsen concluded that the instruction was inadequate because the Alaska Constitution’s grand jury clause uses "may," and grand jurors must be told they have absolute, unfettered discretion to refuse indictment.
- The State appealed; the Court of Appeals reversed the superior court, reinstating the indictment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Alaska Constitution requires a grand jury instruction that jurors have absolute discretion to refuse to return an indictment | Leighton: grand jurors must be told they “may” refuse indictment; word "should" failed to convey absolute discretion | State: constitutional clause authorizes indictment by a majority but does not create a constitutional nullification right; "should" leaves room for discretion | Court: No. The provision authorizes indictments but does not mandate an instruction of absolute nullification power; "should" adequately conveys discretion |
| Whether using "should" instead of "may" in the instruction is reversible error | Leighton: "should" fails to convey the grand jury’s unfettered discretion, so error cannot be harmless | State: "should" does not eliminate discretion and is functionally adequate; harmlessness not at issue because instruction is correct | Court: Not reversible error — "should" signals expectation but retains flexibility and discretion |
| Whether statutory language using "may" requires different interpretation of grand jury discretion | Leighton: AS 12.40.050 and constitutional "may" support instruction of discretion | State: Statute’s "may" means "is authorized to," not a statement about refusal power | Court: Statutory "may" concerns authority to indict, not a constitutional right of nullification |
| Whether contradiction in prosecutor’s additional instructions affects ruling | Leighton: prosecutor’s remarks undermined the judge’s instruction and highlighted issue | State: Superior court ruling was based only on the presiding judge’s instruction | Court: Acknowledged contradictory comments but decision reviewed only as to the judge’s instruction |
Key Cases Cited
- Cameron v. State, 171 P.3d 1154 (Alaska 2007) (describes grand jury as both accusatory and protective)
- United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (U.S. 1974) (overviews grand jury function and scope)
- Preston v. State, 615 P.2d 594 (Alaska 1980) (discusses grand jury’s protective role)
- United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that instructing jurors they "should" indict if probable cause exists does not eliminate discretion)
- Sleziak v. State, 454 P.2d 252 (Alaska 1969) (related grand jury/indictment authority precedent)