State v. Leech, 473 P.3d 218

In November 2013 Christopher Kim Leech joined others who detained two men (a middleman and a victim) at gunpoint, bound and blindfolded them, escorted them into a truck, and drove them to a remote location where the victim was shot; the middleman ultimately shot the victim and later cooperated with prosecutors.
The State charged Leech with two counts each of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated murder, and one count of obstruction of justice; the case proceeded from a joint preliminary hearing to trial.
At the preliminary hearing co-defendant T.J. testified and was cross-examined by defense counsel; the magistrate found probable cause and bound the case over for trial.
At trial T.J. refused to testify despite being granted conditional use immunity; the district court compelled testimony, but T.J. persisted in refusal, and the court admitted his preliminary-hearing testimony under Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(1).
A jury convicted Leech on all counts; on appeal Leech argued the preliminary-hearing testimony was inadmissible because defense counsel lacked a similar motive and opportunity to develop that testimony at the preliminary hearing.
The Court of Appeals held the admission of T.J.’s prior testimony was error under Goins/Ellis principles, found the error harmless as to kidnapping, robbery, and murder convictions, but prejudicial as to the obstruction conviction and remanded for retrial on that count.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether T.J.’s preliminary‑hearing testimony was admissible under Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(1) after he became unavailable at trial	State: preliminary testimony admissible because defense had an opportunity to cross‑examine at the preliminary hearing and Brooks allows admission when opportunity existed	Leech: defense lacked a similar motive/opportunity to develop credibility at the preliminary hearing (limited to probable cause), so 804(b)(1)(B) is unsatisfied	Court: Admission was erroneous—Brooks’s per se rule abrogated by Goins; defense did not have similar motive/opportunity here, so 804(b)(1) did not apply
Whether the erroneous admission was harmless as to each conviction	State: error was harmless or cumulative because other witnesses corroborated key facts	Leech: admission likely affected jury’s credibility assessment and thus outcome, at least for some counts	Court: Error harmless as to aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and aggravated murder (overwhelming corroborating evidence; party liability for murder); prejudicial as to obstruction of justice (the only evidence of a cover‑up was largely T.J.’s corroboration of the middleman)
Remedy for the erroneous admission	State: convictions should stand because error harmless	Leech: at minimum retrial required on prejudiced count(s)	Court: Affirm convictions for kidnapping, robbery, and murder; vacate obstruction conviction and remand for new trial on that count

State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981) (established per se rule admitting preliminary‑hearing testimony when witness unavailable and defense had opportunity to cross‑examine)
State v. Goins, 423 P.3d 1236 (Utah 2017) (abrogated Brooks’s per se rule; held constitutional amendment limited preliminary hearings to probable‑cause function and required showing of similar motive/opportunity)
State v. Ellis, 417 P.3d 86 (Utah 2018) (applied Goins and explained that admission of preliminary‑hearing testimony requires proof defense had similar motive and full opportunity to cross‑examine)
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) (discussed burden allocation in harmless‑error analysis under federal rules)