State v. Labarge, 164 Conn.App. 296

Background

Defendant Michael Labarge was tried and convicted of murder (cutting/stabbing victim, removing and disposing of body parts) and tampering with physical evidence (dismembering and concealing the body). He was sentenced to a total effective term of 65 years.
State charged both offenses in a single long-form information; defendant moved to sever the two counts before trial asserting (1) prejudice from joining a brutal tampering offense with the murder charge and (2) that he wished to testify on the murder count but remain silent on the tampering count.
Trial court denied severance, finding the evidence underlying each count would be cross-admissible and the defendant had not made the required convincing proffer to show substantial prejudice or a strong need to testify on one count but not the other.
Defendant moved to suppress incriminating statements he made to correctional officers during intake at the Walker correctional facility, arguing they were the product of custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings and violated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Trial court denied suppression after finding officers engaged in casual conversation, the defendant voluntarily volunteered statements, and there was no interrogation as defined by Miranda/Massiah; the court concluded no Miranda or Sixth Amendment violation.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying motion to sever counts joined in a single information	State: joinder appropriate because offenses arise from same transaction and evidence is cross-admissible	Labarge: brutal tampering evidence would prejudice jury on murder and he should be able to testify on murder but remain silent on tampering	Denial affirmed: defendant failed to show the evidence would not be cross-admissible; no substantial prejudice shown and proffer re: testifying/silence was insufficient
Whether trial court erred by refusing severance to allow defendant to testify on one count but not the other (Fifth Amendment)	—	Labarge: has important testimony on murder (justification) but strong need to refrain from testifying on tampering; severance necessary to protect Fifth Amendment rights	Denial affirmed: defendant did not make a convincing, specific showing of the nature of testimony or reasons to refrain; burden not met
Whether statements made to correctional officers at intake required Miranda warnings because they were elicited during custodial interrogation (Fifth Amendment)	—	Labarge: statements were the product of custodial interrogation and should have been suppressed for lack of Miranda warnings	Denial affirmed: court found statements volunteered during casual conversation, not the product of interrogation; Miranda warnings not required
Whether admissions violated Sixth Amendment right to counsel (Massiah)	—	Labarge: post-indictment statements were deliberately elicited without counsel present	Denial affirmed: because statements were not deliberately elicited interrogation, Massiah/Henry protections not triggered

Key Cases Cited

State v. Boscarino, 204 Conn. 714 (1987) (factors to assess prejudice from joinder of violently related offenses)
State v. Rodgers, 198 Conn. 53 (1985) (severance is within trial court discretion; substantial prejudice required)
State v. Payne, 303 Conn. 538 (2012) (allocation of burdens on joinder/severance depending on charging form)
State v. LaFleur, 307 Conn. 115 (2012) (Boscarino inquiry only required if evidence is not cross-admissible)
State v. Anderson, 318 Conn. 680 (2015) (joinder proper where evidence would be cross-admissible)
State v. Crenshaw, 313 Conn. 69 (2014) (cross-admissibility supports joinder)
State v. Schroff, 198 Conn. 405 (1986) (defendant must make convincing showing to justify severance to allow selective testimony)
State v. Vitale, 197 Conn. 396 (1985) (inmate’s volunteered statements during casual conversation with corrections officer not Miranda interrogation)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (custodial interrogation requires Miranda warnings)
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (definition of interrogation includes police words/actions reasonably likely to elicit incriminating response)
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (post-indictment deliberate elicitation of statements in absence of counsel violates Sixth Amendment)
United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980) (clarifies Massiah principle regarding deliberate elicitation)