278 P.3d 38
Or. Ct. App.2012Background
- Kurokawa-Lasciak and Campbell with three children detained after casino incident; Campbell had the van keys; defendant previously refused search; Campbell given the van keys with narrow directions to lock, care for the dog, and wait; Bennett later obtained Campbell’s consent to search the van, which yielded marijuana, hashish, scales, and cash; trial court suppressed evidence relying on Randolph; Supreme Court remanded to address Campbell's consent authority.
- Law enforcement pursued an ordinary third-party consent issue under Article I, section 9 after finding that the automobile exception did not apply because the vehicle was not mobile when first encountered; Campbell’s consent was the remaining basis for the search on remand.
- Trial court and appellate court evaluated whether Campbell had common authority to consent to search the van; the court rejected Morales as controlling and concluded Campbell lacked authority given the defendant’s explicit restrictions and timing of the key delivery.
- Court examined preexisting Oregon law on third-party consent, including limitations on co-occupants’ authority and whether consent is valid only when the consenting person has mutual use or control; the court held Campbell had no authority to consent under the facts.
- Outcome: suppression of the evidence was upheld; the search did not fall within the automobile or consent exceptions under Article I, section 9.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Campbell had authority to consent to search the van. | Kurokawa-Lasciak argued Campbell had common authority via shared access. | Kurokawa-Lasciak argued Campbell lacked authority due to grantor’s limitations and timing. | Yes/No authority, leading to suppression |
| Whether the search was valid under Article I, section 9 given lack of consent authority. | State asserted consent or other doctrine justified search. | Defense argued consent invalid, automobile exception inapplicable. | Consent invalid; suppression affirmed |
| Whether the automobile exception could justify the search. | State argued vehicle mobile at time of search or during investigation. | Vehicle not mobile when first encountered; exception not satisfied. | Automobile exception rejected; suppression affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Carsey, 295 Or. 32 (Or. 1983) (third-party consent governs where common authority exists)
- State v. Will, 131 Or.App. 498 (Or. App. 1994) (common authority rests on mutual use/access for most purposes)
- State v. Fuller, 158 Or.App. 501 (Or. App. 1999) (express/implied limits on co-occupant authority matter for consent)
- State v. Beylund, 158 Or.App. 410 (Or. App. 1999) (defendant assumed risk co-occupant would consent; authority depends on access)
- State v. Jenkins, 179 Or.App. 92 (Or. App. 2002) (parent-child or roommate arrangements affect scope of consent)
- Matlock v. United States, 415 U.S. 164 (U.S. 1974) (third-party consent requires common authority)
- Randolph v. United States, 547 U.S. 103 (U.S. 2006) (co-occupant refusal governs unless state adopts broader rule)
- Morales v. United States, 861 F.2d 396 (3d Cir. 1988) (driver-not-lessee of rental car; limits of consent authority)