State v. Krikstan, 290 A.3d 974

Defendant Keith Krikstan, a 30‑year‑old substitute teacher, exchanged sexually explicit electronic messages and FaceTime calls with A.G., a 12‑year‑old student (requests for nude photos, showing penis, instructions to masturbate).
Those out‑of‑school exploitative communications occurred over weeks both before and after two occasions when Krikstan substituted in A.G.’s classes.
While substituting in A.G.’s math class, Krikstan kept her after class, expressed anger/upset about her attraction to a 21‑year‑old ("Joey"), then resumed sexually exploitative electronic contact afterward.
A jury convicted Krikstan of sexual abuse of a minor under CR § 3‑602; the circuit court sentenced him.
The Appellate Court reversed, reasoning the in‑school conversation contained no sexual content and the out‑of‑school exploitation occurred when Krikstan did not have supervisory responsibility.
The Maryland Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Appellate Court, holding the in‑school act—viewed in context—"involved" sexual exploitation while Krikstan had supervisory responsibility.

Issue	State's Argument	Krikstan's Argument	Held
Whether an in‑school, non‑overtly sexual act by a teacher can constitute “an act that involves sexual molestation or exploitation” when it relates to ongoing out‑of‑school sexual exploitation	The in‑class expression of jealousy/anger was a continuation of and related to the out‑of‑school sexually exploitative relationship and thus "involved" sexual exploitation	The classroom conversation was non‑sexual, too vague, and occurred during a time of supervisory responsibility separate from the out‑of‑school exploitation; insufficient evidence of intent or benefit	Yes. Court held an act that "relates to, affects, or is a part of" ongoing sexual exploitation satisfies "involves"; juror could infer relation from context and ensuing resumed exploitation.
Whether evidence of in‑school conduct constituted grooming and, if so, whether grooming would satisfy CR § 3‑602	Grooming in class can be proof the in‑class act was intended to facilitate out‑of‑school exploitation and therefore satisfy the statute	No evidence of specific in‑class acts intended to facilitate exploitation; grooming not proven	Court did not need to decide grooming as a separate ground; it found the in‑class act itself, in context, met the statute.

Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400 (1999) ("involves" construed broadly to cover acts relating to, affecting, or being part of molestation/exploitation)
Walker v. State, 432 Md. 587 (2013) (sexual exploitation can consist of non‑contact behavior; context and continuing course of conduct matter)
Wicomico Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. B.A., 449 Md. 122 (2016) (distinguishes innocuous in‑class behavior from acts intended to facilitate out‑of‑class exploitation; temporal nexus required)
Anderson v. State, 372 Md. 285 (2002) (teacher has supervisory responsibility during school‑related activities; responsibility may extend beyond school if no temporal break)
Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309 (1979) (teachers have responsibility for supervision in connection with academic duties)