State v. Kreis, 451 P.3d 954

Around midnight officers saw Kreis standing near a parked car in a restaurant lot that had just closed; officers suspected theft or DUII and ran the car’s plates.
An officer-in-training (Mendez) engaged Kreis; Kreis walked away toward the restaurant’s back patio; officers followed and asked for identification and whether the car was his.
Kreis declined to answer, appeared intoxicated and agitated (fists, bladed stance, shifting weight), and moved as if seeking an escape; Crino called for backup.
Crino ordered Kreis to turn, face the building, and put his hands behind his back so he could be handcuffed (stating safety concerns); Kreis refused, physically resisted, and officers subdued and handcuffed him.
Kreis was charged with interfering with a peace officer (ORS 162.247(1)(b)) and resisting arrest; a jury convicted him of interfering. The Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on precedent that officer-safety orders are assessed independently of the initial encounter’s legality.
The Oregon Supreme Court reversed: it held the initial stop lacked reasonable suspicion, and an officer-safety justification cannot be used to escalate or effectuate a seizure when the initial seizure had no independent constitutional basis.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Kreis)	Held
Whether Crino had reasonable suspicion to lawfully stop/seize Kreis (DUII/attempted DUII)	Crino had reasonable suspicion based on time/place (late, closed lot), proximity to car, matching owner description, and officer experience	Facts (standing “near” a car; no keys/car-door behavior; walked away) insufficient to show a substantial step toward driving or attempted DUII	Stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion for DUII or attempted DUII; initial seizure violated Article I, §9
Whether the order to turn and be handcuffed was a “lawful order” under ORS 162.247(1)(b), i.e., can officer-safety justify such an order issued to effectuate an unconstitutional seizure	Orders protecting officer safety are lawful even if the initial stop later proves unlawful; lawfulness of an order is judged independently of the initial encounter	An order that effects a seizure is lawful only if it is authorized by substantive law (including Article I, §9); officer-safety doctrine applies only during lawful encounters and cannot be used to justify continued or escalated restraint after an unlawful seizure	Crino’s order was not a lawful order: because there was no independent constitutional basis for the initial seizure, officer-safety concerns could not justify imposing further, more stringent restraint; refusal therefore not criminal under ORS 162.247(1)(b)

State v. Bates, 304 Or. 519 (1987) (officer-safety doctrine: officers may take reasonable safety measures during a lawful encounter when they develop specific and articulable suspicion of an immediate threat)
State v. Ausmus, 336 Or. 493 (2003) (defines “lawful order” as an order authorized by and not contrary to substantive law)
State v. Illig-Renn, 341 Or. 228 (2006) (statute’s word “lawful” excludes orders inconsistent with constitutional protections)
State v. Miglavs, 337 Or. 1 (2004) (reasonable suspicion must be particularized to the individual’s conduct)
State v. Holdorf, 355 Or. 812 (2014) (articulates reasonable-suspicion standard)
State v. Madden, 363 Or. 703 (2018) (officer-safety doctrine can justify a seizure without reasonable suspicion when executing a search warrant if seizure reasonably responds to safety concerns)
State v. Cocke, 334 Or. 1 (2002) (applied officer-safety justification to searches conducted incident to another lawful action)
State v. Neill, 216 Or. App. 499 (2007) (Court of Appeals: lawfulness of officer-safety orders assessed independently of the initial confrontation)