State v. Klofta, 2020 Ohio 5032

Defendant Holly Klofta was indicted for endangering children (R.C. 2919.22(A)); she pled not guilty, moved to suppress statements (denied), was tried by jury and sentenced to 18 months after conviction.
Victim E.S., age 10, testified Klofta made her perform a “lean and rest” push-up punishment and then used a stun gun (described as a pink device) on E.S.’s butt; E.S. described pain like a wasp sting and identified photos of marks.
Mother photographed the visible mark the next day and reported the injury to police; Detective Alley observed the mark, recovered the stun gun at Klofta’s home, and interviewed Klofta, who admitted keeping the device but denied tasing E.S.
The State’s theory at trial: Klofta recklessly created a substantial risk to E.S.’s health by using the stun gun and then failing to protect or attend to the child (an omission theory under R.C. 2919.22(A)).
Defense argued the evidence at most supported excessive corporal punishment under R.C. 2919.22(B) (an affirmative act), that the indictment charged subsection (A), and that the court improperly allowed the jury to convict under a theory not charged; defendant also argued insufficiency/manifest-weight given minor, short-lived pain.
The trial court denied Klofta’s Crim.R. 29 motion; the jury convicted under R.C. 2919.22(A). On appeal the court affirmed, holding the evidence supported a finding she recklessly violated her duty to protect the child by tasing her and failing to attend to the injury.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a conviction under R.C. 2919.22(A) is proper where evidence shows an affirmative act (tasing) typically covered by (B)	The State: Klofta failed to protect E.S. from her own abuse and thus committed an omission (A); (A) can apply when a child is injured while in defendant’s care even if defendant committed the act.	Klofta: (A) addresses omission/neglect only; affirmative acts of abuse belong to (B); convicting under (A) here creates an impermissible variance from the indictment and renders (B) superfluous.	Court: (A) can cover failures to protect a child from harm inflicted while in defendant's care, including where defendant inflicted the harm and failed to act; conviction under (A) was proper.
Sufficiency / manifest weight: whether evidence proved reckless violation of duty creating substantial risk to child’s health or safety	The State: Testimony, photos, recovery of stun gun, and visible marks a week later support a finding of reckless violation of duty and substantial risk.	Klofta: Injury was minor and temporary; evidence insufficient and verdict against manifest weight; defendant was denied due process because charge differed from evidence.	Court: Evidence viewed in favor of prosecution was sufficient; verdict not against manifest weight — conviction affirmed.

State v. Kamel, 12 Ohio St.3d 306 (Ohio 1984) (division A addresses neglect/omission; affirmative abuse addressed in (B))
State v. Sammons, 58 Ohio St.2d 460 (Ohio 1979) (failure to act/seek medical care can support a child-endangering conviction)
State v. McGee, 79 Ohio St.3d 193 (Ohio 1997) (elements of R.C. 2919.22(A): duty and reckless violation)
State v. Mattox, 108 N.E.3d 1139 (Ohio App. 2018) (standard for reviewing sufficiency and weight of the evidence)
State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89 (Ohio 1997) (explaining sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard)
State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380 (Ohio 1997) (explaining manifest-weight standard)
State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (Ohio 1991) (defining the relevant sufficiency inquiry)