State v. Kirby Lenihan (071497), 219 N.J. 251

On Aug. 10, 2007, Kirby Lenihan (18) crashed her car in heavy rain; both she and passenger K.G. (16) suffered serious head injuries and neither wore seat belts; K.G. later died.
Investigators found aerosol cans containing difluoroethane in Lenihan’s car and difluoroethane in her blood; facts suggested inhalant use and that Lenihan drove too fast for conditions.
Lenihan was indicted under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-18 (initially as a second-degree offense) for knowingly violating a law intended to protect public health and safety (the Seat Belt Law) and recklessly causing death; additional vehicular homicide counts were filed and later dismissed/merged as part of a plea agreement.
She pled to an amended third-degree count under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-18b, reserved right to appeal trial court denial of motion to dismiss count one; the Appellate Division affirmed.
The Supreme Court granted certification to decide whether the Mandatory Seat Belt Usage Law, N.J.S.A. 39:3-76.2f, qualifies as a “law intended to protect the public health and safety” under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-18 and whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied.

Issue	State's Argument	Lenihan's Argument	Held
Whether a violation of the Seat Belt Law can be a predicate offense under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-18b	Seat Belt Law targets all drivers/passengers and protects public safety generally; Legislature did not limit phrase to only laws affecting ‘‘widespread’’ harm	Seat belt violations affect a discrete individual (the unbelted passenger) and thus are not the sort of public-safety laws (e.g., fire/building codes, pollution controls) intended as predicates	The Court held the Seat Belt Law falls within “law intended to protect the public health and safety”; its plain meaning and legislative history support inclusion
Whether N.J.S.A. 2C:40-18b is unconstitutionally vague as applied	Statute gives fair notice; scienter ("knowingly") and requirement of reckless causation of serious bodily injury narrow scope	Lenihan lacked notice that a ticketable traffic offense could trigger third-degree criminal liability; statute could enable prosecutorial overreach	The Court rejected the as-applied vagueness challenge: presumption of validity for public health/safety laws, scienter requirement, and the facts here gave Lenihan adequate notice

State v. Bunch, 180 N.J. 534 (2004) (ordinary statutory language presumed to carry its ordinary meaning)
Waterson v. General Motors Corp., 111 N.J. 238 (1988) (recognizing seat belts as primary crash protection and taking judicial notice of their efficacy)
In re C.V.S. Pharmacy Wayne, 116 N.J. 490 (1989) (public health and safety statutes entitled to a presumption of validity)
Hamilton Amusement Ctr. v. Verniero, 156 N.J. 254 (1998) (vagueness doctrine: statutes void if persons of common intelligence must guess at meaning)
State v. Cameron, 100 N.J. 586 (1985) (penal laws receive stricter vagueness scrutiny)
State v. Saunders, 302 N.J. Super. 509 (App. Div. 1997) (scienter requirements mitigate vagueness challenges)
People v. Kohrig, 498 N.E.2d 1158 (Ill. 1986) (unbelted occupants may endanger others; seat belt laws protect public safety)