*1 JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, STATE OF NEW CAMERON, ROBERT J. DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. Argued March 1984 Decided June 1985. *3 Dwayne Vaughn argued appellant C. the cause for J. {Frank Morelli, attorney).
Stanley argued respondent. Cutler the cause for opinion The was by Court delivered HANDLER, Justice. question
The posed by appeal this municipal whether a places ordinance “churches excludes and similar worship” applied from a residential use district can be prohibit a temporarily using minister from his home to hold a one-hour service congregation. each week for his The not, minister claims ordinance does with sufficient and, clarity, religious activity, forbid this applied against him, it is unconstitutionally vague. agree. We
I. defendant, Cameron, Robert is a J. minister in the Church, Reformed Episcopal a denomination that includes some six or seven litiga- thousand adherents this nationwide. When began, tion spiritual he was the leader of the Mount Carmel Reformed Episcopal congregation. spring Church Until the congregation this building. met a local school How- ever, an group increase rent forced the to relocate. The congregation decided to in the meet defendant’s home until a permanent location could be found. Its services were attended twenty-five people about and were conducted once each *4 for congre- week one-hour. These the the were same services school, gation previously prayers, had held at included sermon, taking and the aof collection. Township’s zoning designated The Franklin law seventeen zone in municipality. classifications land use Ordinance (1976). The single-family ordinance established § permitted only zone, houses as the use in the R-15 in which the property Id., Cameron was located. 504.1. The ordinance § worship” places expressly “churches and similar also allowed residential zones. single family homes in other in addition to Thus, 501.1.C,502.1.b, dis- See, id.., 511.1.b. it is not e.g., §§ worship” places of were puted that “churches and similar district that included by the ordinance from use excluded neighborhood.1 Cameron’s Township charged the defendant August 1981 the
On by using his violating zoning ordinance 504.1 with § This permitted then use.” home “for activities other [sic] neighbors reported the defendant’s complaint arose after one of eighty heard feet from that the service could be home, by parked cars on the street those defendant's and that passage of traffic. attending the service hindered Sunday that one Township’s zoning chief official later testified Municipal on this evidence the he heard church music. Based Township found the defendant to be Court of Franklin places of against “churches and similar violation of the ban holding to cease judge ordered the defendant worship.” The home, subject to a fine for each “worship in his $500 service” future violation. novo, the Law
Following appeal an and a trial de Division by using ordinance his held that defendant had violated the also Cameron, Super. “church.” N.J. home as a State Division, (1982). Appellate This decision was affirmed dissenting grounds on the the ordi- Judge Antell vague apply. prohibition of churches was too nance’s (1983). appealed right as of Defendant then NJ.Super. 2:2-l(a). under Rule this Court Township 1 Subsequently, enacted a new ordi Council worship” places in the “churches and similar nance. The law now allows building neighborhood, provided a lot sufficient that the is set on Cameron’s N.J., (1984). Township, B402.5 This ordi § Franklin Ordinance size. A500, "church,” id., provided discussed § a definition of the word nance also 599. infra
591 II. begin analysis by recounting We our that reasons both Federal vague and State Constitutions render laws unen Const., V; (1947) forceable. See U.S. Amend. N.J. Const. Art. I, par. vague 1. evils explained The of were Grayned laws v. 104, 108-109, 2294, City Rockford, 408 U.S. 92 S.Ct. 2298- of 222, 99, (1972)(footnotes 33 L.Ed.2d 227-28 omitted): Vague laws offend several values. because we assume important First, isman free to steer between lawful and unlawful we conduct, insist that laws give intelligence of a reasonable person ordinary to know what opportunity accordingly. Vague so that he act prohibited, laws may may innocent trap providing warning. not fair if and Second, enforce- arbitrary discriminatory ment is to be laws must standards for those prevented, provide explicit who vague delegates them. A law basic apply impermissibly matters policy judges, juries subjective on resolution an ad hoc and policemen, basis, dangers with the attendant of arbitrary discriminatory application. Thus, the vague constitutional ban on laws is intended to regulatory provide adequate invalidate enactments that fail to scope of guidance notice their applica- sufficient for their Jacksonville, Papachristou City 156, 162, tion. v. 405 U.S. 110, (1972). 92 31 requirement S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 115 The statutory essentially clarity process “is concept due grounded play.” in notions of Lashinsky, fair State v. 81 N.J. 1, (1979); Lee, 156, (1984). accord State N.J. pitfall
To vagueness, avoid the the terms of a person ordinance must enable a of “common intelli gence, light of ordinary experience” to understand whether contemplated supra, conduct is lawful. Lashinsky, 81 N.J. at The vagueness 18. determination of against must be made background contextual particular law and awith firm understanding purpose. of its Village As noted in Hoffman Flipside, Estates, 498, Estates v. 455 U.S. Hoffman (1982), S.Ct. L.Ed.2d the standard to vagueness determine the of a law is one can not “be applied. mechanically degree vagueness that the Consti importance tution tolerates —as well the relative of fair notice and depend part fair on the nature of enforcement— the enactment.” *6 level of all attain the same definitional
Not
statutes need
example,
For
clarity
vagueness
under the
doctrine.
a statute
vague
subject
is
to a less strict
effecting
regulation
“economic
narrow,
more
subject
ness
its
matter is often
test because
businesses,
plan
demands
face economic
to
be
because
which
legislation
to
relevant
carefully,
expected
can
consult
havior
be
1193,
498, 102
at
71 L.Ed.2d
action.”
at
of
Id.
S.Ct.
advance
Indeed,
regulated enterprise may have the
at 371-72.
the
clarify
meaning
regulation by
own
ability to
the
its
laws,
process.
by resort
an administrative
Penal
inquiry, or
to
hand,
scrutiny
given
subjected
sharper
on
to
the other
are
exacting
vagueness
and critical assessment under
more
See,
Lee, supra,
at
e.g.,
than civil enactments.
96 N.J.
doctrine
85,
167;
Kimmelman, 94 N.J.
119 n. 16
Town Tobacconist v.
Estates,
(1983).
pointed
supra,
at
As
out
455 U.S.
Hoffman
1193,
371-72,
498-99,
greater impre
at
102 S.Ct.
71 L.Ed.2d at
in enactments with civil rather than
cision can be tolerated
likelihood,
in the
as
penalties
criminal
because of differences
any misunderstanding.
well
in the
consequences,
as
that can elevate the level
Another material consideration
judicial scrutiny
vagueness
the extent to
for
which
impacts
“[PJerhaps
interests.
regulatory law
on constitutional
affecting
clarity that
important
the Consti
most
factor
tution demands of
law is whether it threatens
inhibit
protected rights.”
constitutionally
exercise of
Es
Hoffman
499,
1193,
tates,
102
71
at
supra, 455
at
at
L.Ed.2d
U.S.
S.Ct.
372.,
scrutiny
legislation
particular,
be accorded
upon
especially
first amendment liberties must be
trenches
See,
566, 573,
Goguen,
94
scrupulous.
e.g.,
415 U.S.
Smith
1247,
605,
1242,
(1974);
39
612
Town Tobaccon
S.Ct.
L.Ed.2d
ist,
16;
Hinds,
supra,
A
challenged
applied”
statute can be
“as
if the law
not
clarity prohibit
does
with sufficient
against
the conduct
sought
it
Euclid,
which
to be enforced.
v. City
Palmer
(1971),
402 U.S.
example,
S.Ct.
statute found applied, as notwith- found valid applications,” also in all its in which it of other circumstances standing possibility Lashinsky, supra, 81 N.J. at vague apply); be too would person of another (criminal prohibiting “obstruction” statute nevertheless, but, vague found potentially acknowledged to be in the to defendant’s conduct sufficiently applied clear as to be case). particular summarize, challenged is for facial
To a law vague all assertedly impermissibly one that is vagueness is challenged applied, as how A statute that applications. its contexts, but ever, vague in all conceivable proven not need be particular in the context of the unclear must be shown attack, the as-applied vagueness or In either a facial case. required clarity will degree of scrutiny and judicial level of statute, context in which the purpose of the depend on the strictures, subject to its that is challenged, the conduct law is authorized, and, finally, punishment that is the nature of the upon activities and interests the statute potential impact of constitutionally protected. are III. claim that his the defendant’s now turn to examine We “churches and phrase cannot stand because conviction vague ap worship” renders the ordinance place of similar *8 claim, adjured are to evaluating In this we against him. plied clarity the level of re analytic approach by which an follow depends the nature enactment on language the of the quired of regulated. activity sought to be See the that is Hoffman Estates, supra. zoning in this target of the ordinance activity that is the Further, in character. nor economic neither commercial
case is may civil zoning laws constitute although purposes some for enforced, law, penal quasi-criminal or is regulation, this Co., Transportation Kearny v. Modern nature. See Town of N.J.Super. (App.Div.1971). Finally, as by stressed Judge below, Antell in his dissent 189 N.J.Super. at the impinges directly ordinance upon constitutionally-protected in- terests. The actuality threat or of enforcement could under- rights mine the to free religion, speech, exercise of free free assembly, reasons, privacy. For these constitutional due process calls clarity concerning for the utmost scope of the prohibitions. ordinance’s intended Estates, See su- Hoffman pra. considering itself, the ordinance initially we note that there apparent are no extrinsic factors to in determining aid us meaning intended be ascribed the ordinance’s critical phrase places worship.” “churches and similar Although in many situations the term “church” raise would no unusual interpretive problems, problems posed such are in this case penal application because of the ordinance to a constitutionally-protected activity that allegedly encompassed is by pertinent language.
Being defined, generic not otherwise word “church” Ghent, variety interpretations. See, admits a e.g., “What ‘Church,’ Use,’ ‘Religious Constitutes Zoning or the like within Ordinance,” (1975) (citing using A.L.R.3d 197 cases defini- something tions of church such as: a church is more than merely building religious which the actual services are held; building a church apart public worship, set especially worship, Christian but the conclusion does not follow every place in which services are conducted is a church; merely affording a church is more than an edifice people opportunity worship God; concept of what changed alone, constitutes a church place worship has from a week, during used once or twice a to a church used the entire week, nights days, as well as parochial for various and commu- functions); also, nity e.g., dissenting opinion, post see (a regular home can be as the “a church when it is used organized, recognized site for the traditional services of an religious body, presided which services are the ordained over *9 religion”);
minister said Law opinion, Division 184 N.J.Su- (a per. place persons at 82 church is “a where regularly worship”); Appellate opinion, assemble for Division 189 N.J.Su- (churches per. buildings apart at 405 are public “set wor- ship [including] principal Thus, parish”). house of a encompasses possible term “church” meanings, various meaning subtle distinctions in can critically have different con- sequences sought applied part penal when to be of a statute constitutionally-protected in a context that involves interests. legislative deficiency, however, This need not result being perfectly vague, ordinance considered and therefore wholly though application void. Even an of the ordinance to religious practices might problematic the conduct of certain legitimate some situations and raise vague doubts as to the applied, ness of validly the ordinance so the ordinance could be applied in raising genuine other conceivable contexts without vagueness example, concerns. For the ordinance would cer tainly prohibit be understood use of structures erected religious Indeed, for the conduct of certain functions. in this case, appears that, no one proposition to contest the without offending vagueness applied standards this ordinance could be prohibit special purpose the construction of a building that is architecturally designed particularly adapted pri for the mary use conducting regular on a basis formal religious congregation. services See Zoning Board of Appeals Wheaton, Ind.App. v. 76 N.E.2d (1948); Dent, Congregations Combined 2d F. (D.C.Cir.1943); 2 Encyclopedia The New Britannica (1984). building A with those indisput characteristics would ably constitute a “church.”
An interpretive approach to the ordinance that includes an emphasis Moreover, on structure furnish clarity. would needed interpretation an recognizes the relevance of architectural structure, property, as well as the particularly appro- use of priate in municipal regulation, the context of land-use which physical concerns itself with the use and characteristics of land. *10 McQuillin, ed.) Municipal Corporations See 8 3d 25.01 at § 6-7; id., 48; Rohan, 25.17 1 Zoning P. and Land Use § 1-6, (Bender 1984). pub. Controls at 7 The ordinance thus encompass could be understood to a definition of the term specific enough unfairly surprising “church” to avoid any potential enough guide defendant and clear its enforce- ment.2 specific
The dissenters would be satisfied to use a less
church,
totally
definition of the term
one that is
unrelated to
post at 610.
special building
the notion of a
or structure. See
However,
raising
process
in addition to
due
concerns of wheth-
provides
adequate
er this activities-oriented definition
an
warn-
ing,
vagueness
upon
interpretation
attendant
an
that relies
primarily
understanding
religion
on an assumed common
of
being
creates a real and substantial
risk of the ordinance
against
protected
enforced
innocuous or
conduct. See Camer-
on,
(Antell,
supra,
N.J.Super.
dissenting).
189
at 408
Fur-
J.
ther, any enforcement of the ordinance based on the kind of
religion
being practiced
require
that is
in a home would
local
officers to
observe
evaluate
activities
private
regulatory
of
citizens. Such
license raises the disturb-
judicial
to that
involved in the
avenue of
is related
2 This
interpretation
statutes.
construction of
overbroad
assertedly
* * *
vagueness]
rests on
of overbreadth
contrast
[in
“The concept
of
which forbid the
of substantive due
prohibition
process
principles
issue is not reasonable notice
individual freedoms. The
certain
primary
although
be involved. Rather
standards,
these issues may
adequate
meaning,
given
language
is so
statute,
its normal
issue is whether the
the Constitution.”
to conduct
broad that sanctions may
protected
apply
quoting
938,
NJ. at
v.
280
16,
81
Landry Daley,
F.Supp.
[Lashinsky, supra,
(N.D.Ill.),
220,
455,
U.S.
S.Ct.
The defendant
suggests that the ordinance’s
drafters
precisely meaning
intended
for the word church that
encompasses
special purpose
building
See,
or structure.
e.g.,
Lakewood, Ohio Congregation
Witnesses,
Jehovah’s
Inc. v.
Lakewood,
(6th
City
Cir.1983),
699 F.2d
cert. den.
(1983) (ordinance
U.S.
104 S.Ct.
We need not determine specific whether the definition of a “church,” type includes a of building, as well as —one religious use—should be ascribed to the ordinance. Compare Rosenfeld, (1973) (it State v. 62 N.J. 602-03 is unwise for attempt the Court to narrowing construction to save a law from overbreadth in the absence of an legislative ascertainable preference among possible statutory definitions). alternative Although plausible church, this is a definition of a the ordinance interpreted meaning validly this its core still as could not applied against the in this defendant case. While the ordi- might provide warning nance so fair adequate" construed “church,” guidelines as to what constitutes a that core defini- encompass tion would not home. defendant’s This house is residence, typical single-family building designed not a or specially constructed for the conduct of religious formal ser- vice; indistinguishable neighbor- it is from other homes Further, only hood. the defendant’s home infrequently is used incidentally religious worship and does not exist for the primary purpose practicing religion. clear, therefore, applied
It is
that the ordinance as
to the
vagueness grounds.
defendant is vulnerable on
Its indefinite
meanings focusing
religious activity
on
alone fail to furnish
adequate warning
sufficiently specific guidelines
or
to assure
Further,
specific
its fair and consistent enforcement.
its more
meaning,
imports
concept
special purpose
core
which
of a
building,
ordinary
does not cover an
residential home. We
accordingly
impermissibly vague
conclude that the ordinance is
applied
as
to the defendant
this case.3
A conclusion that
the narrow circumstances of this case
preclude application
prohibit
of the ordinance to
not,
practices
sug-
conducted in the defendant’s home does
gested by
dissenting opinion, compel
municipality
*12
uses,
schools,
incompatible
allow residential zones
such as
hospitals
post
or restaurants.
may
See
at 621.
be
These uses
suggest
process
3 We
a matter
due
"church”
do not
term
zoning
requires some further definition whenever
in a
As
used
ordinance.
noted,
sufficiently
meaning
the term "church” can have a
definite core
case,
grounds
vagueness.
withstand a facial attack on the
In this
Township applied
lying
the term to a set of facts
well outside the definitional
Further,
vagueness
core.
standard used in this case to determine
is
involved, rights
stringent
rights
important
are
so
that a
because constitutional
high
scrutiny
required
they
impermissibly
are
restrict
level of
is
to assure
not
vagueness may
required
ed. This test for
not be
other
cases
presenting
and other land
and
different circumstances
uses
activities.
reasonably defined
clarity
with sufficient
vague
overcome
objections
ness
express
implied
with or without the
or
condition
unique
special
that a
or
building
structure or
must be involved.
judicial
We are satisfied
scrutiny
level of
called for in
in applying
vagueness
this case
doctrine would exceed that
determining
entailed in
question
a similar
as to such other uses.
primary
reason for
comparative
this difference is the
strength of the
protection
constitutional
accorded
free
Supra
4;
dom.
at
Estates,
599 n.
supra,
see
455 U.S.
Hoffman
499,
Further, our determination in this case will not frustrate the municipality attempt regulate in its other kinds of uses of a private may genuinely incompatible home that with the predominant character of residential zones. A zoning regula- general tion can serve the neighborhoods welfare in residential by promoting family-style living, by minimizing congestion, noise, overcrowding, by and encouraging repose solitude, by fostering end, esthetics. To this a municipality can general police powers exercise its problems to deal with the traffic, noise, parking, activity, overcrowding, constant and the like so that the character neighborhood of the residential preserved. See, McQuillin, e.g., supra, 25.24 at 63. § ordinances, regulatory however,
Such must be drawn narrow ly and clearly against be directed assertedly offensive or Baker, detrimental (1979) conduct. See State v. N.J. (local government prohibit living cannot the choice of arrange clearly incompatible ments not shown to be with residential neighborhood); Holding Borough Kirsch of Manasquan, Co. (1971)(municipality 59 N.J. cannot enact an ordinance banning “group properties rental” of prohibi seaside because tion is not sufficiently problems noise, directed to over crowding, traffic, like). and the This narrow especially focus is regulated mandated activity when the constitutionally involves protected interests. Ephraim, See Schad v. Mount 452 U.S. 61, 68-69, 2176, 2182-83, (1981) 101 S.Ct. 68 L.Ed.2d (invalidating a ban on entertainment” requiring “live nar- *13 drafting governmental row to further a substantial interest may imperiled). where constitutional liberties be Consequently, generalized this context a or regulatory broad may ban that only act as an incidental or upon accidental restraint offensive or detrimental conduct cannot be considered a reasonable exer- police powers. cise of the As the Court observed Home Berlin, League Township Builders 81 N.J. (1979), which has some beneficial effect will not [a] provision be deemed automatically general valid and consonant with the welfare. Attention must also be directed * * * toward the detrimental effects that a has. Where particular provision * * * * * * ** zoning general a has effects to the provision contrary welfare, legislative goal being the court is decide whether required proper goal. achieved in a manner related to that reasonably general- described, case the in this already supra As ized ban places worship” on “churches or similar has the potential prohibit perfectly harmless and beneficent activi- ties, as well as those neighbors. that could disturb and offend appears
It thus ordinance’s exclusion of places worship” “churches or particular similar from the sufficiently against residential zone is not tangible directed particular detrimental effects of conduct. It cannot be sus- grounds tained on these necessary alone as a or reasonable police powers. exercise of the police power These asserted objectives cannot redeem the ordinance’s lack of constitutionali- ty vagueness process grounds. on Accordingly, due con- we clude that under the circumstances the ordinance cannot be validly applied against the defendant.
IV. sum, range possible meanings may imputed broad phrase, places worship,” to the “churches and similar in the Township zoning Many Franklin ordinance. of these definitions emphasize only religious activity the character of that is under- cannot, however, taken. It be determined with sufficient cer- tainty religious practices what kinds of were intended to be Nevertheless, governed by may the ordinance. it be reasonable *14 meaning to ascribe a clear core phrase to the critical used in the ordinance, one that avoids a determination that the ordinance is totally vague entirety. and void in its Such a core meaning specific would dependent be more than one solely upon the religious activity occurs; nature of the that it would involve an understanding of the term church in terms of both its architec- design tural and construction and its primary religious actual use. We nonetheless are satisfied that such meaning a core encompass would not single-family house that is used for one hour, once each temporary week as the location to hold rather modest services of a small congregation. that, circumstances,
We conclude under these the ordinance give warning does not fair or notice to person enable a average intelligence experience and to know what activities could turn Further, his or her home into a church. the ordi- nance unguided does not foreclose in application; discretion its provides it no sufficient assurance that its broad and undefined terms fairly, could be consistently, uniformly enforced. reasons,
For these applied defendant, to the the ordinance vague must be found and unenforceable as a matter of constitu- process. tional due predicated The conviction on this ordinance must be set aside. judgment below is reversed.
CLIFFORD, Justice, concurring in result.
Ordinarily I would adhere to the time-honored maxim that half none, a loaf is express better than my approval of the by Court, result reached and await another opportunity to myself unburden of the views separate once me from my colleagues in majority yet lead join me to in their judgment of temptation reversal. The to take that course is great, for the Court tantalizingly comes close to right answer. It hints by at it. But avoiding coming grips directly profound with the underlying namely, whether a issue— municipality can prevent residents from preaching, praying, singing hymns, coming together in the name of their Lord private in a dwelling put residential Court fails to to rest —the important issue, and, an and troublesome the worse for this defendant, perhaps encourages municipality pursue, as it pursued single-minded tenacity, misguided has thus far its purpose forbidding engaging defendant from activity conviction, today mercifully by resulted his reversed this I episode Court. would end this bizarre once and for all declaring beyond “vague- that constitutional considerations ness” any any Township’s powers foreclose use of of Franklin prohibit foregoing activities defendant’s home between *15 Sundays. 11:00 a.m. and noon on
I argument We were told at oral that Robert J. Cameron is a full-time He in family single-family student. lives with his a him, dwelling, by owned not by his church but located at 305 Avenue, Somerset, Township. West Point Franklin proper- zone, ty permits is in an R-15 in which the ordinance 15,000 single-family dwellings square on minimum-lot sizes of feet, complies. a restriction with which the Cameron residence reveals, might far as the So record structure is what one size, expect to find in such a zone: in residential modest bedrooms, kitchen, bath, living-room, dining-room, and a small in addition the nature of a recreation room—a home which ate, family slept, grew, the Cameron did what families do: worked, short, relaxed—in lived. education,
They prayed. pursuing In addition to his also congregation defendant as a acts minister of formative known (Mount Episcopal as the Mount Carmel Reformed Church Car- mel). Theological graduated Mr. was from the Semi- Cameron Philadelphia, nary Episcopal of the Reformed Church in Presbyter in 1980. was ordained as a Deacon denomination, Episcopal The Reformed Church is a Protestant having Episcopal away broken from the Protestant Church generation struggling those influenced 1873 after a between (high churchmen) the Oxford Movement and the Evan- (low churchmen). gelicals In the 1960’s total membership of Episcopal 7,085. the Reformed reported Church was At the 6,176 end of 1980 there were seventy members and a total of churches, generally Illinois, Florida, in the areas of Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, New and South Carolina. At last count clergy totalled 101. Mount hardly Carmel’s is an affluent congregation. It can- services, not afford to rent a location for its not even the $350 per month that 1000 space feet of store-front would cost. It therefore meets in the minister, humble residence of its tradi- tionally practice congregations. of new One should therefore of, any image erase from the mind say, the Most Reverend and Right Runde, M.C., Honorable Robert Kennedy Alexander D.D., Archbishop 102nd of Canterbury and Primate of all England, plopping Canterbury down Cathedral in the middle of County, bucolic Somerset neighborhood or of the Camerons’ being Square. transformed into talking St. Peter’s areWe about a few folks gathering at someone’s home.
Every Sunday, noon, from 11:00 a.m. until Mr. Cameron invites into his residence those with whom he shares mankind’s deepest purpose beliefs. His pray sing is to with his *16 guests, group invited whose numbers have not exceeded twenty-five, and, as group, leader of the message deliver a of inspiration. amplification, lot, There is parking no no sign, no cross, no neighborhood. no defacement of the The offensive conduct, group’s effect of the municipal testified to at the hearing, court amounted complaint by to no more than a one of neighbors Cameron’s singing could be heard from a dis- eighty tance of away feet guest’s and that on one occasion a car parked was in might, front of his house. majesty, The domin- ion, power and Jersey of the State of New are marshalled to conditions, combat these through enforcement of a against zone, restriction churches in a residential in order to stifle the religious activities described above. Supreme
Passing strange it is that the United States
Court
home,
of obscene
permits possession, within the confines
1243, 22
movies,
Georgia, 394 U.S.
S. Ct.
Stanley
see
v.
(1969);
prosecution, as
that this Court disallows
L. Ed.2d 542
group fornication
violating
right
privacy,
of
a constitutional
lot,
parked
in
in a deserted
see State v. Saun
an automobile
(1977);
regulatory
ders,
that this Court overrules a
II me, entirely the State and our For reasons not clear to squeeze the case dissenting colleagues attempted to into have can, through municipality its larger issue of whether a zones churches zoning power, exclude from residential worship. point was not raised defend places similar The included in his statement Appellate in the Division nor is it ant and deliberate questions presented to this Court. Considered for far provocative portentous issue calls resolution of that scrutiny, far briefing, exacting extensive far more more thought has accorded it and hard than been more discussion open one in this question remains an proceedings. these now, way as does the I leave it that state and would Particularly I avoid referring to it. would majority by not even record, adopting, on this what the dissenters’ course of on a non-issue acknowledged minority view to be 613-18; Note, Exercise case, and the Free post at “Land Use see 1562, 1569 (1984). Clause,” n. 42 84 Colum.L.Rev.
606
But
if
accept
proposition,
even
one were to
one must
recognize
power
affect,
that the
through zoning,
religious
activity in a
surely
residential area
any
has its limits. Like
aspect
police
other
power,
of the
authority must be
general
exercised for the
welfare
community,
see South
Burlington
ern
County
Township,
N.A.A.C.P. v. Mt. Laurel
(Mt.
158,
(1983)
II),
92 N.J.
208
Laurel
and “must be exercised
within constitutional
Cleveland,
limits.” Moore v. City
E.
of
494, 514,
1932, 1943,
531,
U.S.
97 S.C't.
52 L.Ed. 2d
(1977) (Stevens, J., concurring
judgment). Moreover,
courts
have held that religious activity
public
itself is
furtherance of
general welfare,
morals and the
see Matter
Diocese
of
Rochester v. Planning Bd.
Brighton,
Town
1 N. Y.2d
508,
849,
(1956),
154 N.Y.S.2d
means selected sought must have a real and substantial relation to the regulation obtained, or must be calculated to proscription reasonably * * meet the evil not exceed the need *. public Holding Borough (1971).] Co. v. [Kirsch 59 N.J. Manasquan, 241, The free-exercise clauses of the United States'and New Jersey Constitutions extend to all lawful conduct founded Yoder, 205, belief.1 See Wisconsin v. 406 U.S. (1972); S.Ct. 2 L.Ed. 2d 27-28 Thomas Review Div., Bd. the Ind. Employment Sec. 450 U.S. 1 “Congress respecting shall religion, make no law an establishment of or ** Const, prohibiting the free exercise thereof U.S. amend. I. “No person privilege worshipping Almighty shall be of the inestimable deprived God in * * agreeable a manner to the dictates of his own conscience N.J. Const. art. 3. para.
607
1425,
(1981);
Verner,
Ill decision foregoing agree For the reasons I with the Court’s violating ordi- to vacate defendant’s conviction for I charged. Likewise do nance in effect at the time he was recently-enacted ordinance concur the conclusion that support on could not a conviction based the same activities produced Township’s this But because of brouhaha. Franklin activities, those determination outlaw word about the latest ordinance is order. argument after oral new ordinance became effective ordinance,
in this Under that Court. “churches and similar zone, places worship” are now a in an conditional use R-15 “building and a as a church defined or structure where *19 worship, for persons regularly design assemble which and primarily conducting orga- are for the construction intended accessory nized services uses associated there- with.” passage prompted correspondence
The
of the latest ordinance
the Court and counsel directed to
effect
between
the
on this
(see
appeal of the “time of decision” rule
Kruvant v. Cedar
Grove,
(1980)).
correspondence
As I do any have to make I not there is believe legitimate any permissi- definition of “church” indeed other or provision of a municipal zoning any ble ordinance or other kind prohibiting of ordinance that can for furnish basis the activi- place ties that took in this The municipali- defendant’s home. ty’s intention, however, persist stated is to effort its to close protected Sunday- the doors of Cameron to the household morning religious this, observances despite conducted there — requirement building ordinance’s definitional that for a conducting intended for the church, “primarily must it be * * * ” added), (emphasis religious services organized religious activity for for was used household Cameron correctly invalidates The Court therefore only Vi68of the week. to this defendant’s con- new ordinance any application of the duct, 597, although again limiting ante at ruling “vague- its to leave no doubt I use the occasion grounds. ness” would misguided that their effort municipal officials the minds of the entirely any on basis is prosecution further must fail and that relief. unwarranted, any application injunctive as would be already has rights his defendant effort to vindicate occasions; on several Municipal Court appeared pro se in the Law expense of a trial de novo undergone the has Division; Appellate Division; appeal an to the has had to mount appeal an to this and, additional cost of finally, has borne the intention to continue municipality signalled its has Court. tolerate wrong. should not he is We tell defendant that when, least, has been defendant to me more of the same goes, enough. saying right along. Enough, as all V *20 1355, 668, 104 S. Ct. Donnelly, 465 U.S. Recently Lynch in Doug (1984), echoed Justice Supreme Court 2d 604 79 L.Ed. people institu religious whose that are a las’s observation “[w]e at -, at 104 Ct. Being.” S. Supreme Id. presuppose a tions Clauson, 343 U.S. (quoting Zorach v. 1360, at 611 79 L.Ed.2d (1952)). The Court 683, 954, 962 96 L.Ed. S.Ct. beliefs, and religious our diversity rich us of the reminded “gov expression, religious accommodating all forms of by of our traditions’ the best action has ernmental ‘follow[ed] ” supra, people’ Lynch, religious nature of our ‘respect[ed] the at -, (quoting at 79 L.Ed.2d at U.S. S.Ct. at at 96 L.Ed. Zorach, S.Ct. supra, 343 U.S. many of forefathers of remembering that the 962). It is worth things, govern- among other escape, these shores to us came to regulation worship. governments ment of their forms of Local enough busy to keep legitimate have more than them in the zoning power, delegated general exercise for the them II, supra, power welfare. Laurel 158. That See Mt. N.J. squandered prevention prayer meetings should not be by privacy in the conducted invitation one’s home. I join judgment reversal of the of conviction. GARIBALDI, Justice, dissenting. presents
This case the issue of whether a minister’s home, by Sunday congregation formal, used each his liturgi- services, cal is meaning a “church” within the of the Franklin Township (Ordinance). Zoning Ordinance I would hold that a home regular church when it is used as the site for the organized, traditional recognized body, services of an religious presided by which services are over the ordained minister of body. When all present, these elements are the use is within the commonly-accepted Ordinance’s meaning of “church places and similar worship.” Because all of these conditions here, are met I hold that would the Rev. Mr. Cameron’s home was used as a meaning church within the of the Ordinance. conclusion,
In reaching this I find that the ordinance in question unconstitutionally does not restrict the free- dom of the congregation Rev. Mr. Cameron or his and that the question, clarity, ordinance with sufficient forbids the reli- gious activity home, conducted the Rev. Mr. Cameron in his him, applied and as is not constitutionally vague.
I controversy arose when the Rev. J. Robert Cameron used regular his every home to hold church Sunday services for congregation of Mount Episcopal Church, Carmel Reformed which he is the minister. The Episcopal Reformed Church is *21 recognized religious separated denomination that the Epis- from The J. Cameron is a copal Church in 1893. Rev. Robert Seminary Episco- graduate Theological of the Reformed the of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He was pal ordained Church Presbyter, as a the a Deacon 1978 and later was ordained currently the ordination in his church. He is highest order of Reformed spiritual minister and leader Mount Carmel compensated these congregation and Episcopal Church services. congregation held spring sometime in the the
Until Sunday building. It in a local school regular formal services its newspapers. An in rent its in local increase services advertised to home. the of services defendant’s led to transfer search, perma- diligent not find a congregation, despite a could Rev. According to to the location that it could afford rent. nent Cameron, caused temporary facilities would have Mr. the use First, liturgical require or formal services hardship. a heavy to that are and difficult of certain articles use damage if stored. subject to accidental transport and are (i.e., kneeler); a lectern prayer a desk a These articles include bible; speak; pews or a from to pulpit to the church which hold and, rail possible, if communion congregation; chairs for Second, Rev. may receive communion. at which members surroundings from that secular detract Mr. Cameron asserts Mr. According to the Rev. solemnity the services. prac- affidavit, he the traditional decided follow Cameron’s others, holding services church, many in his as well as tice or one in the home of its minister “fledging congregation” for a can be permanent ‘church’ location of its members “until obtained.” moving Sunday its services the first weeks after
For few house, congregation continued Mr. the Rev. Cameron’s News, newspaper. Home local its services advertise Churches,” (“The 11 at 5 a.m. service “In the June place at Episcopal Church will take Reformed Mount Carmel residence], in section the Somerset [of Mr. Rev. Cameron’s [the preach- Rev. J. Cameron Township], with the Robert Franklin *22 ing.”). congregation advertisement, After the discontinued this by only, attendance at the services was invitation with invita- know, “people tions extended to that we we meet No [sic].” signs any placed kind of were at the Rev. Mr. Cameron’s home being to indicate that services were held. Sunday
The
church services held at the
Mr.
Rev.
Cameron’s
congregation
bouse were the same
previously
services
had
by
order,
held
school. Until halted
court
these services
every Sunday
noon,
were conducted
from a.m. to
first in the
living room,
defendant’s
then in a
recently
room that he
had
for,
building
added to his house
according
permit applica-
his
April
owner,”
tion of
“activities
which included
by
prayers,
Cameron,
sermon
the Rev.
singing,
Mr.
and the
taking
aof
collection. It is clear that the home was not “used
only infrequently
religious worship,”
for
incidentally
as the
majority alleges.
The Ordinance establishes seventeen different zones. De- zone, home fendant’s is located in the R-15 residential which permits only single-family dwellings. R-15, In addition to places “churches worship” only and similar are prohibited in zones, two other residential R-10 and R-7. Of all resi- zones, dential these three zones have the smallest lot sizes and population. the densest places worship” similar permitted
“Churches and are uses zones, strictly R-20, in all the other residential R-40 and zone, RO-40-1 and in the R-R R-A zone OPT zone. requirements lot zones are minimum some of these there However, the places worship.” OPT “churches and similar zone, zone, zone the defend- the R-15 which which abuts located, family dwellings, and two permits home one ant’s requirement. no minimum lot
II
allegation
any merit in the Rev. Mr. Cameron’s
I do not find
places worship
the
of
and similar
of
that
exclusion
churches
constitutes an unwarrant
single-family
from a
residential zone
worship.
primari
religious
Mr. Cameron relies
ed restriction of
205,
1526,
Yoder,
32
406
92
L.Ed.
ly on
v.
U.S.
S.Ct.
Wisconsin
398,
(1972),
Verner, 374
83
v.
U.S.
S.Ct.
2d 15
Sherbert
1790,
(1963),
support
position
to
his
that the
Court held that religion freedom clause violated the school attendance laws in established The evidence that case of the first amendment. “contraveneQ high school would requiring that attendance 218, at practice.” 92 religious tenets and 406 U.S. the basic expert 1534, 26. was also testimo- at 32 at There S.Ct. L.Ed.2d destroy ultimately ny compulsory attendance could that 212, 1531, 32 L.Ed.2d at community. at at church Id. S.Ct. danger present is here. 23. Neither places worship from R-15 The exclusion Ordinance’s that infirmities caused manifest the constitutional zone does not Yoder, to There is no supra, fall. law in v. Wisconsin Township. religious activity throughout No prohibition of contrary religious her beliefs and to his or required is act one in order to any belief required one to abandon no is comply the law. Verner, supra, U.S.
Nor is the situation Sherbert 1790, 965, case. The similar to this 10 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. Supreme United States Court in that case held that South pay unemployment compensation Carolina’s refusal to a Seventh-Day Adventist because her refusal to work on Saturdays applied. empha- was unconstitutional as The Court sized that ineligibility not is it that declared for only apparent appellant’s benefits derives religion, forgo from the of her but the her to solely practice pressure upon ruling following is unmistakable. forces her to choose
practice
between
religion
forfeiting
of her
on the one
precepts
benefits,
hand,
abandoning
religion
one
of her
order to
precepts
work, on the
accept
other
hand.
The focused on the centrality religious Court the burdened observance to the believer’s faith to determine the existence of infringement. an unconstitutional first It noted that the con- Kingdom merely struction the Hall was “a desireable acces- sory worship, Congregation’s not a fundamental tenet of the
615 Id. at 307. the ordinance It next noted religious beliefs.” making practice of the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ in the resulted require Congregation the expensive, more but did not beliefs religious its beliefs. abandon Congregation an the ordinance are indirect The on the burdens imposed Congregation subjective a aesthetic burden. The may
financial burden and residential in Lakewood in commercial or multi-family build a church only Congregation the and, in these districts is more expensive district. Land area where the lot is located. than the less conducive claims, worship Congregation must choose between this is not a case where the However, incurring government religious forfeiting exercising benefits or its beliefs and Congregation its on the to abandon No is placed criminal pressure penalties. Congregation would face it true that and observances. While is beliefs began building not have on the would site, if it proposed penalties penalties practicing dissuading Congregation from its or the effect of the purpose the increased cost of of the ordinance are the burdens short, faith. Congregation’s if purchasing aesthetic senses, land and the violation Congregation in Lakewood. chooses to build a new church at 307.] lid. exist, religious freedom to
Finding infringement no Village established the standard of review court invoked Co., Realty 272 U.S. S.Ct. Euclid v. Ambler (1926). ordinance did bear L.Ed. It determined health, safety, morals or public relation to “substantial 71 L.Ed. at at U.S. S.Ct. at general welfare.” ration- the ordinance was Accordingly, the Court held that 314. minimal burden had met its ally and that Lakewood based zoning ordinance. justifying its
The exclusion of noise and confusion wide, people rationally 308.] 94 S.Ct. [1536] exercised its few, all and motor vehicles restricted.” due to motor vehicle traffic. uses except police power [39 L.Ed.2d 797 residential substantially preserve (1974) ] [Lakewood, supra, Belle “quiet City Terre, place minimizes has where legitimately and U.S. congestion, 699 F.2d at yards [1] at 9, are Lakewood, free- infringement there no As worship from the R-15 places of The exclusion of dom here. *25 Re- of the continued existence poses no threat to the zone demonstrated has not Episcopal Defendant formed Church. services, including the religious anyone wishing to attend that congregation, members of the Rev. Mr. Cameron’s has suffered particular any detriment. fact, the Rev. Mr. not claim Cameron did before the Court, Division,
Municipal Appellate or the nor does he claim here, congregation that unless the conduct religious could ser- home, at it will vices his be unable to conduct services any other location. Nor has the Mr. presented Rev. Cameron any support facts that would a claim that the exclusion of effectively congre- R-15 churches from the zone terminates his gation’s right practice religion. Nothing in to its the ordinance suggests residing in any allowing that a minister the zones prohibited holding churches would be from church services home; his that the Rev. Mr. Cameron could not conduct servic- abutting zone, by acquiring es in the OPT either a home or using the home or business establishment of someone located in zone; impossible that or that it is the congregation for practice religion neighboring municipality. its
The fact Rev. Mr. congregation Cameron’s unable was premises continue sug- to rent from the Board of Education gests financing any problem is a relocation. That observation, however, very proof far from the needed to support practical the conclusion that there were no other alter- natives that Accordingly, would not violate the Ordinance. has no showing infringes there been that the Ordinance in fact upon Congregation’s right religion. to free exercise of municipality also prong satisfies the second the test namely, forth in set that the Ordinance bears a Lakewood— health, morals, public safety, substantial relation to the or general significance welfare. The Township’s interest in traffic, noise, regulating safety, congestion becomes clear when the Ordinance is as a viewed whole. The United States Supreme acknowledged municipality Court has that a has values, power “lay values, family youth out zones where quiet blessings air seclusion and clean make the area a sanctuary Boraas, people.” Terre Belle U.S. *26 1536, 797, (1974). power 39 L.Ed.2d This S.Ct. meaningless any protec- if uses with first-amendment becomes from a zone. may not excluded residential be tipn that his are “innocuous” and no Defendant asserts activities people having different their effect from a few over for argues, signifi- he therefore has government, cocktails. The no Any regulating activity per interest in his se. deleterious cant through regulated can enforcement of criminal stat- effects utes, ordinances, by application general police power of the of nuisance. law First, argument point reasons. it is
This misses the for two zoning allege types ordinance that other of no defense a zoning a violation of the ordinance. That conduct would not be householder, example, may have several children who a playing backyard does not mean make substantial noise in such zone. nursery a could be established a school restaurant, Similarly, place worship, a small or that a small disruptive to tran- may retail be less small establishment large family is quility single-family of a zone than a irrelevant. Second, governmental it on the that the premised is notion particular use should be assessed regulating interest a land case-by-case part planning than of a whole on a basis rather zoning popular. ignores the reason became scheme. This notion part subject certain un Early zoning arose in ordinances necessity proving uses without the wanted to restraint case-by-case public on a basis. private or nuisance elements Rathkopf, Zoning and D. The Law Rathkopf 1 A. & 1-3, purpose of a 1-11. Thus one Planning, 1.01 at § investigate need to municipality ordinance to relieve by allowing purpose This is achieved each individual situation. classify uses. municipality to Id. upon infringe Rev. not Accordingly, the Ordinance does Nor does the exclusion rights. Mr. Cameron’s first amendment Jersey the New single-family zones violate of churches from Ordinance, I, para. 18. art. Constitution of limiting Congregation the secular interests of the to establish a place worship choosing, at a location of its own does not deprive anyone privilege worshiping “of inestimable Almighty agreeable God in a manner to the his dictates of own *27 addition, Id., Lakewood, para. conscience.” 3. as in the rationally municipality Ordinance is based inasmuch as the is merely invoking police power maintain peace its to the tranquility neighborhoods. of its residential
Ill I agree today Nor do this decision the Court’s not, clarity, religious Ordinance does with sufficient forbid the activity and, by the Rev. in conducted Mr. Cameron his home as him, applied vague constitutionally is unenforceable. Although majority the Mr. the Rev. Cameron and couch their objection vagueness in the terms of unconstitutional statute, argument simply their basic is that the the use of home regular services did not render home a his Thus, meaning “church” within the of the Ordinance. accord- ing argument, to this inapplicable Ordinance is this context. majority, concluding phrase
The that the “churches and places worship” analyzes similar vague, is the word by focusing building being “church” on the or is structure that signify place worship, used a church or similar than rather religious activity on participants engage. which the It is activity, structure, not the towards which the is Ordinance interpret majori- To narrowly directed. Ordinance as ty suggests many would leave uncovered activities otherwise intended be restricted. explicit
In the contrary, absence of an indication to the thee presumes legislative body term, court that the intended that generally employed, according others like be construed to its meaning. commonly-accepted Twin-City Bible Church Zon 919, 924, 927-28, 8 Appeals, Ill.App.3d Ill.Dec. ing Bd. of 921-22, 1381, (1977) 365 N.E.2d 1383-84 (construing “church”); Moyer v. Board Zoning Appeals, 311, 233 A.2d 316-17 (Me.1967) “hotel”); (construing Zoning Jones v. Hearing Bd. of Tp., (1972) (constru Lower Merion Pa.Cmwlth. 288-89 “club”). ing All that required interpretation is that proceed in accordance commonly with what would be under by stood language employed. See A. Rathkopf & D. Rathkopf, The Law Zoning Planning, supra, 9.03, & § (4th 1985); 9-6 ed. Renz v. Corp., Penn Cent. 87 N.J. (1981)(words in statutes construed according to common mean ing); Hills, Levin v. Parsippany-Troy (1980) 82 N.J. (same); Dairies, Abbotts Inc. v. Armstrong, 14 N.J.
(1954) (same). given The label the use the owner does not determine whether proposed use comes within the terms of a zoning ordinance. This is ascertained from the actual use operation. the method of 1 A. Rathkopf Rathkopf, & D. Law Zoning 9.06, and Planning, supra, at 9-17. § *28 Jersey
New case law accords with principles. these In George Excise, v. Board 73 (Sup.Ct.1906), N.J.L. 366 of aff'd o.b., (E. 1907), N.J.L. & A. the building, court held that a partially dwelling used as a storage and area partially and used Curists,” as a mission “Faith was not a church. The Faith Curists, who evidently organized were not under the laws of Jersey, New held evenings services on certain Tuesdays and on (but not Sundays) on and Sunday conducted a school the building. suggested Id. at 367. The court that the common meaning of “church” “body persons is a of of a common religious faith purposes associated for worship under some permanent form of organization.” There was no testimony any “that religious organization holds proscribed within the meetings services,” area stated for church so the court held building, that a group merely which a “religiously inclined persons” “together like,” met study for Bible and the was not a church. reasoning suggests Id. at 368. This that the activities determining at the location are the factors to establish whether building a is used as a “church.” considered is not
That the nature of the user should be Nevius, long in his ago As as Justice dissent surprising. Fisher, Baptist Soc’y in Trustees N.J.L. meaning the term “church” had (Sup.Ct.), noted that the organizational years so that it involved an shifted over the “church” aspect. The term meeting signified the common convened consult upon anciently any public designate of sacred or of a was afterwards used to place State,
welfare religious meetings, again congregations, religious and it was assem- applied and but at the time and under our institutions associations, blies or present or This it must be understood to a laws, corporation. express spiritual it considered used in that sense is now its and must be ordinary acceptation in these articles of association. [Id. at 257.] Adjustment, v. Board Misc.
Newark Athletic Club N.J. (Sup.Ct.1929), also focused on the actual use made of case, applicant sought permit an a property. In that against public garage in that did not zone such erect a a district particular applied. restrictions One such structures unless garage of the within 200 feet precluded restriction construction required The court therefore to determine of a church. was particular could be characterized as whether structure building in meaning church of the statute. The within question parish conducting used for was a house read, school of at which there are Parish, hymns the Sunday Trinity prayers sung, reading twice each instruction, bible scripture Sunday except during August. night There is choir in the week every July practice except meetings and church held There are church committee social functions Friday. during for deaf mutes held once a month Lent.
there and services except building meetings young of the of the church, this are also held people Meetings scouts. are also women’s auxiliary boy vestry probably building. held in this [Id. 58.] using people using George, people the mission in
Unlike the *29 However, religious body. Trinity organized were an Parish Church, place worship, Trinity congregation had a main of house, suggests parish at the like the which that the activities mission, from at the Faith Curists’ differed those activities body’s place worship. main of traditionally reserved for the
621 These eases accord following dictionary with the definition of Dictionary, Black’s Law in (4th church 1951): 306 ed. general religious CHUECH. In its most sense, founded and society propagate
established
Jesus Christ, to
and
by
receive,
his
preserve,
doctrines
and ordinances.
gathered
It
also mean a
of
may
communicants
into
body
church order,
Jennings,
(Mass.)
v.
Stebbins
10 Pick.
193;
or
of
body
community
Christians,
government
united under one form of
of the same
by
profession
faith,
McNeilly
Presby-
the observance of
the same ritual and
First
ceremonies,
Brookline,
terian
Church in
building,
243 Mass.
137 N.E.
691, 694;
Congregations
Dent,
Combined
District
Columbia v.
140 F.2d
of
of
congregation,
Presbyterian
Trustees
Pencader
D.C.
Church
U.S.App.
254;
of
Gibson,
in Pencader Hundred v.
organization
22 A.2d
Del.,
782, 787, 788;
Williams,
religious
Williams v.
purposes,
N.C.
S.E.2d 334, 338;
regularly
Liquor
where
Stubbs v. Texas
place
assemble for
persons
worship,
Board,
Control
religious
In
Zoning frequently permitted ordinances define proscribed or activity commonly-used “restaurants,” words such as “hospitals,” above, and “hotels.” As discussed there exists a presumption legislature intended that one should con- strue such according terms commonly-accepted to their mean- ing. doTo otherwise reasoning and follow the of the majority, upon which building structure, relies or would result an anomalous example, excluding result. For restaurants from particular municipality, zones in the the Ordinance makes no dining activity mention of generic as such. The word “restau- rant” connotes a variety interpretations. might One con- ceive of a posh eatery restaurant requiring parking valet
622 with a few or a small store-front delicatessen and formal attire through running these chairs. The thread tables common To focus on the images activity that occurs therein. impose impossible task on the building would an or structure of such statutes. drafters
IV
determining
impermis-
a statute is
touchstone in
whether
The
against
enforce-
vague
complainant
whom
sibly
is whether
that his conduct runs
sought
fairly
has
warned
ment is
been
In our recent case of State
statutory proscription.
afoul
statute,
156,
(1984),
Lee,
held that the
which
96
167
we
v.
N.J.
degree
person
crime if that
person guilty
of a fourth
makes
manifestly appro-
weapon
circumstances not
possesses a
“under
have,”
may
“impermis-
uses as it
was not
priate for such lawful
opinion
In that
we stated:
sibly vague
applications.”
in all its
susceptible
precise
prohibited
is not
“That the
behavior
The words of
legislative paralysis.
not lead to
definition need
warning so that an
challenged statute are a sufficient
degree of cer-
ordinary person
apprised
‘is
with a reasonable
”
166;
proscribed.’
Village
Id. at
see
tainty of that which is
Inc.,
Estates,
455 U.S.
Flipside,
Estates v.
Hoffman
Hoffman
362, 371,
498,
reh’g
489,
71 L.Ed.2d
102 S.Ct.
(1982);
denied,
950,
2023,
102
Abstract words daily usage, a content conveys any that person interested a concept sufficient of what is “A term may forbidden. have a meaning enough well engaged defined to one apply enable in trade to it correct ly.” Annot., 374, 96 L.Ed. (1952). always 378 And while it will possible legal imagination be for fertile conjure up hypothetical in meaning cases which the of terms will be disputed, applicable practical standard “the criterion of fair notice to those to whom the statute is directed. The American Communica particular important.” context is all Douds, supra, tions Ass’n v. 382, 412, 339 U.S. 674, S.Ct. 70 94 L.Ed. 925, Grayned see (1950); City Rockford, also v. 951 of U.S. 104, 111, 2294, 408 92 S.Ct. 2300, 222, 33 L.Ed.2d 229 (1972) (an proscribed “making any anti-noise ordinance that of noise or impermissibly diversion which not vague disturbs” “we expect certainty since can never mathematical from our Cooper, v. language.”) 77, Kovacs 79, 448, 336 U.S. 69 S.Ct. denied, 93 L.Ed. reh’g U.S. S.Ct. 336 69 93 L.Ed. 1083 (1949) (use of words in “loud and raucous” restricting Trenton ordinance sound trucks did not render stat vague ute through and daily unenforceable because words had acquired use sufficiently concept a conveyed content forbidden). what was urges Ordinance, majority being quasi-criminal that this nature, application heightened scrutiny. 100 requires the by approach rejected has been numer
N.J. at 594. This strict Marco, Suspension De In re 83 N.J. ous cases. 36-37 (1980) Parmigiani, v. (1974), State N.J. 154 (citing aff’g 65 Sales, Angelo’s N.J.Super. Motor State (App.Div. 200 Gill, Provenzano, 1973); (1966); State v. N.J. State v. Bros., Inc., N.J.Super. 34 N.J. State v. (1961); Gratale (1953)). Instead, scrutiny applied level of be has fairness, question given been held to turn on the the statute given the situation of defendant. Cer- provisions, and its gives person tainly, query must the statute we whether intelligence his conduct is ordinary fair notice that forbidden But, penalties. as we stated in De punishable certain at 37: Marco, 83 N.J. supra, linguistic That does not consist of a conducted test, however, analysis language vacuum. It includes not but related itself, simply provision to which the is to be well, especially reality provision provisions applied. Marco, determining penalizes a statute that De whether construed, malpractice strictly was to we physicians physician defendant’s status as a and whether a considered ordinary intelligence would have to understand “physician act, legislature prohibit that the intended to violations of the prohibit any gross malpractice might intended to act of added). (emphasis patient.” the life or health of a Id. threaten *32 Therefore, may reasonably that one’s conduct one 'who know may proscription falls within the of the relevant ordinance be charged so construed. with notice that the ordinance would be may successfully challenge the statute on One not thereafter vagueness grounds simply other conduct within the because the accorded the same fair ambit of statute would not be 733, 756, 2547, 41 warning. Levy, Parker v. 94 S.Ct. U.S. (1974). L.Ed.2d upholding certain rested decisions of the court statutes sufficiently
[T]he having a the conclusion that words or technical or upon they employed phrases meaning, enough known to enable those within their reach to other well special * * * meaning, them or a well-settled common law notwith- correctly apply standing degree might an element of in the definition as to which estimates * * v. General Constr. U.S. 46 S.Ct. Co., differ *. [Connally (1926).] 70 L.Ed. here, sufficiently Applying principles the ordinance is these Cameron, minister, Mr. a fairly clear so as to warn the Rev. regular Sunday runs afoul of that use of his home for services township’s places of all “churches and similar the exclusion supra worship” from the R-15 residential zone. As discussed 594-595, acquired a common “church” has at word meaning in everyday parlance that turns on the nature of the user and the made of property. meaning actual use The enough “church” is well established so that a man of the cloth certainly religious that engaged would understand activities by fledgling “church,” his congregation thereby constituted a providing him notice required by procedural with the fair due process.
The Rev. an Mr. Cameron is ordained minister Re- Episcopal spiritual formed Church and leader of the Mount Episcopal Carmel consisting Reformed Church. The services sermon, collections, prayers, singing, a regularly conducted every Sunday home, Rev. Mr. Cameron’s the same were congregation previously services the conducted. services liturgical required were formal and certain equip- ment, desk, including prayer bible, a a lectern for the church a pulpit, rail, pews congrega- communion or chairs for the recognized affidavit, tion. As defendant himself his permanent services would held in house be his “until ‘church’ And, course, can location obtained.” the advertisements discontinued, newspapers, in the although support the conclu- sion that the defendant’s home constituted the church for the congregation of the Mount Episcopal Carmel Reformed Church. my It not charge unreasonable in view to Mr. the Rev. Cameron with notice such would be construction of the ordinance.
Moreover, the Township provided the Rev. Mr. Cameron Zoning activity proscribed Municipal notice his was Municipal Township Ordinance. The Court of Franklin found *33 Yet, it Rev. Mr. Cameron in violation of the Ordinance. penalty against no him him assessed and instead ordered subject holding cease services in his home to a fine for $500 complainant’s knowledge each future violation. belies Such process contention he deprived was due because of activity question lack of in proscribed. notice that the was As such, challenge constitutionality to the the Rev. Mr. Cameron’s him applied must fail. of the statute on its face Y case, Subsequent argument of this the Court was to the oral adopted zoning Township that Franklin had a new advised governing changed the standards the use of a ordinance the term property as a “church” a R-15 zone and defined Grove, (1980), “church.” Under Kruvant v. 82 N.J. Cedar normally require legality that the of the use of the we would Mr. home as a “church” be determined under Rev. Cameron’s Cameron, zoning ordinance. Counsel for the Rev. Mr. the new however, requested has that the “time of decision” rule not be stated, because, application of applied correctly here as he Mr. the new ordinance will not invalidate Rev. municipal court that he had violated the Cameron’s conviction prior Ordinance.
Therefore, home is I hold that the Rev. Mr. Cameron’s would regular is the prior a “church” under the Ordinance because it congregation Episcopal Reformed site for his of Mount Carmel Moreover, Township’s I hold that the Franklin Church. would places worship” from the exclusion of “churches and similar located, zone, R-15 Mr. Cameron’s home is which Rev. municipality’s zoning power; legitimate was a exercise of the that the exclusion neither first nor fourteenth amend- violates rights; prohibition vague. is not ment and that the Accordingly, judgment I would affirm below. O’HERN, JJ., concurring in the result. CLIFFORD and and Justices CLIF- For reversal —Chief Justice WILENTZ FORD, HANDLER, and O’HERN—5. POLLOCK and GARIBALDI—
For SCHREIBER affirmance —Justices 2.