State v. Joshua Rathbun, 184 A.3d 211

Background

Defendant Joshua Rathbun was indicted and convicted of two counts of first-degree child molestation based on his daughter Megan’s disclosures and testimony; he received concurrent 40-year sentences with 25 years to serve.
Allegations arose after Megan (born 1999) exhibited self-harm and disclosed to her mother in 2012 that her father had sodomized her and performed oral sex on her; she underwent medical and forensic evaluations.
Dr. Natalie Kissoon, a child-abuse pediatrician, performed a medical exam, found no definitive physical signs of abuse, but initially testified that Megan’s disclosure was "consistent with sexual abuse." The trial court later struck that specific statement.
Defense moved to strike Dr. Kissoon’s testimony in full, moved for a mistrial (pass the case) after the testimony, and later sought a new trial based on newly discovered evidence (a post-trial police report in which the mother alleged domestic violence by her partner).
The trial justice denied the motions; defendant appealed arguing improper bolstering (expert vouching), need to pass the case due to prejudice, and entitlement to a new trial based on the later police report.
The Supreme Court affirmed: it held the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the remaining expert testimony, refusing a mistrial, or denying a new-trial motion.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility / bolstering of expert testimony	State: Remaining testimony was relevant, within expert's field, and not vouching for witness credibility	Rathbun: Dr. Kissoon improperly bolstered Megan by opining her disclosure was consistent with abuse and lacked foundation	Court: Struck the specific vouching remark, found remaining testimony permissible and not impermissible bolstering; no abuse of discretion
Motion to pass/mistrial after stricken testimony	State: Stricken statement cured by instruction; victim's testimony alone can suffice under §11-37-11	Rathbun: Jurors heard the prejudicial statement; cautionary instruction insufficient — mistrial required	Court: Trial justice’s curative instruction and discretion to assess prejudice were adequate; denial affirmed
New trial — newly discovered evidence (post-trial police report)	State: Report was not outcome-changing and would be at best impeaching	Rathbun: Post-trial police report about mother’s domestic-violence allegations would explain Megan’s behavior and alter verdict	Court: Report was discoverable or impeaching, attenuated to central issue, failed Firth test; new trial denied
Corroboration requirement for sex-offense convictions	State: Victim’s testimony need not be corroborated under statute and precedent	Rathbun: Sought corroboration and attacked probative value of expert testimony	Court: Corroboration is not required; jury decides probative weight; no error

Key Cases Cited

State v. Lynch, 854 A.2d 1022 (R.I. 2004) (admissibility of evidence reviewed for abuse of discretion)
State v. Momplaisir, 815 A.2d 65 (R.I. 2003) (evidentiary rulings lie within trial justice’s discretion)
State v. Griffin, 691 A.2d 556 (R.I. 1997) (trial justices have wide discretion over expert testimony)
State v. Watkins, 92 A.3d 172 (R.I. 2014) (expert testimony that bolsters victim credibility can be improper)
State v. Haslam, 663 A.2d 902 (R.I. 1995) (repeated references to recovery or credibility constitute improper bolstering)
State v. Huffman, 68 A.3d 558 (R.I. 2013) (distinguishing expert medical consistency opinions from impermissible vouching)
State v. Arroyo, 844 A.2d 163 (R.I. 2004) (opinion on another witness’s truthfulness is impermissible bolstering)
State v. Botelho, 753 A.2d 343 (R.I. 2000) (expert testimony must be relevant, within expertise, and founded in fact)
State v. Bettencourt, 723 A.2d 1101 (R.I. 1999) (factors for admitting expert testimony)
State v. Dubois, 36 A.3d 191 (R.I. 2012) (jury presumed to follow curative instructions absent evidence to the contrary)
State v. Barkmeyer, 949 A.2d 984 (R.I. 2008) (trial justice best positioned to assess jury prejudice)
State v. Ordway, 619 A.2d 819 (R.I. 1992) (mistrial required only when prejudice cannot be cured by instruction)
State v. Collazo, 446 A.2d 1006 (R.I. 1982) (standard for passing a case/mistrial)
State v. Cabral, 410 A.2d 438 (R.I. 1980) (corroboration of victim’s testimony not required)
Owens v. Silvia, 838 A.2d 881 (R.I. 2003) (appellate review of trial justice’s exercise of discretion)
Morra v. Harrop, 791 A.2d 472 (R.I. 2002) (standards for discretionary rulings)
State v. Benton, 413 A.2d 104 (R.I. 1980) (jury decides weight of expert testimony)
State v. DiPetrillo, 922 A.2d 124 (R.I. 2007) (two-part test for new trial based on newly discovered evidence)
State v. Firth, 708 A.2d 526 (R.I. 1998) (four-part inquiry for newly discovered evidence standard)