*1 Conclusion
Accordingly, judgment of the Dis-
trict quashed, Court is and the record in
this case shall be remanded to the District
Court with our decision endorsed thereon
for the entry judgment of a in favor of the
school committee.
Justice FLAHERTY did participate.
STATE
Raymond LYNCH.
No. 1999-327-C.A.
Supreme Rhode Island.
Aug. 2004. *6 Bush, Plaintiff. Esq., R.
Christopher Providence, Laroche, for De- Esq., Mark fendant. WILLIAMS, son, C.J., psychologist.
Present: a school Michelle testi- FLANDERS, GOLDBERG, fied that she FLAHERTY did so because she was con- SUTTELL, might and cerned that defendant abusing JJ. Thereafter,
Mary. Ms. Tillotson called Mary to her Ms. office. Tillotson testified OPINION that Mary initially said that was not she SUTTELL, Justice. supposed to talk about what her father did defendant, to her her mother Raymond Lynch, The when work. ap- peals Superior Mary then said that defendant had jury from sex convictions “all her the time” the basement first-degree three counts of sexual as- their second-degree immediately sault two home. Ms. Tillotson and counts sex- ual called Warwick Police Department assault. The victim of all five and assaults Children, Youth, Department developmentally daugh- was his and impaired ter Families and later Mary.1 alleges He trial court drove Mi- police chelle to committed thirteen distinct station. errors that warrant reversal of some or all convic- The arrested that day. defendant was tions, and that trial abused his Several weeks later indictment was by denying discretion the defendant’s mo- charging him filed with three counts of tion for a new trial. first-degree sexual assault and two counts second-degree against sexual assault Facts and Travel Mary, count second-degree one incident, precipitating At the time of the assault of simple and one count assault years was sixteen old and resided sister, against younger her and one count Warwick, Island, parents, Rhode with her of simple assault A Michelle. younger sister, younger brother. convicted him of the five involving counts Friday, September On Mary in- Mary,2 after which defendant filed a mo- school, Michelle, vited a friend from trial, tion for newa which was denied on sleep girls over at her house. The 8,May 1998. sentenced bed, together Mary’s watched movie serve, sixty years, thirty defendant to *7 and fell asleep. then first-degree on the each of sexual assault convictions, years and ten to serve on the trial Michelle testified at that she woke two second-degree sexual assault convic- up leaning to find defendant her and over tions, all the to run concurrent- sentences rubbing upper part the of the of back her ly. facts supplied Other will be as needed thigh. She further testified that defendant to the appeal. address issues on her, you told place sleep, need a to “[I]f you can come with sleep me.” Michelle I immediately Lynch left the household and walked home. Michelle was described as Mary’s Competency “hysterical” when she arrived home. The alleges The defendant that the trial called, police responded were and to her justice in finding abused his discretion rape a home with crisis counselor. testify in competent light to of her 24, 1996, limitations,
On September cognitive the next school and communicative day, Mary-Ellen impairment abilities, Michelle met Tillot- intellectual and the juveniles acquitted 1. The names of victim and all The defendant was on the other 2. opinion mentioned in this are three fictitious. counts. the trial that recognized It was testimony competency at her conflicting A sexual cognitive limitations. does have hearing. assault, however, and a traumatic event is Rule 601 of the Rhode Island than may clearly more memorable thus be a requires that witness Rules of Evidence occurrences. See everyday other normal testify. court competent to The trial (R.I. Girouard, 882, A.2d v. State must make four determinations evaluat 1989). believe It is reasonable ing competency: a witness witness’s a Mary may have clear though even “observe, recollect, com must be able to places and times recollection of exact municate, appreciate necessity and took alleged multiple assaults the truth." Seabra telling Trafford- fact that cognizant is still place, she Seabra, (citing 655 A.2d occurred. the assaults Cabral, 623, 629, 122 R.I. 410 A.2d State v. (1980)). This will overturn ability to com- Mary demonstrated only a decision for abuse competency by relating municate facts of Ranieri, (citing Id. discretion. assaults, body parts pointing to her when (R.I.1991)). “The 1098-99 asked, identifying defendant and defer afforded considerable This courtroom. level communication making competency ruling ence in a since competency requirements meets the position he is in the best assess testify (ability See id. before court. present ability comprehend witness’s demonstrated adequately communicate oath, give and obligation of crime, relating the facts of the witness may account of what he have seen correct body parts diagram, pointing to Franklin, (citing or Id. heard.” courtroom). identifying defendant (1968)). 724, 241 103 R.I. Mary could Athough defendant noted that hand, case at con whether she communicate adequately Mary, a voir and was suffi ducted dire high from school graduate going ability to ciently satisfied that she had the currently year, grade what she observe, recollect, communicate, and in, responses we conclude her overall necessity tell appreciated she ques- capacity to understand indicated ing agree. truth. We answers. intelligent to furnish tions and testimony abil- demonstrated her transcripts also evidence ity testified that at to observe. She necessity of tell Mary’s knowledge of the two time of trial lived with house- she the truth. ing mates, they own rooms. and that had their And, you if “THE he asks COURT: that she had a television She testified *8 to do? you supposed question, what are work computer her and a that didn’t room it was not connected. Additional- because I’m talk supposed “THE WITNESS: ly, details concern- she testified in here.
ing multiple times that defendant sexu- And, you sup- are “THE what COURT: ally assaulted her. us? posed to tell remember. The defendant er, favorite television demonstrates Mary’s testimony of the sexual assaults that Mary that she had did not know what programs were on notes, howev- ability day her or going to “THE WITNESS: “THE "* [*] [*] COURT: tell us any Ml Everything. lies? right. Now are you “THE No. room. WITNESS: any she had books whether “THE Why COURT: not? on her meeting Michelle, Based with she “that it important believed to talk with
“THE WITNESS: its [sic ] Because Mary general about her well-being.” Ms. very important to tell the truth.” Mary Tillotson then asked come to her “A child need articulate magic words with office Michelle. As a result of her that he or knows she the difference be- Mary, conversation with she called the De- tween a lie a truth long and as the child partment Children, of Youth and Families understands the definitions of and both police. police and the Warwick A officer Girouard, was there to tell truth.” responded high spoke school and Gerald, (citing A.2d at 886 In re Mary both and Michelle. Ms. Tillotson (R.I.1984)). A.2d 220-21 defer to We and, report made a written request the judgment justice, of the trial upon who officer, girls drove both police hearing exchange, this was confident that station. inMary fact did understand the difference between the and a truth he. After much discussion counsel out- reviewing
After the four testimonial ca- presence jury, side the of the the trial pacities required for a finding compe- said that he would allow Ms. Tillot- tency, we conclude did Mary son to relate what told her that Mary not err in finding to testi- competent jury returned, afternoon. When the Ms. fy. Though cognitive she suffered from Mary Tillotson testified that told her that: and limitations, communicative met she not supposed “She’s to talk about what standard of competency by set forth her dad does to her when her mom is at Court. We also note our established rule work. She told me that —an incident any concerning doubt minimum credi- her, I had related to she—she af- bility of the witness should be resolved firmed that has something happened to favor allowing to hear the her. She told that her me father had had testimony judge the credibility sex with her the basement.” Marr, witness themselves. State v. Tillotson Ms. also testified that curiam) (cit- when she (per happened, asked how often this had ing Evidence, § McCormick On 62 at 91 Mary “seemed to (4th be confused about the Strong ed. Prac. Series Treatise times.” 1992)). “Hearsay evidence is a state
II
ment,
than
other
one made
the declar
Testimony
Psychologist
of the School
ant while
testifying
hearing,
at a
prove
offered
evidence to
the truth of
alleges
The defendant
Angell,
the matter asserted.”
Mary-Ellen
statements
made to
Til
(1979).
R.I.
As a
lotson, a
school psychologist,
certified
were
rule, hearsay statements
are excluded
improperly admitted in
violation
Rule
from the evidence
at trial
introduced
be
803(4) of the Rhode
Island Rules
Evi
oath,
the usual
safeguards
cause
dence because there was no
confrontation,
cross-examination,
are
*9
(or
health)
Mary sought a medical
mental
However,
not available. Id.
there are nu
diagnosis from Ms. Tillotson.
exceptions
merous
to this rule.
Ms.
Septem-
Tillotson testified that on
24, 1996,
ber
803(4),
employee
high
of the
Purposes
Rule
“Statements for
of
school
Treatment,”
asked
to meet
Diagnosis
her
with Michelle. Medical
or
allows
however,
must,
proper
be a
There
to
admitted into
hearsay statements
be
that the statements
showing
foundation
if the statements were:
of
purposes
“for the
question were made
purposes
“made for the
of medical di-
Here,
diagnosis or treatment.”
medical
describing
agnosis or treatment
for
psychologist
Mary
not seek out the
did
history,
present
or
or
past
medical
her problems;
a
or treatment of
diagnosis
sensations, or
or
symptoms, pain,
Mary.
sought
rather,
out
psychologist
inception
general
or
character
that Ms.Tillotson
no indication
There was
cause or external source thereof insofar
Mary as
psycholo
herself to
a
identified
diagnosis or
reasonably pertinent
to
knew that she
gist, or that
even
treatment,
including
statements
but
Further,
it
even
is not
psychologist.
a
for
physician
solely
made to a
consulted
Tillot
clear
was alone
Ms.
litigation
purposes
preparing
of
for
they spoke or whether Michelle
son when
testimony
trial.”
obtaining
or
for
during their conversation.
present
was also
in making
A
motive
the state
declarant’s
a
admissibility
“The
of evidence is
seeking di
ment must be consistent with
sound
question addressed
discretion
See,
v.
agnosis
e.g.,
or treatment.
State
of the trial
and will not be dis
(Iowa
Hildreth,
169-70
N.W.2d
appeal
turbed on
absent a clear abuse of
Wade,
750, 622
1998);
136 N.H.
State
Momplaisir;
discretion.” State
(1993).
The trial
A.2d
(R.I.2003)
65, 72
v. An
(citing
A.2d
dilemma, noting:
considered
(R.I.2002)
374-75
dreozzi
hearsay excep-
clear
“it’s not
from
curiam)).
admissibility Mary’s
The
of
(per
is, making
it
purpose
tion as to whose
hinge
statements
on whether
the state
treating person,
statement
“reasonably pertinent
ments were
to the
purposes
it’s for the
whether
diagnosis
formulation
a medical
or
treat
treating person
purposes
or for
C.,
Id.
In
(citing
ment.”
re Jessica
words, did
person.
In other
the treated
(R.I.1997)).
1357, 1363, 1364
A.2d
to the
[Mary] make these statements
Clearly, Mary’s
declarations
purpose
for the
psychologist
school
psychologist
helpful
school
be
in di-
psychologist
could
treated
the school
being
listening
mental
issues. The
agnosing
psychologist
her
health
the school
purpose
for the
statement
that her father “had sex with
the statements
* *
*
I
[Mary]?
presumed
very
treating
in the
might
basement”
be
rele-
in the
school
that a student
Warwick
vant
to the treatment of emotional and
system visiting
psychologist
school
injuries.
psychological
perpe-
When
psychol-
in the school
premises
on school
trator is member of the child’s immedi-
ogist’s
psycholo-
there to be
office was
household,
may
identity
ate
his or her
well
* * *
gized by
psychologist.
the school
only
reasonably pertinent
[Mary’s]
it
going
I’m
rule
is
plan,
of a treatment
but also to
formulation
and not
making
the assertion
purpose
child
in a safe and
ensure that
is
* *
psychologist's]
so that treatment can
secure environment
G.,
Audrey
be effectuated.
re
underlying
admitting
rationale
Cf.
curiam)
(per
fur-
made in the
out-of-court statements
(child’s
disclosing
doctor
or treatment
diagnosis
therance of medical
identity
“strong
not ad-
motivation
perpetrator generally
person
has a
that will
merely assigns
fault
about information
missible because
be truthful
diagnosis
her]
form
of his
diagnosis).
[or
the basis
and does not aid
*10
Advisory
treatment.”
Note
It is
Committee’s
well established that “the
803(4).
ease,
to Rule
In this
was no
of hearsay
there
admission
evidence is not preju
showing
Mary’s
that
in
purpose
making
merely
dicial
when
evidence
cumula
diagnosis
for
guilt
statements was
or treat-
tive and when defendant’s
is suffi
Tillotson,
ment
from
thus no ciently
by proper
Ms.
and
established
evidence.”
Mary
Micheli,
(R.I.
showing that
had a
motiva-
“strong
1995)
curiam)
meeting
tion to be
(per
(citing Angell,
truthful.” After
122 R.I.
Michelle,
14).
Mary
Ms. Tillotson summoned
at
405 A.2d at
“While
is true
into her office. Whether Ms. Tillotson did that evidence is
accumulated
the course
“diagnose
this to
and treat”
or
Mary
for
of a trial to
guilt,
determine a defendant’s
purely
no im-
cumulative.
investigatory reasons is of
not all evidence is
‘Cumula
port
dispositive
here. The
fact is that
‘tending
prove
tive evidence’ means
Mary did not make these
statements
same
to which
point
other evidence has
”
Ms.
Coleman,
Tillotson
seeking
because she was
been offered.’
treatment,
(1992)
underpin-
and
there
thus
is no
Neb.
478 N.W.2d
ning of reliability.
(quoting
Third
Webster’s
New Interna
(Unabr.1981)). Thus,
Dictionary
tional
Moreover,
showing
was no
there
“cumulative,”
qualify
ever,
fact,
Mary.
Ms. Tillotson
treated
question
only
need not be introduced
after
directly
When asked
if she ever counseled
prove
tending
other evidence
the same
Mary, Ms. Tillotson testified that she
Rather,
point already has been admitted.
occasions,
“met” with her on several
but
one,
is a retrospective
the test
adminis
regularly
“those were
coun-
scheduled
tered at the close of all the evidence to
seling
added,
appointments.” She then
determine whether the admission of cer
“They
generally
were
request
tain
in light
evidence was harmless
of all
someone else
me to
meet with her.”
that point.
the evidence admitted on
conclude, therefore,
We
that there was an
record,
pre-
insufficient
support
reviewing
foundation
After
we conclude
sumption
Mary’s
testimony
to Ms.
merely
statements
that Ms. Tillotson’s
Tillotson were “made for
purposes
light
subsequent
cumulative
testimon
diagnosis
y.3
medical
treatment.” The trial
usual
excluding
The
reasons for
hear
this,
oath,
recognize
say
seemed to
nev-
but
statements —lack of
confron
tation,
Mary
ertheless drew an inference that
greatly
cross-examination'—-are
likely
seeking
simply
to be
treatment
be-
abated here
Tillotson’s
because Ms.
testi
psy-
cause she was
speaking
mony
anything
the school
did not reveal
other than
chologist
prem-
in her
by Mary
office
the school
testified to
herself. See
ises,
talking
as she
had she
might
Angell,
been
R.I. at
IV (R.I.1981). A.2d It is incumbent Jury Instructions to the upon point judge counsel out to the argues The defendant next specifically any corrections or additions justice the trial two committed reversible necessary. that are Id. procedure This is charge jury. First, errors in his critical that any may to ensure errors justice trial defendant contends that immediately, jury corrected before the by instructing jury erred that evidence commences deliberations. Id. Accord its activity of past sexual 1995 with ingly, object the defendant’s failure is juvenile pur another was limited respect fatal to of his claims error with pose assessing credibility. The de jury these two instructions. argues fendant should court have jury that instructed the it could infer from V previous this evidence that activity. of sexual knowledge Secondly, Evidence of Prior Acts defendant contends that Fred Greene by including erred additional in trial, Before the state moved in degree struction that the “second prevent eliciting limine to defendant from charge assault simple could also constitute any evidence relative to a sexual assault assault.” perpetrated upon Mary by Fred Greene errors, these
Both asserted how for which Greene was tried and conv ever, were waived defendant’s failure to icted.4 The also moved in li defendant object requesting after instructed the mine the court allow such jury. firmly It established that evidence. is He asserted that evidence object jury “failure to to a instruction pre assault “should have been admissible appeal.” on sex [Mary’s] knowledge cludes review the instruction show acts or neighbor 4. Fred Greene was an adult Mary's. charge rape of a withdrawal witnesses]
specific sex acts” that she had described
man
than the defendant
Both
were
other
present
case.
motions
complain-
challenge
but
as a
impaneled,
after the
admissible
heard
credibility in
defen-
opening
ing witnesses]
statements.
before
Oliveira, 576
rape trial.”
Id.
dant’s
hearing
the motions
The focus of the
also held
we
*13
Mary’s previous
whether evidence of
was
eleven-year-old victim’s accusations
by
rape
the
protected
sexual activities was
to demonstrate
should have been admitted
statute,
11-37-13,
§
which
shield
G.L.1956
jury
had other
the
that she
sources
a
to introduce evidence
permits
defendant
acts she de-
knowledge of the sexual
her
engaged
complaining
witness
scribed,
allegations were
though
even
her
conduct,
no-
only
prior
prior
upon
sexual
nor withdrawn.
proven
neither
false
If then
specific
proof.
tice and a
offer of
relevant,
court
the evidence to be
finds
“The admission or exclusion of evidence
may
Dorsey,
State v.
783
be admitted.
relevancy
of
is within
grounds
on
(R.L2001)
(citing
A.2d
State
954
and,
justice
the trial
sound discretion of
(R.I.1990)).
Oliveira,
A.2d
576
113
of this discre
showing
absent
of abuse
justice
by
ruled that
assault
The
tion,
ruling
this Court will
disturb
eight years
occurred seven or
Fred Greene
admissibility
of
concerning
evidence.”
ago and
not relevant.
defendant
was
The
(R.I.
Calenda,
A.2d
Mary
request
question
renewed
his
2002)
curiam)
(quoting McBurney
(per
during
about the incident
his cross-exami-
Services,
Inc.,
Apex,
Law
Inc. v.
It
Mary,
nation of
with a similar result.
(R.I.2001) (mem.)). Here,
we
911-12
apparent
transcripts
from the
seems
in the trial
no abuse of discretion
see
of
court’s
was the fact
ruling
the basis
justice’s decision to exclude evidence
Mary’s
conclusive-
allegation
been
Mary.
on
prior
Greene’s
assault
Fred
ly
by Fred
subse-
established
Greene’s
no
Clearly, the
evidence had
proffered
quent
being
appeal,
conviction as
true. On
Mary’s
respect
credibili-
relevance
defendant
asserts
such
convicted,
had been
con-
ty. Fred Greene
demon-
should have been admissible to
the truthfulness of
clusively establishing
Mary’s knowledge of specific
strate
sexual
It was not the function
accusations.
acts.
in an
retry
that case
Superior
credibility. The
was
rape
impugn
statute
effort
shield
eight years be-
encourage
report
assault occurred seven
enacted “to
victims
Also,
trial.
unlike the eleven-
unnecessary
fore the
inviting
crimes without fear of
Oliveira,
nine-
was
history.”
year-old victim
probing into the victim’s sexual
old,
limited,
Oliveira,
at
cognitively
years
teen
albeit
Dorsey,
(citing
The exclusion or admission evi- ment. absence of relating prosecutor being contact between said that the dence sexual witness was subject and show he John was also a offered “to when said did her, jus- parties’ things proof motions in limine. The trial these there was that it engaged explained counsel for He further that parties happened.” tice and both fairly concerning Sgt. testify in a would ad- extensive discussion Holsten John have would not position Mary. John’s declarant’s having mitted to sex admissible, unless declarant prosecu- made statement statements were penal his it to true.” argued, tor as statements believed no there been interest. Because argues that brief, In his defendant aas showing that John was unavailable sexual denial that of John’s written light 804(b)(3), witness, required as is Rule all his asser- and intercourse occurred excused, however, Sgt. sub- Holsten was that did occur that the sexual contact tion ject recall. consensual, gave he the oral statement was parties stipulated later to John’s “ contrary Holsten ‘so far Sgt. re- unavailability, Sgt. Holsten * * * liability’ criminal to [his] as a Over defendant’s called witness. oral he said that believed [be] could objection, she testified that John further to the detective.” He Mary. initially that he even knew denied is not a substantial suggests there know acknowledged later he did He person a reasonable likelihood that her, finally having admitted the oral position would believe John’s her. He said he fondled intercourse with him Hol- by Sgt. statements attributed her, penetrated vaginally her and tried Further, he asserts sten. penetrate anally, but was unsuccessful. *15 properly failed to consider John’s justice occurred, said, large The incident he on a evidence, corroborating the age, the lack of a a rock in wooded area near school. to likelihood that he would be sent small cross-examination, Sgt. Holsten tes- On School, the Training and the fact that the statement, that an making tified after oral he penal authority present when true statement, a John started to make written police, was the made the statements not father, interrupted by was and but his the father. also contends that but his He completed never it. The that statement justice erroneously trial found that John wrote that John admitted he had been given rights. had been his “Miranda” smoking pot Mary, and fondled but ended following sentence: were on “We probability We first note that the nothing kissing the rock we were juvenile be fourteen-year-old would that happened.” state’s Notwithstanding, indeed, liability is, re subject to criminal objection strenuous that this written state- mote, possible allega although, given the penal against ment not declarant’s force coercion and the mental tions of or interest, justice the trial admitted the victim, entirely out of disability of the as full it was statement exhibit because in of the event possibility the realm of being offered as “direct contradiction jurisdic Family to waive Court were testimony.” [Sgt. Holsten’s] however, A delinquency proceeding, tion. 804(b)(3) provides pertinent Rule civil, of crimi opposed as one is “one part: nal, Matter a Child nature.” In the (18) Age, Years Eighteen A Against Interest. state- under “Statement (R.I.1999) (mem.) (quoting mak- which at the time of its A.2d ment (R.I. D., 1173, contrary so far declarant’s re John
ing 1984)). Also, interest, justice percep trial or so as pecuniary proprietary or observed, “may also tively the statements subject declarant far tended interest because liability, against to render economic civil or criminal or know whether declarant doesn’t invalid claim the declarant another, not.” subject pregnant in the is or person that a reasonable
The sodomy, admission of a statement un as for under then-existing ver- exception § der an rule Finally, is sion of G.L.1956 11—10—1.5 noted, justice within sound discretion of the trial the trial the statements were pecuniary to his contrary and shall not be overturned unless interest Torres, event clearly pregnant erroneous. became as a See State v. their, sexual result of encounter. (admissibility A.2d clearly an excited utterance within hand, other it On the is not from clear justice’s discretion and not be over will that a the record reasonable fourteen-\ unless turned there is an of that abuse year-old, investigation alleged under for an discretion); Estate Sweeney Charpen assault, would be mindful (R.I.1996) (admissi tier, possibility Mary might had a have bility of the residual to the hear exception disability mental sufficient to transform an say clearly rule within the discretion of the act of consensual sex into a sexual assault. and will not be overturned likely It perhaps is more that John’s mo- unless there was an abuse of discre admitting to having tive sex- consensual resulting prejudice). tion penal ual relations with was to avoid liability, least to obtain more favor- focus of inquiry The our must be on able treatment from the authorities. Such whether statements so tended to far self-serving generally statements lack the subject John liability to civil or criminal trustworthiness underlies the rule. person position that a reasonable in his not have would made them unless he be- test is not whether a declar them to lieved be true. “The rationale for subjected ant’s could have him exception people likely is that are liability; criminal civil or rather damaging to make statements that are sufficiently whether statement was *16 they themselves unless believe them to be against the declarant’s interest that rea Advisory true.” Note to Rule Committee’s person position sonable declarant’s 804(b)(3). have made would not the statement unless it he believed to be true. See Williamson Here, weigh there are factors that . States, 594, 603-04, v United U.S. both of the issue. The conversation sides (1994). 2431, 129 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d “Rule at place police took the Warwick station 804(b)(3) is founded on the commonsense presence of his to an pursuant father motion that reasonable rea people, even investigation alleged of an assault. sexual who are not hon people especially sonable Although there was no that direct evidence est, not to self-inculpatory tend make given warnings, he had been the Miranda they statements unless to be believe them prosecutor representation made such a 599, 114 at true.” Id. S.Ct. 2431. Further, Court. to the the sexual activi- hearsay ties to which he admitted light In of this circumstances statements, consensual, case, even if would ar- not we are satisfied that a reasonable subject him for guably liability to fourteen-year-old would be that his aware with a penetration mentally-disabled acknowledging indi- sex- statements consensual 11-37-2, § subject vidual under G.L.1956 as well ual with contact could also statement, nature, against 5. time of G.L.1956 or with At the John's either with mankind beast, provided: § 11-10-1 any imprisoned exceeding shall be (7) (20) years against twenty and detestable crime nor less "Abominable than seven Every person who shall convicted years.” nature. — of the abominable and crime detestable Sgt. Holsten was might that he John’s statements penal liability, him to responsibility as a re- any incur financial harmless error. Accordingly, we are unable thereof. sult argument to defendant’s turn We next that oral statements to conclude John’s state John’s admission contrary to his Holsten were so far Sgt. clause the confrontation ments violated Rule interest as be admissible under “The Sixth Amendment. the Sixth 804(b)(3). pro Clause Confrontation Amendment’s satisfied, however, are We that, prosecutions, all criminal ‘[i]n vides admission was harmless error be their * * * enjoy right shall accused The defendant yond a reasonable doubt. against the witnesses be confronted with identify any prejudice from does ” ——U.S. Washington, him.’ Crawford fact, it of these statements. admission ——, ——, 124 S.Ct. first introduced to the
was defendant who
(2004)
Const.
(quoting
L.Ed.2d
U.S.
objection,
evidence
jury, over
state’s
VI).
raised
This issue was not
Amend.
sexual encounter
John
trial,
first
in defen
raised
and indeed
during
Mary.
his
He
cross-examination
sup
post-oral argument
dant’s
citation
support
three
advanced
reasons
plemental authorities.
previous
of the
contention
encounter between
and John was
Supreme
cites the recent
The defendant
First,
argued, it
relevant.
he
established
proposi
opinion
Crawford
Mary spoke
police
the fact that
of wit
tion that
testimonial statements
during
period
alleged
when she
same
nesses
from
are admissible
absent
her,
abusing
yet
that defendant was
unavailable, and
is
only
the declarant
when
complaint
failed to
against
she
make
previ
only
defendant has had
when the
Secondly,
him.
he asserted
it dem
The ex
opportunity
ous
to cross-examine.
knowledge
prior
onstrated her
is to overrule
press effect of Crawford
place
“same exact
acts
took
[sexual]
Roberts,
U.S.
rationale of Ohio
And, thirdly, he
in this case.”
maintained
(1980)
John’s properly pre are questions that sider Mary supported contention defendant’s v. court below. See State sented in the had other sources she (R.I.1987). Burke, 725, 731 Un 522 A.2d Further, asserting knowledge. by however, circumstances, der certain consensual, his were statements relations implicating issues basic will review they Court Mary’s allegations that contradicted record, rights. These circumstances constitutional reviewing were forcible. After are: the admission of we are satisfied that
“First, crime, if complained type the error of must even it is the same than consist more harmless error. and irrelevant inadmissible.” State v. Second, 1206, the record must be sufficient to Gallagher, 654 A.2d Cardoza, permit 200, determination of the issue. (citing v. 465 A.2d State * * * Third, (R.I.1983)). counsel’s failure to raise The rationale poli behind this the issue at trial must be due to the fact issues, cy is to alleviate confusion of the upon that the issue is a novel rule based surprise, prejudice unfair to defen of law of which counsel could not reason Colvin, (citing dant. Id. v. State 425 A.2d ably have known at the time of trial.” (R.I.1981)). 508, 511 Evidence of other (R.I. Ramsey, State 844 A.2d admitted, however, may if crimes be 2004) Smith, (quoting State v. 766 A.2d “guilty tends to establish defendant’s (R.I.2001)). 913, 919 intent, motive, knowledge, design, plan, scheme, system, or the like” relative to the Because we conclude that the error was charged. (quoting Id. harmless, however, offense we need not address Lemon, (R.I.1985)). 497 A.2d issue within the context Crawford “The decision on whether evidence of other this case. permissible crimes is to a purpose relevant VII is left to the sound discretion of the trial Breen, justice.” State v. 767 A.2d Admission of a Letter Written (R.I.2001). If the trial finds that Defendant probative outweighs potential value Younger Sister prejudice, for unfair and chooses to admit argues The defendant that state’s evidence, specific cautionary instruc exhibit No. a handwritten letter from explain tion also must administered to youngest daughter, defendant to his purpose jury may for which the limited unduly prejudicial because the letter men Brown, consider it. second-degree tions an unrelated child (R.I.1993). charge. abuse The defendant asserts that this error not be cured could exhibit No. 7 was a handwritten State’s argues instruction. The defendant young- letter mailed from defendant to his 404(b) the reference violated Rule daughter advising est her: Evidence, Rhode Island Rules of which up you are summonsed to show “When crimes, precludes evidence of other in court for 2nd DEG. Child Abuse wrongs, prove or acts to a defendant’s just, charge, you probably ignore could character order to show that said it, they drop charges. up, not show crimes, wrongs or actions conformed to definitively I’ll You’ll have to check. that character. [Mary], Though I up show to talk to admission of evidence “[T]he anticipate they drop charges *18 that will rests the sound discretion of the trial then, also, testify. with refusal a and will not be disturbed absent Dad” of that showing of an abuse discretion.” (R.I. Hazard, trial, 1111, objected v. At defense counsel State 2001) Motta, exhibit, asserting of this that (quoting 748 A.2d introduction Graff (R.I.2000)). rule, a to the “2nd DEG. Child general “As the reference Abuse,” of de- that or tends to indicate was admitted as evidence evidence shows The trial participated that the accused has a fendant’s bad character. trial, jury distinguish on found that the could not crime for which he or she is not abuse, testimony, only it has all such assault child As with between sexual give it you as fit to for objection. weight see and thus overruled defendant’s such not, however, child must argues purpose. defendant You appeal, On as testimony any weight evi- charges legally distinguishable are give abuse the child that the defen- tending prove from assault and thus dence disposition redacted charges propensity abuse should have been some or dant had jury. may it have confused is because the crimes with which he to commit words, you must charged here. In other was asserts that the exhibit The state just because defen- not conclude evi- “probative because was introduced to, testified engaged the conduct dant of the guilt consciousness of dence of the crimes for must have committed he charged.” The does crimes defendant he is here on trial.” which admissibility letter for contest rather, purpose; argues, this he An intimidate or dis attempt charge child should degree “2nd abuse” testifying directly suade a witness from have been redacted. to show conscious admissible relevant instance, prejudice no this there was State v. part. guilt ness of defendant’s from the introduction of the letter shown Burke, (citing A.2d charges We referring to of abuse. (R.I.1987)). Payano, A.2d 721 of jury acquitted note that the defendant could that this letter rea are satisfied We and sim second-degree sexual assault attempt sonably interpreted by as an ple charges youngest his involving assault persuade youngest daugh his the father Moreover, daughter. we conclude that him. drop charges against We ter char prove note not introduced to bad was of conclude that admission this therefore act, of prior acter or as evidence a bad but of was within the discretion prove rather to defendant’s consciousness justice. See, of guilt charged. of the crimes (R.I. e.g., Ricci VIII 1994). probative The value of the state Testimony Doctor McCue’s any undue outweighed danger ment prejudice defendant. next asserts that defendant Dr. hearsay testimony Bridget additionally jus- We note that the trial McCue, ob-gyn physician resident tice of a gave option defense counsel the Hospital, improper Infants Women & instruction; re- cautionary defense counsel Court under ly Superior admitted The court instructed fused it. nonetheless 803(4) purposes Rule as at the end of the case: diagnosis or treatment. medical trial, you heard “In the course day same September en- testimony that the here On defendant psy- first to the school spoke is not the gaged some conduct which & now Dr. McCue of Women Infants charges chologist, he is basis for for which First, Mary. thorough examined testimony Hospital on trial. That was offered taken, patient per you showing history purpose for a limited what tran- procedure, to document preparation hospital motive or intent or some visit, and then hospital acci- before spired or absence of mistake or knowledge *19 Mary com- of exam was conducted. physical in connection with the conduct dent “pain Dr. of down there” contends to McCue plained which the State the defendant bottom,” referring to her in her “pain him. charges against is for the the basis trial, vaginal/rectal positing area. At the state the standard “[I]n as * ** admissibility asked Dr. of such statements Mary McCue whether “indi- determining merely the test is not happened to her what cate[d] acts or not part whether the statements are which that pain?” her caused her Defense Rather, history. of a case ‘admission or objected counsel to the admission of rejection hinge will on whether what has Mary’s hearsay declaration to Dr. McCue. patient been related mil assist or The state then conducted in limine voir helpful diagnosis in the or treatment McCue, dire of Dr. in which defense coun- Contreras, his ailments.’ v. testimony sel asserted that Dr. McCue’s of [523,] 534-35, [612,] R.I. A.2d statement to her should not [(R.I.1969)]. If such statements narrate exception be admitted unless “there’s an diagno- details not either connected with purposes as medical she was treat- [if] treatment, they sis or will be inadmissi- ing purposes.” her for medical The trial they ble unless fall within another hear- justice concluded that Dr. McCue’s subse- say exception. Id. quent Mary treatment with antibiotics as to causation en- prophylaxis against sexually transmit- “When statements fault, unlikely fixing ted foundation to ter the realm of it is disease was sufficient present hearsay patient physician allow Dr. McCue to testi- or the consid- mony diagnosis er them or treat- Mary’s description of what caused related 803(4) States, ment. pain, under the Rule medical Sullivan United exception. (D.C.App.1979). 159 n. 11 the circumstances where fault is an is- trial, At Dr. McCue read to the sue, do not hold statements of causation history Mary from the had taken from she reliability the same of truthfulness and exam, including perti- at the time of the (Emphasis are add- properly excluded.” part: nent ed.) Saturday, put penis “On he his in the “investigating The defendant asserts that front and Monday, put the back. he sexually the transmission of a transmitted penis in the front and the back. He designed assign disease is fault and is hurt put way me because he it all the purposes not for the of treatment.” in.” We first reiterate our standard of review additionally explained Doctor McCue admissibility discussed above that the of a history, point Mary at this the oral statement under diagnosis medical could happened not find words for what hearsay exception is within the sound dis- next, Dr. opined but McCue cretion of and shall describing “ejaculation.” clearly overturned unless erroneous.
The defendant that Dr. also note the similarities in circum- asserts McCue’s We testimony “merely assigned by explic- surrounding fault stances the statements action, itly describing a sexual and had made to Dr. McCue and those she made nothing psychologist. psy- to do with her antibiotic treatment the school As with the chologist, Mary Dr. sexually transmitted diseases.” de- did not seek out purposes diagno- for the precedent fendant asserts of this McCue medical Rather, testi- sis or treatment. she was precludes the admission of this accom- Pina, mony, panied by Molloy Det. Lori-Ann and cites to State (R.I.1983), provides per- Department which Warwick Police to Women & Hospital express for the part: purpose Infants tinent *20 IX examination. Doctor McCue a forensic perform that she was asked to testified Evidence Custodial Chain (examination) assault, kit that she rape or physical physi- as a exam after described that argues next The defendant cal assault. cer justice improperly admitted the trial showing a without physical tain is, however, a vast difference be-
There custody, and thus the chain of continuous psy- a conversation with a school tween permitting erred in Jenni Superior Court physical in school office and a chologist Finch, from the a forensic scientist fer by hospital. examination a doctor in a Health, testify Department of there,” in Mary’s complaints “pain down hair performed pubic tests that she situation, “strong latter do evince a presence of semen. samples revealed that provides motivation to be truthful” 803(4). underpinning the rational of Rule that on A of the record indicates review Mary had There also was evidence samples speculum September complaint police made a similar to the rectal Mary’s vaginal taken from were taken to the hos- detective before she was part “rape-kit” of the examination areas as pital. McCue, samples by Dr. administered recently Clearly, the fact that pubic hairs were taken from multiple and anal times vaginal both sex by Nurse Laura body clothing and her in pertinent diagnosis of the cause Molloy Detective testified Tetrault.7 in pain pelvic of her area. On direct the hair Nurse Tetrault take she observed examination, testify not Dr. McCue did Mary’s pubic re- samples from and swab Mary had identity person about the of the for- samples and that those were gion, with, recently only sex to the fact that she of Health. Department warded had sexual intercourse.6 It is similar to a Forensic Scientist Jen- Rhode Island State situation in which a victim of a car accident Finch that she received the nifer testified by physician: is treated the fact that collection kit from sexual assault evidence injuries were suffered in a car accident is Hospital. Infants Mr. Menard of Women & pertinent diagnostic purposes, when trial, objected to the results At defendant “non-diagnostic” other as the facts such samples on these performed of the tests description color of the car or a a lack of foundation and insuffi- based on hand, may driver not be. the case at judge over- custody. chain of cient justice was reasonable for the trial to con- saying: objections, ruled to the doctor clude would he con- person is on the who “the burden potential cause of her about the source break that there’s been some tends aided Dr. pain, and that the statement the time a custody from the chain Moreover, Dr. diagnosis. McCue gets time it is collected until the sample did, fact, Mary by pre- McCue treat And, I’m in this case analyzed. satisfied thus conclude scribing antibiotics. We founded.” are not well grounds did not abuse reversible charges now hearsay testi- The defendant by admitting this discretion 804(3). insufficiency alleged error based on mony under Rule Nurse Tetrault identify state offered call defendant as 7. The 6. Doctor McCue did it as unnec- testify, refused pressed but the perpetrator until on cross-exami- essary. attorney. nation defendant's *21 1044 Manocchio, A custody
the chain of
Nurse Tet-
ation.”
review of State v.
between
931,
(R.I.1985),
934-35
Department
precedent
rault
of 496 A.2d
and the Rhode Island
defendant,
cited
reveals that this Court
Health.
only
ability
established
that the
to cross-
again
We
reiterate that “the
accuracy
examine a witness about the
admission of evidence rests in the sound
memory
impor
his or her
was of crucial
justice
discretion
and will
any
not provide
guidance
tance.
It did
showing
be disturbed absent a
of an abuse
jury instructions. See State v. Ma
Hazard,
of that
A.2d at
discretion.”
785
(R.I.1987) (On
nocchio,
872,
A.2d
874
523
252).
(quoting Graff,
1120
748 A.2d at
It is
remand,
importance
the Court reaffirmed
“showing
well established that the
of con
ability
to cross-examine a witness about
custody
only
chain
tinuous
is relevant
accuracy
memory).
of his or her
evidence,
weight
not to its ad
It
is
well established
Cohen,
151,
missibility.”
538 A.2d
justice
a
charge given by trial
need
“[t]he
(R.I.1988).
evidence,
physical
154
To admit
”
only ‘adequately cover
the law.’ State
[]
party
only
a
must show
the reasonable
(R.I.2002)
Hazard,
797 A.2d
probability
tampered
that no one has
with
Krushnowski,
(quoting State v.
773 A.2d
A.2d
Reyes,
exhibit. See State v.
(R.I.2001)
curiam)).
(per
‘“On
(R.I.1996)
curiam)
(per
(citing
review,
the instruc
[this Court] examinefs]
(R.I.
Bracero,
State v.
434 A.2d
entirety
tions in their
to ascertain the
1981)); Cohen,
instruction
Pacheco,
justice properly did not instruct also contends The defendant gratification element of sexual by the state did not presented The defen- first-degree sexual assault. second- every of the first-or prove element argues dant that the instruction was said a rea- beyond counts degree sexual assault brevity “in of the context such and outside doubt, constitutional violating the sonable degree of his instructions as to first sexual Winship, in In re requirements set forth The assault that was ineffectual.” de- be vacated and remanded and thus should trial complains fendant further Winship, In In re 397 U.S. for new trial. anything about explained “never 1068, the United States 90 S.Ct. jury or what he gratification sexual to the Due Process held that the Supreme Court by ‘proffer a certain intent in the meant Amendment of the Fourteenth Clause ” mind of the defendant.’ denies the United States Constitution accused of deprive power state trial instructed: every ele- liberty proves unless the state you regard “I tell that with to the might the crime necessary to constitute ment charge three counts that sexual as- first doubt. charged beyond reasonable degree, first each case sault defen which element It is unclear proved has you must find State therefore, assertion, to in this the fel- dant refers beyond a reasonable doubt that gener challenge it as a intercourse, interpret sexual we latio or the whether for his first- the evidence anal, sufficiency al purpose assault second-degree sexual degree and gratification or sexual arousal or sexual challenge to the suffi words, necessary “[A] convictions. In other it is assault. framed properly ciency of the evidence in the mind of proffer a certain intent justice’s trial challenge to the to in terms of a explained that the defendant as I’ve judg- motions for added.) denial of the defendant’s you.” (Emphasis curiam) (cit- trial.” A.2d acquittal (per ment of and new State v. (R.I.1993) (cit Mercado, Salvatore, ing 635 A.2d 763 A.2d Collazo, 1011- ing (R.I.2001)). (R.I.1982)). Because defendant did of the evi- independent After an review acquittal a judgment
move for on the case, justice weighed dence in this charges, aforementioned this Court must credibility and other witnesses restrict its review to the motion for new and determined that his material evidence Portes, trial. See State juror verdict as a was the same as *23 (R.I.2004). case, by jury. In this the
reached
the
a
Mary
central
issue was whether
was
XII
judge
The trial
consid-
credible witness.
Trial
Motion for New
acknowledged
ered
inconsistencies and
the
of
impairment
that
suffered from an
Lastly, defendant asserts that the
cognitive
her
intellectual abilities and
justice
by deny
trial
his discretion
abused
trial,
a new
in
court
ing defendant’s motion for
and communicative limitations. The
light
credible,
of
substantial inconsistencies
accepted Mary’s testimony as
testimony.
in her
saying
part:
in
credibility
where
of
“This is a case
the
a motion for a
ruling on
witness,
trial,
complaining
the
the
justice
principal
“the
acts
thir
new
trial
as a
juror
witness,
remotely as-
independent
teenth
and exercises
cannot even be
credibility
of
judgment
transcript
witnesses
of the
from the bare
sessed
weight
and on
of the evidence.” State
she uttered. One had
intelligible words
(R.I.2001)
Rieger,
A.2d
1001-02
watching
listening
here
and
Banach,
(quoting State v.
[Mary]
telling
that
realize
(R.I.1994)).
justice
The trial
must
truth.”
light
of
charge
consider
justice
added:
trial
jury,
his or
determining
her own
evidence, weighing
of the
opinion
story
credibili
a
horror
“[Mary] described
choosing
conflicting
ty
among
and
testimo
of
up years
of
at the hands
growing
her
must
she
ny, and
determine whether he or
accepts
father. Since
would have reached a different result than
and can
everything she did
truthful
Id.
jury.
that reached
“Provided
find
she said
readily further
that what
trial
an
justice
has ‘articulated
each
proves
guilt
defendant
motion,’
adequate
denying
for
rationale
found
five counts on which he was
justice’s ruling
trial
on a new trial motion
doubt, there
guilty beyond a reasonable
great weight.”
Id. at 1002
is entitled
absolutely
retry
no
reason
Bleau,
A.2d
(quoting State v.
case.”
Dame,
citing
justice
that the trial
did
We conclude
(R.I.1989)).
justice’s
“A trial
evi-
any
misconceive
material
overlook or
ruling on a
motion will not be
new-trial
wrong
clearly
dence and was not otherwise
overturned unless the
in his
We
assessment
the evidence.
or
clearly wrong
unless he
she over
judgment
affirm the
therefore
material
rele
looked or misconceived
motion
denying
defendant’s
to a critical
vant evidence that related
Bolduc,
a new trial.
issue
the case.” State
in the event
interest
pecuniary
[John’s]
Conclusion
as a result of
pregnant
became
herein,
affirm
stated
we
For the reasons
encounter.”
their sexual
Superior
of conviction of the
judgment
Court,
majority
papers
company
return the
I
part
to which we
Where
“it is not clear
this case.
is when
indicates
four-
that a reasonable
from the record
Justice,
FLANDERS,
concurring.
an
investigation for
teen-year-old, under
assault,
mindful
would be
alleged sexual
majori-
disagree with the
respectfully
I
have had a
Mary might
possibility
ty’s analysis of whether John’s
to transform
disability sufficient
mental
sexual con-
about his consensual
into a sexual as-
act of consensual sex
witness,
Mary,
complaining
tact with
I do not believe
Respectfully,
sault.”
a statement
was inadmissible as
part is
knowledge on the declarant’s
such
meaning of Rule
John’s interest within the
admitting the statement
prerequisite to
804(b)(3)
of the Rhode Island Rules
804(b)(3).
question under Rule
*24
alleged
my opinion,
In
John’s
Evidence.
Sergeant
oral admission to
Kerri Holsten
a
was
assessing
In
whether
statement
a men-
having
of
had consensual sex with
interest,
truly against
the declarant’s
sixteen-year old
tally incapacitated
objective
an
test to
employed
courts have
such
definitely against his interest because
804(b)(3)
text of Rule
the
determine —as
subject
a
“so far tended to
the
statement
in
person
“a reasonable
requires —whether
liability,
to
or criminal
declarant
civil
would not have
position
the declarant’s
* * *
person
that a
in the de-
reasonable
unless the declarant
made the statement
the
position
clarant’s
would not have made
added.)
(Emphasis
it to
true.”
believed
be
statement unless the declarant believed
Commonwealth,
v.
821 S.W.2d
Taylor
See
804(b)(3).
to
true.” R.I. R. Evid.
Kiewert,
72,
(Ky.1990);
v.
1031,
(1992);
338,
City
N.H.
advisory
As the
committee’s note to
Combs,
804(b)(3) indicates,
App.3d
94 Ohio
Dayton v.
“[t]o
Rule
be admissi- of
(1993).
“usual
ble,
The
actually
must
have a
640 N.E.2d
statement
determining
wheth-
pe-
employed
for
declarant’s
standard”
potential
damaging the
against the declar-
legal
or
er the statement was
cuniary, proprietary, penal,
inter-
added.)
objective
on an
“rea-
majority
ant’s interest focuses
(Emphasis
ests.”
standard,
than a
rather
sonable-person”
to
acknowledges that “the sexual activities
the actual state of mind
subjective
focus on
admitted
[John]
which
or she made the
statements,
consensual,
ar-
when he
even if
would
of
declarant
2 McCormick on Evidence
subject
liability
for
statement.
guably
him
sexual
319(e)
(John
Strong, 5th
§
at 329
W.
mentally
a
disabled indi-
penetration with
ed.1999)
11-37-2,
logic, at-
(although
§
strictest
“[i]n
as well
vidual under [G.L.1956]
* * *
actual
focus on the
tention
should
sodomy,
then-existing
under the
ver-
as for
in the declarant”
major-
produced
of mind
§ 11-10-1.” The
state
sion of [G.L.1956]
objective
that,
standard is an
prevailing
trial
ity
concedes
“as the
also
test).8
Kiewert,
In
noted,
contrary
“reasonable-person”
were
the statements
against
("Hearsay
declaration
inter-
employed
under the
Although
a sub-
8.
some courts have
declar-
exception
unless the
determining
against-
is unreliable
jective analysis
est
for
making the state-
aware at the time of
out-of-court
ant is
nature of a declarant’s
interest
interest.”); People
interest,
against
City
his
ment that it is
see Roberts
Cir.1985)
(6th
561 N.Y.S.2d
Morgan, 76 N.Y.2d
Troy, 773 F.2d
trial
Hampshire Supreme
gave
New
Court ex-
John
his statement
a
police
police
connection with
employing
objec-
plained
reason for
an
investigation
allegations
into
tive standard:
incapacitated
mentally
and therefore
804(b)(3) clearly
“Rule
sets forth
unable to consent
sexual intercourse.
objective
determining
for
standard
Sergeant
Holsten
Police
Warwick
nature of the
against-interest
statement.
Department
* * *
testified at
that after ini-
adopted
This standard was
for
tially
that he
denying
Mary,
even knew
reasons;
practical
because the initial
eventually
having
John
admitted
sexual
requirement
applica
threshold
for the
with her.
admission
intercourse
This
oc-
tion of the rule
that the declarant be
Sgt.
questioning
curred while
Holsten was
unavailable,
rarely
there will
be evidence
John,
station,
presence
police
at the
thought.”
of what
the declarant
Kie
Sergeant
his
father.
Holsten testified
wert,
(Emphasis
somehow any In under our familiar raise- believed such a was true. To rule, argu- he statement the the or-waive defense waived § 11- constitute crime under G.L.1956 was ment that John’s statement 37-2(1), engaged the accused must have against interest the his because penetration person with another allegedly failed to that a reasonable show and he or she must or fourteen-year position “know[] ha[ve] old John’s would mentally know victim is reason to not have known or have reason know disabled, disabled, mentally §as mentally physi- or 11- incapacitated, 37-2(1) object- argued requires. Defense counsel cally helpless.” The state to the (1990) (declarant person” language of Rule 562 487 must "reasonable N.E.2d 804(b)(3) been he or she the have aware when made Rules of of the Rhode Island Evi- contrary that it dence, statement his or her reasoned decisions are those the better Commonwealth, interest); Lilly penal 255 objective that use the test. (1998) ("the 533 Va. S.E.2d admissibility upon statement’s is based applied Rhode 9. This Court has Island subjective belief declarant of the that he hearsay governing excep Rules of Evidence making against penal his admissions inter- juvenile delinquency proceedings. tions to est”) Lilly Virginia, grounds, on rev’d other G., (R.I. Andrey See In re 116, 140, U.S. 119 S.Ct. 2002) curiam). (per that, (1999), given I conclude L.Ed.2d interest. penal or financial the declarant’s to the admission of John’s oral state- ed broader, embracing Rather, also the rule is only that John asserted ment on basis subject the declar- merely consensual, statements the sexual intercourse was delinquency liability, such as a ant to civil was not therefore his statement against are otherwise adjudication, or that coun- against penal his interest. Defense or proprietary, pecuniary, the declarant’s objected admissibility sel never Indeed, ex- interests. legal ground on the John’s oral statement the declar- ception for statements that John prosecutor failed to establish range a wide ant’s interest “reaches possibility was “mindful of the immediately directly and statements that disability had a mental suffi- might have pecuniary proprie- or qualify or impair cient to transform an act of consensual sex including speaker,” tary interest Consequently, into a sexual assault.” subject speak- that tend to statements preserve failed to this conten- defendant liability, employment, to loss of er to tort appeal at trial tion as basis reverse employment opportunities. or to loss of justice’s decision to admit Laird Kirk- Christopher B. Mueller & C. testimony into evidence. Evidence, § 497 at 824-25 patrick, Federal addition, advisory In committee’s (2d ed.1994). short, I believe 804(b)(3) (3): (“Exception note to Rule of the rule when it takes too-narrow a view Interest”) indicates, Against Statements fourteen-year old that a reasonable insists admissible, the statement must “[t]o that the state- have had to be aware would actually potential damaging have a subject pe- him to question ment in could penal, pecuniary, proprietary, declarant’s of financial liability nal or to some sort added.) legal (Emphasis interests.” narrowly responsibility. The rule is so Thus, necessary satisfy all that is errs, my opinion, and the Court drawn aspect of the rule is that the declarant’s effectively by interpre- redrafts it when potential damage have solely penal on the potential tation to focus interests, or her including declarant’s of the admis- consequences and financial *26 avoiding liability. in potential interest civil fourteen- on a reasonable sion and whether circumstances, I Under these would hold year have aware of such old would been fourteen-year that a ad- reasonable old’s consequences. in inter- engaged mission that he sexual event, that John’s any I would hold mentally a course with disabled classmate damaging to his potentially was statement certainly potential damaging for “the avoiding potential criminal and interests in pecuniary, proprietary, pe- the declarant’s mentally having sex with a liability civil interests,” nal, legal regardless or it lying and then about disabled classmate any knowledge whether the record reflects constitute a crime under police. to the To mental part on his about the classmate’s 11-37-2(1), § circumstances must be disability. in accused sexual engaged such that Also, I construes Rule believe the Court accuser and -with his or her penetration 804(b)(3) narrowly it insists that too when or has reason to know that he “knows fourteen-year incapacitated, old have men- mentally a reasonable would is the victim disabled, in physically helpless.” the statement or tally had to be aware subject person lacks the penal could him to liabili- This is because such question intercourse. Be- ability to consent to the ty responsibili- to some sort of financial 804(b)(3) found potentially be require cause John could ty. Rule does Mary had even if contrary guilty of this offense question in the statement 2001); Harding, inter- engage in sexual “consented” to curiam). Thus, in this course, engage (per that he did his admission po- not overturn such decision Mary described had should the sex acts justice’s in avoid- trial decision compromise appeal his interest unless the tential liability for was and criminal or exclude such evidence ing potential civil to admit Moreover, Verrecchia, regard- A.2d at clearly in acts. engaging such erroneous. say mental pressed I am hard less of John’s awareness 390. observed, of such evidence— disability, justice’s as the trial trial admission subject contrary pecuni- undeniably to John’s tended to statement was which Mary became a minimum— liability in the event that to civil ary interest declarant if, erroneous, ma of the sexual encoun- even as the pregnant clearly result concludes, no clear evi jority there was ter. per that a reasonable dence the record inter- Lastly, it was also John’s be aware that position would son John’s and civil avoiding potential criminal est mentally disabled. writ- contradictory oral and liability give what police to the ten statements justice prop- that the trial I also believe Mary. Martha Stewart happened with testimony of Holsten’s erly Sgt. admitted long in a list of defendants only the latest cu- pursuant to the oral statement John’s alone convict- accused—let who have been The cura- rative-admissibility doctrine. obstructing justice by lying ed—of doctrine, tive-admissibility under certain investigating their who were authorities circumstances, party that “if one provides reasons, I For these alleged misconduct. fact that is received an inadmissible offers * * * statement ad- hold that John’s oral would may offer afterwards opponent Mary— intercourse with mitting only claim to admission facts whose similar only previous that contradicted not one counter- negative, explain, or they is that knowing Mary, but verbal denial of even fact.” prior inadmissible balance (“we were also his later written § 15 at Evidence Henry Wigmore, John po- nothing happened”) kissing and 1983). (rev. Here, —was Tillers ed. Peter penal to his civil tentially damaging testi- counsel who first elicited was defense interests; fourteen-year that a reasonable Mary on his cross-examination mony from not have made position would old John’s allegations previ- concerning her of her true; and unless it was an admission such by John. What ous sexual abuse therefore, that, did not cross-examination, during not hear did ruled error when he commit reversible *27 orally to however, admitted John Sgt. to Holsten that John’s oral statement allega- Mary’s details of Sgt. Holstén the 804(b)(3). under Rule was admissible in fact had namely, that he had tions: her. Defense intercourse with Moreover, acknowledges, as the Court argument op- in his suggested, a hear counsel into evidence of such the admission to the state’s motion limine position to exception trial under an say at statement evi- offering from prevent the defense lay within the sound hearsay rule dence, directly on See, the evidence bore e.g., justice. of the trial discretion (R.I. introduction 377, credibility.10 The Verrecchia, 390 effectively complaining wit- challenge to against motion in arguing the state’s 10. In allegations credibility were limine, even if those ness’ believe "[W]e defense counsel noted: again, And proven withdrawn.” prior false or complaining witness' that evidence of statement, sum- closing defense counsel may in his be admitted allegations of sexual assault of the Indeed, permits rule use “the better suggested this evidence if admissibility even alle- of curative type principle the same of sexual-abuse made first her father made gations objection that she made an has been (John), person one other against at least instance.” Id. falsely. espe- and that she did so This curative-admissibility Thus, doctrine when, here, cially as was able true admitting ground for can be an alternate Mary’s difficulty relating the
to observe would be hearsay that otherwise evidence inci- sequence alleged timing and exception an under inadmissible by her father. dents abuse Armentrout, 8 v. hearsay rule. State Burke, 621, In v. 529 A.2d State banc). (Mo.1999) (en 99, In S.W.3d (R.I.1987), the doc recognized this Court Armentrout, defendant, who was Burke, admissibility. trine of curative a murder —the motive charged with elicited, on defense counsel cross-examina robbery hearsay testi- which was —elicited witness, a statement that a tion of a state’s during of a state’s mony cross-examination and threatened person approached third testified Id. The state’s witness witness. redirect, at the witness. Id. 630. On the deceased on cross-examination about prosecution questioned this witness voluntarily the defendant her gave victim contents of this conversation. Id. This employed court checkbook. Id. The principle of Court held that “[u]nder doctrine, allowing curative-admissibility * * * admissibility intro prior curative testimony of a dif- to admit the the state for a cer duction of inadmissible evidence that the de- who testified ferent witness permits tain of facts class she was afraid that ceased victim said answering in to allow the introduction of if did not kill her she defendant would pertaining admissible evidence same illegal drug purchases. continue to fund his at matter.” Id. 631. The Court went * * * held that 111. The court Id. note, party one seeks the “[w]hen injected an issue a defendant has “where admission of inadmissible evidence without case, allowed to may the state into the objection by opponent, the allowance of inadmissible evidence admit otherwise answering evidence is within the sound negative explain or counteract order justice.” also discretion of the Id. See issue defendant raised inference (R.I. Brash, v. State injects.” (quoting Id. at 1986) (defense objection did not waive (Mo.1995) (en Weaver, 912 S.W.2d hearsay simply because defense Martin, banc)). 241 Kan. also State See counsel elicited additional answers (1987) (admission 582-83 740 P.2d from same witnesses on cross-examinat po- out-of-court of declarant’s ion).11 may apply A court curative admis light “in of [de- admissible upheld lice as when, here, however, there sibility, even cross- issue on opening up the fendant] introduction objection to the initial examination”). § 15 at 731. Wigmore, of the evidence. questions the re- "open[] *28 the door” between John's the inconsistencies marized statement, serology statement blood John's oral test on crime-scene written sults of Mary's testimony about the Sgt. and only Holsten initially inquired defense counsel when incident, testimony [Mary's] observing "[h]er blood to the police officers sent the whether make sense ”[i]t reliable” and doesn’t is not however, held, testing. This FBI for happen.” didn’t because it allowing hear- justice’s error in that the trial Id. say evidence was harmless. 273, Mallett,
11. But see
(R.I.1991) holding
defendant did not
that
Johnson,
against
therefore her ac-
Kan.
905 tions
John —and
In State v.
(1995)
P.2d
99-100
the court held that
father —were untrue.
cusations
testimony
when defense counsel elicited
admission of John’s
Absent
curative
implied
from a
that the wit-
Holsten,
witness
the court
Sgt.
oral statement
ness,
defendant,
than the
was an
rather
admitted the cross-exami-
should
have
crime, the state was
accomplice to the
subject
on this
testimony
nation
otherwise
entitled to admit into evidence
and
misleading
incomplete
because of the
hearsay to rebut defense
inadmissible
in
impression it
have created
would
innuendo. On cross-examination
counsel’s
jurors
minds of the
about the nature
witness,
of a state’s
defense counsel asked
question.
incident in
of phone
whether
there were “records
analysis
I
also concur
Court’s
third,
calls”
the witness and a
between
right
his
the defendant waived
in
crime.
person implicated
unavailable
claim here be-
raise a Sixth Amendment
also asked
Id. at 99. Defense counsel
this issue at trial.
I
cause he did not raise
a note addressed to the
whether there was
that,
in
if the trial
erred
agree
even
person,
witness from the same third
warn-
I do not
admitting
testimony
ing
police.
not to talk to
Id.
John’s
the witness
—and
harm-
acknowledged that defense
an error was
The court
believe he did—-such
knew that the note and the tele-
counsel
all
the Court recites
less for
the reasons
implicate the
phone
Arsdall,
conversations did not
v. Van
opinion.
its
See Delaware
crimes,
sought
but
to use
witness
673, 684, 106 S.Ct.
475 U.S.
“change
the focus of the
their existence
(1986)
“the con-
(holding
L.Ed.2d
witness,
imply
and
evidence”
stitutionally improper denial of
defen-
defendant,
co-participant
a witness
opportunity
impeach
dant’s
Id. at 100. The Kansas
the crime.
bias,
like other Confrontation Clause
* * *
held that:
Supreme Court
errors,
subject to
harmless-error
the defendant addressed the tele-
“Once
analysis”).
that the evidence
Given
phone
and the note
this
conversation
was not
alleged
John’s
oral statement
cross-examination,
during
manner
event, the defendant
any
harmful to him in
[the
was entitled
rehabilitate
excep-
satisfy
aspect
this
does not
introducing details of the
by
witness]
rule.
tion to our raise-or-waive
The trial court
conversation and note.
Moreover, by bringing up
previous
in permitting [the witness]
was correct
on his cross-examina-
incident with John
testify
to the contents of the note
* *
introducing John’s
tion of
conversation
*.”
telephone
and his
on his cross-
written
Id.
Holsten, defendant
Sgt.
examination of
Johnson,
counsel
allowing
As in
defense
right to confront
waived his constitutional
only portion
here to admit into evidence
alleged oral admis-
John about the latter’s
Mary’s
information about
of the relevant
in consensual sex with
engaging
sion to
encounter with John would
previous sexual
his or her
Mary. A defendant can waive
right to a fair trial.”
“prejudice the State’s
including the
rights,
Sixth
constitutional
such, under the curative-
Id. at 99. As
right to confrontation. Unit-
Amendment
doctrine,
admissibility
I would hold
(7th
243 F.3d
Cooper,
ed States v.
allowing
not err in
did
Cir.2001);
State, 772 N.E.2d
Norton v.
testimony
Sgt. Holsten’s
present
state to
(defendant
(Ind.Ct.App.2002)
to rebut
oral admission
about John’s
and cross-
may
right
to confront
accusa-
waive
suggestion
defendant’s
*29
Johnson,
Kansas, in
voluntarily
preme Court of
both
examine witnesses
error)
cases).
100,
“[b]y opening
through
(collecting
See P.2d at
held
574,
hearsay,
Borges,
also
v.
to otherwise inadmissible
door
(R.I.1986) (an
her
accused can waive his or
Amendment
the Sixth
defendant waives
right
present
at his or
constitutional
right to confrontation.”
such an
is volun-
her trial when
absence
Johnson,
Here,
in
1258,
Feng, 421 A.2d
tary); State v.
Holsten’s testimo-
Sgt.
admitted
properly
(a
pleads
defendant who
n. 10
to rebut
oral statement
ny about John’s
a criminal
contendere to
guilty or nolo
by defendant’s counsel
suggestion
waives,
constitutional
charge
among other
allegedly false accusa-
Mary made other
rights,
right
Amendment
to con-
Sixth
kind of
of the same
against
tions
John
him).
against
front the witnesses
Courts
accused her father of
sexual acts that she
frequently held that a defendant
have
By questioning
committing.
rights
his or her constitutional
waived
incidents with
cross-examination about the
respect
prosecutor’s
to a
use of inadmissi-
John,
opened
counsel
the door
defense
it
prosecutor
ble evidence
used
when
oral state-
otherwise inadmissible
John’s
initial intro-
only to rebut
defendant’s
in
he admitted
Sgt.
ment to
Holsten which
similarly
duction of
evidence.
inadmissible
in
In
committing
question.
the sexual acts
Steele,
504, 504,
States v.
610 F.2d
United
addition,
counsel introduced into
defense
Cir.1979)
(8th
(any
error made in ad-
hearsay state-
written
evidence John’s
mitting
gave
statements defendant
without
having any
he denied
ment—one which
warnings
Miranda
is
reversible when
By
Mary.
cross-
sexual intercourse with
‘opened
“defendant
the door’ and ‘invited
examining Mary
allegations
about her
”);
People George,
error’
v.
49 Ill.2d
attacking
purpose
John —for the
(1971) (defendant
274 N.E.2d
cannot
credibility
by introducing John’s
—and
complain
prosecution’s
at
references
during the de-
written
property allegedly
pursuant
trial to
seized
Holsten,
Sgt.
fense’s cross-examination of
to an
invalid search warrant because
effectively
defendant
waived his Sixth
was defense counsel that first elicited tes
con-
right
Amendment
to confront John
timony
property during
about the
cross-
Sgt.
Holsten
cerning his oral admission
witnesses).
prosecution
examination of
engaging
this conduct.
States,
See also
v. United
347 U.S.
Walder
Moreover,
Supreme
the United States
(1954)
62, 64-65,
74 S.Ct.
A would allow defense this should not have admit- been selectively jury by counsel to mislead the However, I depart from the ted. where revealing only poten- those details that are in majority is its conclusion that the admis- concerning tially helpful to the defense testimony of harmless sion Tillotson’s was incidents, the previous leaving such while error. in evi- the dark about other material previously This Court has set forth the concerning really dence what happened. determining utilized in factors Thus, previous having chosen raise this whether error is harmless. Those factors of
incident in his cross-examination degree importance the of include “relative hearsay and to John’s introduce written testimony prosecu of the witness Sgt. of statement on his cross-examination case, Holsten, testimony was I waived tion’s ‘whether conclude defendant cumulative, right alleged John his or presence to confront absence of evi engaged Holsten Sgt. admission to that he corroborating contradicting dence in with consensual intercourse testimony of the witness on material Mary. of cross-examination oth points, extent * * * permitted, and the overall erwise Although did not base ” strength of case.’ State prosecution’s hearsay this oral on the the admission of (R.I. considerations, Bustamante, A.2d ap- on v. above-referenced 2000) Texter, peal, justice’s we can affirm the trial evi- (quoting State dentiary than the ruling grounds (R.I.1991)). other viewing After Tillot- actually upon ones relied to admit this of the testimony through prism son’s Froais, testimony. See factors, it is clear that Tillot- Bustamante cases). 735, 738 (collecting witness, in especially an important son was case, compe where the the context reasons, For I in the deci- these concur sub tency of the witness was complaining of the to affirm the defendant’s sion conviction, I although, respects, ject judicial do and where some determination so for reasons from those relied different com Mary, both sides conceded by majority. upon witness, developmentally dis plaining surprise pros It no abled. seems FLAHERTY, Justice, dissenting. ecution Tillotson as a witness offered holding I respectfully dissent from the testimony. advance of This alone First, grounds. this case on two testimony description undercuts her respect testimony Mary-Ellen to the as “cumulative.”12 Tillotson, majority- that agree I with the A fair in this case reading of the record regarding matters relat- testimony testimony con- also reveals that Tillotson’s by Mary ed to her evidence substantially strength to the tributed subject exception not set forth case. I cannot prosecution’s therefore 803(4) Rhode Rules of Rule Island tes- agree that the admission Tillotson’s Evidence, Pur- entitled “Statements for a rea- timony beyond was harmless error poses Diagnosis Medical or Treatment.” Gomes, doubt. subject sonable See As hearsay, evidence (R.I.2001). I majority Consequently, that A.2d exception, agree I with the existing (esp. that evidence 12. evidence is as: "Addi- lished Cumulative defined support).” does need the same as exist- which further tional evidence of character ed.1999). (7th Dictionary ing supports Law and that a fact estab- Black's *31 grounds.13 testimony jected on Amendment that admission of her Sixth believe the af- the statement trial court admitted The reversible error. trustworthy. Id. at 1358. finding it ter Similarly, allowing I also hold that would contended that its Crawford appeal, On oral Sergeant testify Holsten to about the him of his Sixth deprived admission concern gave that John to her statement to confront and cross- right Amendment contact with ing the nature of his sexual against him. the examine witnesses I agree error. with was reversible recollec majority Sgt. the Holsten’s conviction, the the United vacating In tion of oral statement was John’s Supreme Court noted States subject exception and not set forth require- met all of the wife’s statement 804(b)(3) in Rule of the Rhode Island in the rules reliability for set forth ments against Rules of Evidence as a statement However, the Court held evidence. However, interest. to then conclude rules there is a clash between those when testimony the officer’s was harmless flies to con- right and the Amendment Sixth holding of directly in the face of the recent frontation, safeguards the constitutional Supreme States United prevail. must — Washington, case of v. U.S. Crawford case, argument In instant —, 124 S.Ct. 158 L.Ed.2d far weak- of John’s statement is admission (2004). Crawford, er than Crawford. stabbing The case involved a Crawford concluded Supreme Court United States State, in Washington in which the defen require- met the that the wife’s statement given dant and his wife were Miranda Here, ments of the rules evidence. warnings questioned their in hand, majority specifically the other volvement, any, Crawford, if in the crime. challenged statement concludes — at —, at Dur U.S. S.Ct. 1357. 804(b)(3). under Rule pass does not muster ing interrogation, defendant’s wife Nevertheless, holds that the Court gave a impheating statement her husband. admitted. statement should be Thereafter, assault charged he was majority points out that: The trial, At attempted murder. the wife however, “John, at the time testify, was called to but she invoked her was neither nor at the testify. that he made the statements privilege marital and declined to defen- against time the trial a witness point, prosecution At that offered her an inci- His statements concerned into evidence as a statement dant. interest, totally allegations unrelated to the against penal pursuant dent 804(b)(3) never in- against defendant and were Washington Rule Rules of — to be used as evidence Crawford, Evidence. U.S. tended — - —, the accused herein.” at 1357-58. Crawford ob- S.Ct. harmless, it was suffi Although, by majority, defense error was more than
13.
as noted
ciently
and it was not
challenge
addressed in
record
counsel did not
the admission
it constituted "a novel rule
Sgt.
testimony
Amendment
raised because
Holsten’s
on Sixth
reasonably have
"post-oral
counsel could not
grounds
of his
law that
until the submission
requisite
The
argument
supplemental
at the time of trial.” Id.
citation to
authori-
known
ties[,]”
provided by
rights
law was
constitutional
novel rule of
I believe that this
Crawford
—
—,
Washington,
U.S.
124 S.Ct.
squarely
exception to the
issue falls
within the
(2004), a decision that was
analysis apply does not to Sixth Amend violations”). right-to-counsel-clause
ment questionable light Crawford, is analysis ap is
whether a harmless error Even if
propriate the first instance. this Court has determined
appropriate, analysis implicated only
that such an
