State v. Joseph V., 196 Conn.App. 712

Defendant (first cousin of victim) was tried and convicted of: sexual assault in the first degree (§ 53a-70(a)(2)), risk of injury to a child (§ 53-21(a)(2)), and conspiracy to commit risk of injury (§§ 53a-48(a), 53-21(a)(2)) for repeated sexual abuse of a child between ages ~7–10.
Victim and coconspirator T (also a first cousin) testified: multiple incidents of abuse occurred, including fellatio and anal intercourse; some incidents involved both men acting together.
State charged “on or about diverse dates” and alleged sexual intercourse (fellatio and anal intercourse) and alternative forms of contact—counts that aggregated multiple incidents.
Defendant moved for a bill of particulars and, alternatively, requested a specific unanimity instruction; trial court denied the bill and refused the specific unanimity charge but gave general unanimity instructions.
Defendant also moved to preclude testimony that he and T had an ongoing sexual relationship since childhood; trial court allowed limited testimony that they had an ongoing sexual relationship.
On appeal defendant argued (1) denial of bill of particulars and omission of a specific unanimity instruction permitted a nonunanimous verdict, and (2) admission of evidence about the sexual relationship was unduly prejudicial and irrelevant to conspiracy; the Appellate Court affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether denying bill of particulars and refusing a specific unanimity instruction allowed a nonunanimous verdict	Information legally sufficient; case turns on witness credibility so unanimity risk is unlikely	Information duplicitous (aggregated multiple incidents/acts), so jurors could convict based on different incidents; needed specific unanimity instruction	Sexual assault count: no error—§53a-70(a)(2) proscribes a single type of conduct (sexual intercourse) even if proven by different acts; no unanimity instruction required. Risk-of-injury and conspiracy counts: alternatives existed, but jury instructions did not sanction nonunanimity and specific instruction was not required.
Whether admitting limited testimony that defendant and T had a long-term sexual relationship was improper	Relationship is relevant circumstantial evidence of agreement/intent and relevant to T’s credibility; probative value > prejudicial effect	Relationship evidence was irrelevant to conspiracy, improperly showed propensity/character, and was unduly prejudicial (taboo, potential juror bias)	Admission was within the court’s discretion: evidence was probative of conspiracy and credibility, limited in scope, and not unduly prejudicial; no abuse of discretion shown.

State v. Saraceno, 15 Conn. App. 222 (Conn. App. 1988) (duplicitous charging concerns arise only where policy considerations implicated; credibility-driven cases often do not produce unanimity problems)
State v. Famiglietti, 219 Conn. 605 (Conn. 1991) (multipartite test for when a specific unanimity instruction is required)
State v. Benite, 6 Conn. App. 667 (Conn. App. 1986) (trial court must give specific unanimity instruction when alternative statutory subsections are conceptually distinct)
United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977) (federal unanimity rationale requiring jury to agree on factual basis of the offense)
State v. Marcelino S., 118 Conn. App. 589 (Conn. App. 2009) (applying Saraceno where credibility dominated and duplicity did not create unanimity risk)
State v. Michael D., 153 Conn. App. 296 (Conn. App. 2014) (duplicitous information may exist, but credibility-centric evidence can negate reasonable risk of nonunanimity)
State v. Mancinone, 15 Conn. App. 251 (Conn. App. 1988) (limits Benite to cases involving alternative statutory subsections or elements)
State v. Dyson, 238 Conn. 784 (Conn. 1996) (a trial court’s silence about unanimity is not equivalent to an instruction that sanctions a nonunanimous verdict)