924 N.W.2d 184
Wis.2019Background
- Joseph Reinwand was convicted of first-degree intentional homicide for killing Dale Meister in 2008 and sentenced to life without possibility of release to extended supervision.
- Prior to the murder, Meister told ~15 friends and family that Reinwand threatened to kill him and asked them to "look into" Reinwand if anything happened; one statement to Pastor Baur asked the pastor to tell police "to dig deeper" and named Reinwand.
- The State introduced those out-of-court statements over hearsay objections, invoking the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine to admit them despite Meister’s unavailability (he was the homicide victim).
- The State also admitted a 2012 letter in which Reinwand admitted a prior nonviolent burglary to rebut Reinwand’s claim at interview that he had memory problems (other-acts evidence).
- Trial evidence included physical links to a .22 pistol, a gun grip under Reinwand’s truck seat, a .22 bullet in Reinwand’s garage, a jailhouse confession, witnesses placing his truck near the trailer, and DNA testing (some based on 2008 methods that included Reinwand as a possible contributor; newer 2014 methods were inconclusive).
- Reinwand challenged (1) confrontation-clause implications of Meister’s statements and the applicability of forfeiture-by-wrongdoing, (2) admission of the burglary letter, and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel (trial: opening door to outdated DNA; sentencing: failing to request PSI and present mitigation).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Reinwand) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Meister's statements to friends/family were testimonial under the Sixth Amendment | Statements were testimonial or admissible under forfeiture-by-wrongdoing because Reinwand killed Meister to prevent future testimony | Statements were nontestimonial; if any testimonial, Confrontation Clause barred admission unless forfeiture applied | Court held the statements were nontestimonial under the Clark primary-purpose test; Confrontation Clause not implicated, so forfeiture issue not reached |
| Whether forfeiture-by-wrongdoing applies where defendant killed victim to prevent victim from testifying in a separate proceeding (certified question) | Forfeiture applies when defendant wrongfully procures witness unavailability to prevent testimony, even if the separate proceeding was not yet pending | Forfeiture should not apply if the killed declarant would not be a witness in a proceeding against the defendant | Not reached by majority (because statements were nontestimonial). Concurrence would have held forfeiture inapplicable where victim would not have testified against defendant in the separate proceeding |
| Admissibility of other-acts evidence (2012 burglary letter) | Admitted to rebut Reinwand's claimed memory loss (permissible impeachment of credibility) | Admission was improper propensity evidence and unfairly prejudicial | Court held admission was proper: offered for permissible purpose (credibility), relevant, and probative value not substantially outweighed prejudice |
| Ineffective assistance of counsel (trial and sentencing) | Counsel’s cross-examination opened door to outdated 2008 DNA results and counsel failed to pursue PSI/mitigation at sentencing | Errors prejudiced Reinwand; warrant new trial or resentencing | Court assumed, without deciding, some performance deficiencies but held Reinwand suffered no prejudice: DNA result would not have changed verdict given other strong evidence; sentencing would not have changed given facts and court’s stated views |
Key Cases Cited
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (Confrontation Clause excludes testimonial hearsay absent prior opportunity for cross-examination)
- Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (forfeiture-by-wrongdoing requires intent to prevent witness testimony)
- Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (primary-purpose test and historical background of Confrontation Clause)
- Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173 (statements are testimonial only if their primary purpose was to create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (two‑prong standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)