State v. Jordan, 151 Conn.App. 1

Defendant Victor L. Jordan, Sr. faced an aggravated sexual assault charge and underwent a long procedural history with numerous court appearances from 2010–2011.
Beginning with defense resistance to representation and repeated refusals to appear, the court ordered competency evaluations and later allowed pro se representation with standby counsel.
The court found him competent to stand trial after a 2010 competency hearing and he was eventually barred from pro se self-representation due to disruptive behavior during jury selection in 2011.
Jury selection occurred largely without the defendant; special counsel and trial judges managed disruptions and ultimately the defendant was tried in his absence for parts of the proceedings.
During trial, the defendant testified in his own defense, and on August 11, 2011 he was found guilty of aggravated sexual assault in the first degree; sentencing occurred in December 2011 with the defendant absent for portions.
On appeal, the defendant challenged the court’s denial of a second competency evaluation and argued the independent inquiry into his competency was inadequate under § 54-56d.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was the competency evaluation request properly denied?	Jordan did not raise substantial evidence of incompetence warranting a second evaluation.	The court failed to conduct an adequate independent inquiry and should have canvassed him personally.	No abuse; denial upheld; no substantial change in competency shown.
Did the court need to canvass the defendant personally for an adequate inquiry?	Court engaged in extensive colloquies with counsel, satisfying independent inquiry requirements.	Personal canvass was required following Dort; failing to canvass violated due process.	Personal canvass not required; court's record and colloquies satisfied independent inquiry.
Did the August 2010 competency evaluation render a second evaluation stale under Mordasky?	No strict stale-rule; inquiry should consider whether condition changed since prior finding.	Evaluation was stale and should have triggered a new competency examination.	No stale error; defendant failed to show material change in condition; second evaluation properly denied.
Was the court's determination that the disruptive behavior was intentional and not due to incompetence correct?	Orchestrated disruption to delay proceedings; not indicative of mental impairment.	Disruptive conduct could reflect cognitive or mental illness needing examination.	Disruptive behavior not evidence of incompetence; competency intact.

Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (U.S. 1960) (defining competency as ability to assist and understand proceedings)
State v. Paulino, 127 Conn. App. 51 (Conn. App. 2011) (contemporary standard for competency in Connecticut appellate review)
State v. Johnson, 253 Conn. 1 (Conn. 2000) (independent inquiry required when reasonable doubt exists)
State v. Dort, 138 Conn. App. 401 (Conn. App. 2012) (questions adequacy of independent competency inquiry; canvass issue on appeal)
State v. Mordasky, 84 Conn. App. 436 (Conn. App. 2004) (no bright-line stale rule; consider material change in condition)
State v. Murray, 28 Conn. App. 548 (Conn. App. 1993) (disruptive but not automatically indicative of lack of competence)
State v. Kendall, 123 Conn. App. 625 (Conn. App. 2010) (abuse of discretion standard for competency determinations)
State v. Ross, 269 Conn. 213 (Conn. 2004) (distinction between independent inquiry and independent psychiatric evaluation)