State v. Jones, 2011 SD 60

Jones was convicted of two counts of third-degree rape under SDCL 22-22-1(4) based on the victim's intoxication.
The defense requested a jury instruction requiring the State to prove that Jones knew the victim was intoxicated and incapable of consenting; the court denied and gave a different instruction focused on incapacity irrespective of knowledge.
The trial evidence showed the victim drank heavily and was allegedly unable to consent; the prosecution relied on expert testimony about intoxication to establish incapacity.
The circuit court instructed that consent is not a defense if the victim was incapable of giving consent due to intoxication, considering all circumstances and without a knowledge element.
Jones appealed, arguing the Legislature did not intend strict liability, and the court should have included a knowledge requirement; the State argued no such requirement existed.
The majority held that SDCL 22-22-1(4) must include knowledge that the victim’s intoxication rendered her unable to consent, reversing and remanding for a new trial with a knowledge-instruction; a dissent would affirm the conviction, arguing no knowledge element is required.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does SDCL 22-22-1(4) require knowledge that the victim was incapacitated?	Jones contends knowledge is required; without it, the statute is strict liability.	State argues no knowledge element is required; proof of incapacity due to intoxication suffices.	Majority: knowledge is required; remand for new trial with knowledge instruction.
Was the jury instruction error reversible despite the verdict?	Instruction misstates law by omitting knowledge requirement, prejudicing Jones.	Instruction properly conveyed that intoxication can render incapacity; knowledge is not required.	Reversed and remanded for new trial with proper knowledge instruction.
Should the statute be read consistent with legislative history or plain language?	Legislature intended knowledge to be an element due to punishment severity and history.	Statute's plain language governs; no knowledge element is present and cannot be read in by policy.	Statute read to include knowledge element; legislative history supports knowledge-inclusion.

Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (Supreme Court 1994) (strict liability requires congressional intent; silence not enough)
State v. Stone, 467 N.W.2d 905 (S.D. 1991) (knowledge not required for certain offenses; precedents guide interpretive approach)
State v. Barr, 237 N.W.2d 888 (S.D. 1976) (read knowledge into some statutes; context matters)
State v. Nagel, 279 N.W.2d 911 (S.D. 1979) (whether mens rea is essential depends on statute language and purpose)
State v. Fulks, 160 N.W.2d 418 (S.D. 1968) (statutory rape and knowledge concepts; statutory interpretation framework)
State v. Schuster, 502 N.W.2d 565 (S.D. 1993) (non-consent where incapacitated; knowledge not required in certain contexts)