352 P.3d 776
Wash.2015Background
- Leroy Jones was convicted of second-degree assault after a street fight; trial evidence conflicted over who was aggressor and when Jones had a knife.
- After the guilty verdict, trial counsel withdrew, admitting he had failed to interview eyewitnesses identified in police discovery (Lori Brown, Michael Hamilton, and later Sulva Ooveda).
- Replacement counsel located and interviewed Hamilton (and relied on Brown’s trial testimony and other discovery) and moved for a new trial on ineffective-assistance grounds; the trial court denied the motion.
- On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed; this court granted review and ordered a remand RAP 9.11 hearing to take evidence about counsel’s investigation.
- Remand hearing testimony established counsel made no informed decision to forgo interviewing or calling those witnesses; expert testimony found counsel’s performance deficient.
- The Supreme Court reversed Jones’s conviction for ineffective assistance (Strickland prejudice and performance satisfied) and held Jones’s Florida assault priors were comparable to Washington second-degree assault for POAA sentencing purposes (Sublett controls).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did trial counsel render ineffective assistance by failing to interview/call eyewitnesses identified in discovery? | Jones: counsel’s unexplained failure to interview/call Brown, Hamilton, Ooveda was deficient and prejudiced the defense (denied opportunity to develop victim theory and put neutral eyewitnesses before jury). | State: failure was not prejudicial because Brown testified at trial and Hamilton’s account would not have changed outcome or was inconsistent with other witnesses. | Held: counsel’s failures were deficient and prejudicial — reasonable probability of a different outcome; conviction reversed and remanded for new trial. |
| Are Jones’s prior Florida assault convictions "comparable" to Washington second-degree assault for persistent-offender sentencing despite Florida not recognizing diminished-capacity defense? | Jones: Florida’s rejection of diminished capacity makes the offenses non-comparable. | State: elements are essentially identical; difference in availability of diminished-capacity defense is irrelevant under state precedent. | Held: Availability of diminished-capacity defense in Washington but not Florida does not defeat comparability; priors counted (Sublett controlling). |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two-part ineffective-assistance standard: deficient performance and prejudice)
- State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61 (state-level framing of Strickland standard)
- State v. Ray, 116 Wn.2d 531 (failure to investigate/interview witnesses can constitute ineffective assistance)
- State v. Sublett, 176 Wn.2d 58 (difference in availability of diminished-capacity defense does not preclude comparability for POAA sentencing)
- State v. Ford, 137 Wn.2d 472 (comparability analysis for out-of-state convictions)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (limits on using underlying facts of prior convictions for sentencing enhancements)
- In re Pers. Restraint of Lavery, 154 Wn.2d 249 (discusses limits on examining underlying facts of foreign convictions)
- Howard v. Clark, 608 F.3d 563 (illustrative federal appellate authority on how additional eyewitness testimony can create reasonable doubt)
