State v. Jones, 2018 Ohio 306

Background

Antonio M. Jones was indicted for the 2013 shooting death of James Lane on counts including murder, felony murder, tampering with evidence, and having a weapon while under disability; jury convicted on murder, felony murder, tampering, and firearm specifications; trial court merged felony murder into murder and sentenced to an aggregate 33 years to life.
Jones’s direct appeal affirmed convictions (this court in Jones I).
Jones filed multiple post-conviction/challenge filings: a delayed-new-trial motion (denied and affirmed in Jones II), a petition under R.C. 2953.21 for ineffective assistance (denied and affirmed in Jones III), and the present pro se motion captioned as Civ.R. 60(B)(5) alleging fraud on the court and double jeopardy/R.C. 2941.25 violations.
Trial court treated the Civ.R. 60(B) filing as a petition for postconviction relief under R.C. 2953.21, denied it as barred by res judicata and by the statutory bar on successive postconviction petitions (R.C. 2953.23).
On appeal, this court affirmed, holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion: the filing was properly recast as postconviction relief, the claims were barred by res judicata, and the petition was a successive petition not falling within statutory exceptions.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Jones)	Held
Whether Civ.R. 60(B) could be used to collaterally attack a criminal conviction	Civ.R. 60(B) is not the proper procedural vehicle; criminal rules and R.C. 2953.21 govern collateral attacks	Jones argued Civ.R. 60(B)(5) alleging fraud on the court was a proper basis	Court recast the motion as a R.C. 2953.21 petition; Civ.R. 60(B) not controlling when Crim.R./postconviction statutes apply
Whether the petition was barred by res judicata	Claims that could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal are barred	Jones argued the jury improperly convicted him of both murder and felony murder and that double jeopardy/merger rights were violated	Petition barred by res judicata because Jones relied on record evidence/claims that could have been raised earlier
Whether the petition was a successive petition barred by R.C. 2953.23	The filing was a second petition for postconviction relief and did not meet statutory exceptions	Jones asserted reliance on trial counsel and lack of earlier awareness prevented earlier raising of the claims	Court held the petition was successive and neither statutory exception (unavoidable prevention/newly recognized retroactive right or DNA-based actual innocence) applied
Merits of double jeopardy / R.C. 2941.25 claim (if reached)	State contended merger occurs at sentencing and submission of allied-offense counts to the jury is permissible	Jones argued submission of both murder and felony murder to jury violated R.C. 2941.25 and double jeopardy	On the merits, precedent permits submission of allied-offense counts to the jury; merger occurs at sentencing, so the claim would fail

Key Cases Cited

State v. Osborne, 49 Ohio St.2d 135 (Ohio 1976) (statute prohibits conviction of both allied offenses, not submission of both to the jury)
State v. McGuire, 80 Ohio St.3d 390 (Ohio 1997) (allied offenses of similar import merge at sentencing; conviction consists of verdict plus sentence)
State v. Szefcyk, 77 Ohio St.3d 93 (Ohio 1996) (res judicata applies in postconviction proceedings)
State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279 (Ohio 1999) (standards for denying postconviction petitions without an evidentiary hearing)
Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217 (Ohio 1983) (abuse-of-discretion standard defined as unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable)
State v. Schlee, 117 Ohio St.3d 153 (Ohio 2008) (courts may recast civil motions in criminal cases when appropriate and rules of civil procedure may guide where criminal rules do not apply)
State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377 (Ohio 2006) (trial-court rulings on postconviction petitions are reviewed for abuse of discretion)