State v. Jones
2017 Ohio 1168
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Kyle L. Jones was tried by jury on six counts of rape (all alleged as forcible rape under R.C. 2907.02(A)(2)) and one count of kidnapping (R.C. 2905.01), arising from an incident on Sept. 1, 2014 involving victim B.D.
- B.D. testified she was taken to an apartment basement, was given drugs, knocked unconscious after being struck, found with clothes removed and bleeding, and later identified Jones; forensic testing found seminal fluid and a vaginal DNA profile consistent with Jones.
- The jury asked during deliberations whether a person can consent while under the influence; the court instructed on consent when substantially impaired but reiterated that the State still had to prove force or threat of force as charged.
- The jury convicted Jones of two counts of rape (vaginal and anal) and kidnapping; he was sentenced to a total of 14 years and classified a Tier III sex offender.
- Jones moved for a new trial claiming (1) the court’s supplemental instruction effectively allowed conviction on an unindicted statute (substantially impaired person), (2) counsel was ineffective for failing to secure witness Amanda Barber, and (3) kidnapping should have merged with rape for sentencing; the trial court denied the motion.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Jones's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court’s supplemental jury instruction on consent and intoxication improperly allowed conviction under an unindicted statute (substantially impaired person) | The instruction correctly stated the law on consent and intoxication and reminded the jury force/threat elements still had to be proven | The instruction blended R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(a) (substantially impaired) with the indicted forcible-rape statute, effectively amending the indictment | Court held the response was a correct statement of law and did not permit conviction on an uncharged theory; overruled error |
| Whether the instruction amounted to an unlawful amendment of the indictment | The instruction did not change the elements the jury had to find and thus did not amend the indictment | The court’s answer to juror question effectively charged an unindicted offense | Court held there was no amendment of the indictment; overruled error |
| Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to secure/subpoena Amanda Barber as a witness | Even if counsel erred, Barber’s proposed testimony would not likely change outcome given victim testimony, corroborating witness (Gwynn), and DNA evidence; Barber’s testimony may have been inadmissible without proper impeachment foundation | Counsel failed to adequately describe Barber’s expected testimony and failed to secure her attendance; this was deficient and prejudicial | Court assumed potential deficiency but found no prejudice as DNA and other evidence made a different verdict unlikely; overruled error |
| Whether kidnapping and rape convictions should merge under allied-offenses doctrine | Kidnapping involved separate restraint (blocking exit, prolonged confinement, and assault) and exposed victim to additional risk, so convictions need not merge | The restraint was incidental to the rape and not a separate animus, so kidnapping should merge with rape | Court held kidnapping did not merge with rape (separate animus and increased risk); overruled error |
Key Cases Cited
- Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217 (Ohio 1983) (abuse of discretion standard explained)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-part ineffective assistance of counsel test)
- Bradley, State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (Ohio 1989) (applying Strickland in Ohio)
- State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545 (Ohio 1995) (trial court discretion to supplement jury instructions)
- State v. Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d 126 (Ohio 1979) (when kidnapping and rape may be separately punished)
- State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114 (Ohio 2015) (allied-offenses test and questions to determine separate animus)