State v. Johnson, 450 P.3d 790

Deputies responded to two incidents at Vickie Walker’s home: property damage to a door and, the next day, Walker reported Johnson ripped a phone from the wall and threatened to burn her house and kill her.
Walker made contemporaneous statements to officers describing violent threats; the bodycam recording used to prepare a report was lost before trial.
At trial Walker and other family witnesses downplayed or could not recall the threats; defense argued threats were colloquial or misremembered (Walker was recently hospitalized and on morphine).
Johnson was charged with criminal damage and criminal threat (statute criminalizing either intentional threats or threats made in reckless disregard of causing fear).
The jury was instructed on both mental states (intentional or reckless), returned a single verdict form, acquitted on property damage, convicted on criminal threat, and Johnson was sentenced to 14 months plus postrelease supervision.
The Kansas Supreme Court held the evidence was sufficient as to both mental states but concluded the statute’s reckless-disregard alternative is unconstitutionally overbroad; because the jury could have relied on the unconstitutional alternative and the State failed to prove harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt, the conviction was reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence for criminal threat (intentional or reckless)	State: Evidence (Walker's statements to officers, circumstances, timing) supports conviction under either mental state.	Johnson: State must prove both alternative means; evidence (Walker's trial lack of recall and family colloquial threats) insufficient.	Court: Reviewing in State's favor, evidence supported both intentional and reckless alternatives; sufficiency requirement met.
Constitutionality of the statute’s reckless-disregard alternative and effect on verdict	State: Conviction should stand because evidence of intentional threat is strong; harmless-error analysis should favor affirmance.	Johnson: Reckless alternative is overbroad; because jury could have relied on unconstitutional provision, conviction must be reversed unless State proves constitutional harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt.	Court: Reckless-disregard provision is overbroad (per Boettger); because jury was instructed on both alternatives and verdict form was not specific, State failed to show the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt — conviction reversed and remanded.

Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (true-threat doctrine permits regulation of statements expressing intent to commit unlawful violence)
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (Due Process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute a crime)
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (constitutional harmless-error standard)
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalid statutes cannot constitutionally support conviction)
State v. Williams, 303 Kan. 750 (2016) (when jury instructed on alternative means, State must show sufficient evidence of each to ensure unanimity)
State v. Rosa, 304 Kan. 429 (2016) (standard of review for sufficiency of evidence)
State v. Dunn, 304 Kan. 773 (2016) (appellate courts do not reweigh evidence or assess credibility)
State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541 (2011) (distinguishing statutory and constitutional harmless-error standards)
State v. Brown, 295 Kan. 181 (2012) (discussion of alternative-means harmlessness analysis)
State v. Raskie, 293 Kan. 906 (2012) (jury’s role in weighing conflicting testimony and credibility)