State v. Johnson
2012 ME 39
| Me. | 2012Background
- Johnson was indicted for operating after habitual offender revocation (Class C) based on a 2007 OUI conviction used to upgrade a 2009 charge from Class D to Class C.
- Johnson moved to strike the 2007 conviction, contending the 2007 guilty plea was involuntary/unknowing due to lack of proper Rule 5 notice.
- The court found the 2007 arraignment complied with Rule 5 and the plea was constitutionally valid, then Johnson pled guilty to Class C in a conditional plea.
- Johnson did not seek direct appellate review or post-conviction relief for the 2007 conviction.
- The trial court sentenced Johnson to seven months and $1,000 fine; Johnson appealed challenging the strike ruling.
- The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed, holding Johnson may not collaterally attack the 2007 conviction in the current proceeding except on a Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel basis.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Can a defendant collaterally attack a prior uncounseled conviction in a later enhanced-charge proceeding? | Johnson’s 2007 plea was involuntary; uncounseled convictions may be attacked. | Custis limits collateral challenges to Sixth Amendment right to counsel. | No; only Sixth Amendment right to counsel grounds may be used. |
| Is Custis-based restriction applicable under Maine law to preclude non-counsel grounds for collateral attack? | Custis should extend to Maine as controlling federal precedent. | Custis limits attacks to right to counsel, not other defects. | Yes; non-counsel grounds are barred in this context. |
| Is post-conviction review the exclusive forum for challenges to prior convictions used for sentence enhancement? | Johnson could strike the prior conviction in current prosecution. | Post-conviction review is exclusive for such challenges. | Yes; the exclusive post-conviction route applies. |
| Did Johnson allege a Sixth Amendment violation to permit collateral attack? | Johnson did not raise Sixth Amendment issue. | Gideon-related right to counsel was not argued as basis for attack. | No; lack of an asserted Sixth Amendment claim bars relief. |
Key Cases Cited
- Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994) (collateral attack limited to denial of right to counsel for sentencing enhancements)
- Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel as fundamental defense applicable to state prosecutions)
- Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374 (2001) (extension of Custis to prevent collateral challenges to fully expired convictions in some contexts)
- Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994) (uncounseled misdemeanor convictions may be used to enhance punishment (subject to Custis framework))
- State v. Galarneau, 2011 ME 60 (2011) (upheld constitutionality of lawyer-for-the-day representation in similar OUI case; discussed Custis framework)
- State v. Ali, 2011 ME 122 (2011) (post-conviction review as exclusive forum for certain claims)
- State v. Vainio, 466 A.2d 471 (1983) (collateral challenge to prior conviction for firearm prosecution rejected)