State v. John J. Eddy, 68 A.3d 1089

John J. Eddy was indicted on five counts (three first-degree child-molestation sexual-assault counts and two first-degree sexual-assault counts) and repeatedly discharged court-appointed attorneys, electing to represent himself.
The Superior Court appointed standby counsel multiple times; Eddy repeatedly rejected and discharged counsel and insisted on proceeding pro se after extensive colloquies with the trial justice about risks.
On the morning jury selection began, Eddy asked for counsel; the trial justice denied appointment because Eddy had ample prior opportunities and the request came after the jury was sworn (jeopardy had attached).
Eddy then voluntarily asked to be absent from the remainder of the trial; the trial justice conducted a detailed colloquy, allowed him to leave, and instructed the jury not to infer guilt from his absence.
The trial proceeded in Eddy’s absence, the jury convicted him on all five counts, and he was sentenced to multiple life terms; Eddy appealed pro se.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Validity of waiver of counsel	State: waiver was voluntary based on record and repeated refusals of counsel	Eddy: his waiver was not voluntary	Waiver was voluntary under totality of circumstances; Eddy repeatedly rejected competent counsel
Revocation of waiver / appointment of counsel after waiver	State: trial justice has discretion to deny post-waiver requests, especially when dilatory and last-minute	Eddy: he revoked his waiver at trial and should have been appointed counsel	Trial justice acted within discretion to deny eleventh-hour request after jury empaneled; record shows dilatory motive
Requirement to appoint counsel when pro se defendant voluntarily absents himself	Eddy: absence without counsel violated Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments; counsel should be appointed (at least standby)	State: defendant voluntarily waived presence; no constitutional requirement to appoint counsel for voluntary absence	No constitutional requirement to appoint counsel when a pro se defendant voluntarily absents himself; distinction drawn between voluntary and involuntary removal
Rule 43 / defendant charged with crimes equivalent to capital offenses	Eddy: Rule 43 forbids trial in his absence for capital-equivalent charges	State: offenses were not punishable by death; Rule 43 inapplicable	Rule 43 applies only to death-penalty prosecutions; charges here were not death-penalty offenses, so continuing trial was proper

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (defendant has a constitutional right to represent himself)
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (right to be present may be lost by consent or misconduct)
State v. Thornton, 800 A.2d 1016 (R.I. 2002) (standby counsel and waiver-of-counsel principles in Rhode Island)
State v. Laurence, 848 A.2d 238 (R.I. 2004) (repeated rejection of appointed counsel can constitute voluntary waiver)
United States v. Leveto, 540 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2008) (post-waiver requests for counsel lie within trial court discretion; dilatory motive is relevant)
United States v. Mack, 362 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2004) (involuntary removal of pro se defendant may require appointment of counsel to fill representation gap)
Clark v. Perez, 510 F.3d 382 (2d Cir. 2007) (no constitutional violation where pro se defendant voluntarily absented herself and waived presence)
Thomas v. Carroll, 581 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2009) (discusses concerns about breakdown of adversarial process when pro se defendant absents himself; court’s remarks dicta on requiring counsel)