State v. Jerzy G.
162 A.3d 692
| Conn. | 2017Background
- Defendant Jerzy G., a Polish national who overstayed a B-2 visitor visa after six years in the U.S., was charged (2012) with sexual assault in the fourth degree and applied for accelerated rehabilitation (AR), which, if completed, would result in dismissal.
- The trial court granted AR for two years (April 2012–April 2014) with conditions; ICE discovered his overstayed visa and commenced removal proceedings; an immigration court ordered removal and DHS barred reentry for ten years; defendant was deported in August 2012.
- After deportation, probation advanced the AR termination hearing; the trial court found the defendant failed to complete AR, terminated his participation, ordered his rearrest, and set a $5,000 bond for release.
- The Appellate Court dismissed the defendant’s appeal as moot under State v. Aquino because the record showed deportation resulted from visa overstay independent of the AR termination, and the defendant offered no evidence that vacating the trial court’s orders would permit reentry or naturalization.
- This certified appeal addressed whether Aquino controlled and whether collateral-consequences doctrine preserved justiciability; the Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court, holding the appeal was not moot under the reasonable-possibility collateral-consequences standard.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether appeal is moot after defendant’s deportation | State: Aquino requires dismissal where deportation reason is independent of challenged decision; no practical relief possible | Jerzy G.: Record establishes deportation reason and there is reasonable possibility of prejudicial collateral consequences from AR termination (e.g., impeded reentry, arrest on return, bond/prison, reputational harm) | Court: Appeal not moot — Aquino, properly read, does not bar review when record shows deportation reason and there is a reasonable possibility of collateral consequences; remand to Appellate Court |
| Proper construction of State v. Aquino | State: Aquino stands for refusing review when deportation reason not shown to be caused by challenged conviction/decision | Defendant: Aquino should be read alongside McElveen collateral-consequences standard (reasonable possibility), not as imposing sole-cause rule | Court: Aquino is reconciled with McElveen; it requires record evidence of deportation basis but does not impose a sole-cause, insurmountable rule |
| Standard for collateral-consequences mootness inquiry | State: Appellate Court applied Aquino to demand proof that vacatur would permit reentry/naturalization | Defendant: McElveen’s “reasonable possibility” standard governs and suffices to preserve jurisdiction without proof of definitive ability to reenter | Court: Applies McElveen — defendant must show reasonable possibility of prejudicial collateral consequences; he met that standard here |
| Whether trial court’s orders afford practical relief if reversed | State: Reversal would not remove independent immigration bar (visa overstay) and thus offers no practical relief | Defendant: Vacatur could remove arrest warrant and bond exposure, improve discretionary reentry chances, and remove reputational stain | Court: Reversal could remove arrest/bond consequences and potentially affect discretionary reentry outcomes; practical relief possible, so review appropriate |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Aquino, 279 Conn. 293 (Conn. 2006) (deportee appeal dismissed as moot where record lacked evidence that challenged conviction was the sole basis for deportation)
- State v. McElveen, 261 Conn. 198 (Conn. 2002) (articulates collateral-consequences standard: litigant must show a reasonable possibility of prejudicial collateral consequences to avoid mootness)
- Housing Authority v. Lamothe, 225 Conn. 757 (Conn. 1993) (eviction judgment not moot because it could adversely affect future subsidized housing eligibility despite other adverse factors)
- Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1998) (federal mootness approach requiring actual injury; distinguished by Connecticut court in applying broader collateral-consequences standard)